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Abstract)
This%practice,based%thesis%aims%to%inform%new%kinds%of%creative%art%and%
design%practice%that%are%engaged%with%the%production%and%critique%of%new%
technological%artefacts%and%systems.%The%core%focus%of%this%research%is%the%
role%of%materiality%in%making,processes%as%part%of%an%ecology%of%
technological%experience,%in%other%words%an%‘experiential%ecology’.%%
%
Building%on%an%existing,%ontological%argument%that%meaning%is%an%a%priori%
property%of%being,%a%proposition%for%materiality’s%intrinsic%historicity%is%
developed.%It%is%argued%that%material%things%have%meaning,%anterior%to%
interpretation,%and%that%consequently%meaning%is%connected%to%objects’%
pasts.%It%is%then%described%how%a%principal%implication%of%this%understanding%
in%the%context%of%making%with%contemporary%technologies%is%the%adoption%
of%an%‘archaeological’%%approach%to%studying%and%producing%artefacts%which%
engages%with%such%pre,existing%meanings.%It%is%suggested%that%a%possible%
consequence%of%this%archaeological%engagement,%for%practitioners,%is%that%
they%view%their%making%activities%as%situated%within%ecologies%of%existing%
agencies%and%interactions%of%the%material%world%into%which%practice%
intervenes.%Building%on%Dewey’s%articulation%of%the%connection%of%aesthetics%
to%the%circumstances%of%art’s%production%aesthetic%experience%within%such%
ecologies%integrates%the%activity%of%making%to%the%material%histories%of%
artefacts.%
%
%To%inform%making,practices%thus%conceived,%a%%framework%of%five%separate%
facets%of%materiality%is%developed:%performative,%distributed,%spatio,
temporal,%fragile,%and%future,oriented.%This%framework%is%applied%through%a%
case%study%describing%the%making,process%of%a%new%artwork%entitled%
‘Neurotic%Armageddon%Indicator’.%The%results%of%%this%application%are%
examined%to%assess%their%contribution%to%the%earlier%introduced%experiential%
ecology.%
%
This%practice,based%research%makes%the%following%contributions:%(i)%a%
design%framework%that%defines%five%facets%of%materiality%and%suggested%
applications%and%benefits,%(ii)%a%series%of%experimental%artworks%that%
articulate%and%develop%that%framework%and%(iii)%an%articulation%of%
experiential%ecologies%that%offers%ways%for%designers%and%artists%to%
contextualise%their%production%as%part%of%a%vibrant%material%world.%
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Chapter 1. Introduction: Hello (Material) World 
 
“Everywhere we remain unfree and chained to technology, whether we 
passionately affirm or deny it. But we are delivered over to it in the worst possible 
way when we regard it as something neutral” (Heidegger, 1954) 
 
 
“I use technology in order to hate it more properly” (Paik, 2006) 
 
 
1.1 Background and Related Work 
This research is proposed at a time when the physical materiality of contemporary 
computing technologies is evident to researchers and publics alike. The 
popularisation of 3D printing, the ‘Internet of Things’1 and the ubiquitousness of 
computing devices all contribute to a growing popular vision of integrated physical 
and digital worlds. It is easy to forget that only a decade or two ago research 
describing the immateriality of digital content (Negroponte, 1996; Mitchell, 2000) 
seemed seminal to the point of ubiquitousness (Blanchette, 2011, pp. 1-8). The 
information stored in, and distributed by digital technologies, continues, though, to 
be seen as ‘immaterial’ and this view is as pernicious as it is pervasive 
(Kirschenbaum, 2008). It has been described how an understanding of digital as 
‘abstract zeroes and ones’ (i.e. as immaterial) is afforded only by an a-technical 
understanding of the nature of computing systems (Blanchette, 2011, p. 2) which 
artificially separates computer systems from the data which they store and 
                                            
1 “…the integration of several technologies and communications solutions. 
Identification and tracking technologies, wired and wireless sensor and actuator 
networks, enhanced communication protocols (shared with the Next Generation 
Internet), and distributed intelligence for smart objects” (Atzori, Iera, & Morabito, 
2010) 
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compute. Blanchette describes how this putative separation has permitted some 
researchers to make unfounded claims firstly about the nature of computer data 
(as lossless, free, infinitely fast), the design of systems (which should be primarily 
concerned with efficient abstraction), and the implications for culture (for instance 
as human memory achieves perfection by being augmented by infinite data 
storage) (2011, p. 4). 
 
A number of scholars, however, have contributed to a dissolution of the ‘myth’ of 
immateriality in the context of designing and critiquing technological artefacts and 
systems. Their work will be reviewed more thoroughly in Chapters Two and Three 
but to summarise. Some have approached the material history of technology 
through specific artefacts asking how they can be used to critique contemporary 
technologies through both theory and practice  (Ernst, 2003; Ernst, 2011; Flusser, 
1990; Huhtamo, 2004; Huhtamo & Parikka, 2011; Zielinski, 2006). Others have 
attempted to identify how material concerns can be integrated into a design 
process through an engagement with formal qualities of materials (such as texture, 
colour, or form) (Jung & Stolterman, 2011; Wiberg, 2013). Some have described 
how the history of craft practices might provide models for materially-engaged 
making (Jung & Stolterman, 2012; Robles & Wiberg, 2010; Zoran, 2013). 
 
Although the above research represents a number of significant critical advantages 
for thinking about the development of technologies and their implications in culture, 
efforts to apply materiality, as a concept, directly to design and the making-process 
remain in their infancy and suffer from a significant limitation. This limitation is that 
there is too explicit a focus on the formal qualities of materiality (Jung & 
Stolterman, 2012; Wiberg, 2013; Robles & Wiberg, 2010; Zoran, 2013) which is 
often discussed as a basis for ‘hermeneutic’2 (Jung & Stolterman, 2011, p. 402) 
approaches. Such approaches  “examine[…] how material artifacts are 
                                            
2 While Jung & Stolterman, 2011, p. 402 appear to employ the term “hermeneutic” 
to mean ‘interpretative’ a further criticism would reject this rather glib use of the 
term, pointing to the long and contested pedigree of this concept in philosophy. 
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experienced and implicated in personal and social life” (Jung & Stolterman, 2011, 
p. 402). Such research, while offering valuable pathways for designers to explore 
audience/user responses to artefacts, represents a reductive approach to the rich 
philosophical history of the concept of materiality. Crucially it negates agential and 
performative approaches (such as in Barad, 2003; Drucker, 2013) to materiality 
which emphasise the way that materials act in the world. The nature of that action, 
and in particular the blurring of a priori distinctions between physical causality and 
human intentionality has been theorised by a number of authors (Harman, 2010; 
Latour, 2005; Law, 1992). The attribution of agency to objects as well as a sense of 
separation of materiality from human interpretation has lead to some authors to 
distinguish conceptually between ‘objects’ and ‘things’3 (Brown, 2001; Heidegger, 
1971; Ingold, 2012). This distinction presents an opportunity to revisit making-
practices with material approaches that are not primarily focused on qualities and 
interpretation.  
 
In other research, some authors, artists and designers have explored how 
technological artefacts and systems may be thought of as part of an “ecology”, 
taken as the “…interrelationship of a system and its environment” (Oxford 
Dictionary of English, 2010). Some research sees ecologies in cognitive terms 
where artefacts support or structure human cognition, action or perception 
(Hutchins, 1995; Gaver, 1991), where others focus on the way they contribute to 
the social organisation of work, (Bentley, et al., 1992; Heath & Luff, 1991; Sharrock 
& Anderson, 1993). More recent offerings though broaden the scope of ecological 
approaches by grounding ecologies in either explicitly material terms (Bennet, 
2010; Ingold, 2012) or by describing them from an ontological standpoint Barad, 
2003. Contemporaneously, some authors emphasise the social and psychological 
implications of living with technology (Dourish & Bell, 2011; McCarthy & Wright, 
2004) focusing on how technological design shapes the environments where we 
                                            
3 Heidegger, does makes this distinction in a complex, partial and nuanced way 
which is discussed in more detail in Chapter 2. 
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live, work and play. Implicit in this latter point is the notion that we are ecologically 
involved with technology through such environments. Although ecologies have 
been related to materiality in a number of ways (Bennet, 2010; Ingold, 2012; 
Barad, 2003), what is so far absent, is a developed account of how theories of 
materially founded ecologies, can substantively inform processes of experimental 
design and making. 
1.2 Road Map and Contributions 
The overall contribution of this thesis is to inform making-practice engaged with 
development for and with computing technologies through a formulation and 
analysis of materiality, and though this to offer an alternative approach to theorizing 
our ecological relationship with them. The design and making-practice described is 
‘for’ and ‘with’ technologies in the sense that it uses contemporary technologies 
(with) and is intended to contribute in a critical and speculative sense (as in Gaver 
& Martin, 2000) to the development of future ones (for). This contribution will be 
achieved in the following way. 
 
First a variety of theoretical sources and practical art and research projects will be 
reviewed with a focus on how the concept of ‘materiality’ as been employed and 
with what effect. The goal is not to develop a definition of materiality but rather a 
series of features of interest, aspects which can be examined further through both 
practical and theoretical research. They are aspects of the concept which are 
potentially rich for making-practice and/or theoretically provocative. Subsequently, 
a number of sources which evoke the notion of an ‘ecology’ to discuss the way that 
we live with technology will be examined. From the synthesis and analysis of these 
sources and from the findings of an integrated, experimental art and design 
practice, a number of facets or categories of materiality will be defined and then 
applied in the following chapters. In Chapter Five, the facets of materiality are 
taken as a design framework and discussed through a case study of the integrated 
research and production process of an artwork. 
 
   5 
In the final chapter, materiality, as part of a making-process, will be discussed as 
part of an ecology. The implications of an ecological perspective for both makers 
and audiences/users will be examined.  
 
The three contributions of this thesis will now be summarised. 
 
The major contribution of this thesis is to offer a materially informed approach to 
making through a framework of five facets of materiality. These facets are arrived 
at by an interconnected practice and theory based research process. This 
framework offers novel insights to makers by offering methods of embodying 
research in the process of making itself, informed by material concerns. The core 
focus of this framework is to fundamentally reposition makers in their attitude 
towards technological materials while simultaneously suggesting practical 
opportunities for intervention. This approach is oriented to artefacts themselves 
and seeks to reconstruct or repurpose artefacts through tailored technological 
intervention. Such interventions incorporate techniques from hardware hacking, 
creative programming and DIY electronics. 
 
The second contribution of this thesis is to provide examples and analysis of this 
framework’s application. A process of making, practically and theoretically informed 
by the five facets identified is discussed at length. It is described, for instance, how 
Null by Morse literally re-programmes smartphones to embody and perform 
research into historical communication media, Neurotic Armageddon Indicator 
rebuilds the ‘Doomsday Clock’ to query theories of representation, and (Refractive 
Index (2012)) explores the relationship between screen content and physicality by 
applying fundamental concepts from computer programming to the context of 
‘screenology’ (as in Huhtamo, 2004).  
 
The final contribution is, in response to the lack of explicit application of material-
ecological theorisation to experimental making-processes, to develop, 
retrospectively to the practical research undertaken, an analysis of the three-way 
   6 
relationship between materiality, ecologies and making, and to suggest potential 
directions for future research. 
  
1.3 Motivation 
This research is presented to contribute to a community of designers and artists 
and particularly to inform their making-practices. However, to offer such a 
contribution is to make a value judgement about the nature of what actually 
constitutes a benefit to an individual artist/designer. “In design we can see the 
representation of arguments about how life ought to be lived” (Margolin, quoted in 
Agid, 2012, p. 28). In a field as variegated as art and design this may be 
considered to be contentious. Benefits to makers could be categorised in different 
ways: as practical or methodological, as personal or developmental, as offering 
insight to future research, as financial even. When a design framework is intended 
to inform practice, it reifies certain values which are, of course, partial. Gaver 
explains how design manifestos, “suggest certain approaches to design as both as 
desirable and productive of future practice” (Gaver, 2012, p. 938), but is at pains to 
describe how frameworks avoid such “normative” stances, (Gaver, 2012, p. 938). 
Normativity, however, is inescapably implicit in the view of a particular kind of 
future practice, i.e. that produced by an approach to design. Unless productivity of 
any kind whatsoever is the goal of a framework, a certain kind of product is 
implicitly valued and proposed as a new norm.  
 
In light of Gaver’s (2012) point above it is acknowledged, at this early stage that 
this thesis proposes a particular view of art and design practice whose theoretical 
motivations are implicit in the thesis as a whole but are clarified here. Approaches 
founded in materiality are posited as of benefit to those engaged in art and design 
practices with an emphasis on techne as a form of knowledge production4. That is 
                                            
4 The relationship between episteme (often translated as “knowledge”) and techne 
(often translated as “craft”) in ancient Greek philosophy is complex and interwoven 
(Parry, 2008). A full discussion of this is not within the scope of this thesis but 
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to say, practitioners whose work is engaged, with building, crafting, constructing, or 
sculpting conceived of as a contribution to knowledge irreducible to words. It will be 
explained later how particular kinds of views of the separation between knowledge 
and practice have become embedded in some forms of design practice as well as 
in some kinds of academic research (Ingold, 2013, pp. 1-2). The position adopted 
by this thesis is in opposition to this separation and it will find its use for those for 
whom this position has value. 
 
The basis of this thesis in, and usefulness to such practices provides a distinct 
alternative to some other attempts to provide theoretical direction for art practice, 
born partially as responses to the digital age, over the last decade. For example, 
Nicolas Bourriaud (2002) proposed a “relational aesthetics”, an approach to 
contemporary art production, curation and critique which emphasized art’s potential 
as a site for social exchange. The canonical example of such practice, cited 
extensively by Bourriaud, is the artist Rirkrit Tiravanija whose art events based on 
cooking and eating with audiences represent a continuation of 1960s Fluxus 
happenings (Bourriaud, 2002, p. 25). It is not the intention here to denigrate such 
art practices but to suggest that to take the view that “…artistic praxis appears 
these days to be a rich loam for social experiments…” (2002, p. 9) is to potentially 
see practice as a site on which to apply theories. This is essentially a ‘top down’ 
approach to artwork that implicitly sees objects as expressions or representations 
of ideas. Bourriaud’s (2002, p. 9) claim that we are living in the final stage of a 
Debordian ‘Society of the Spectacle’ (Debord, 1995 [1968]) misreads the 
significance of digital exchange, seeing it, again, as immaterial. Curators Beryl 
Graham and Sarah Cook have attempted to position media art in continuation with 
contemporary art, particularly of the kind espoused by Bourriaud. Their approach. 
 
                                                                                                                                     
suffice to say that both are conceived of as forms of “knowing in the widest sense” 
(Heidegger, 1954, p5) 
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“explores the characteristics distinctive to new media art, including its immateriality 
and its questioning of time and space, and relates them to such contemporary art 
forms as video art, conceptual art, socially engaged art, and performance art.” 
(Graham & Cook, 2010) 
 
Bourriaud, Graham and Cook’s research is intended principally for critics and 
curators (Bourriaud, 2002, p. 7; Graham & Cook, 2010, p. 1). As such it is perhaps 
unfair to criticize it for a lack of benefit for makers. But by emphasizing 
relationships to conceptual and contemporary art, and by omitting serious analysis 
of the process of art production in the former, and of technologies used to produce 
media art in the latter, the authors miss an opportunity to investigate the role of 
technology as part of practice. 
 
The contribution of this research is intended for an audience of artists and 
designers who wish to found and develop their practice as embodying research, as 
a way of contributing to the production of knowledge. The implications of this 
approach and its congruence with recent positions in design research will be 
discussed shortly. Before that though, I will briefly describe how my own attitude 
towards art and design practice as a knowledge making activity was developed 
through my exposure to other disciplines through collaboration and participation in 
a particular kind of research environment. This short section, though 
autobiographical, is included to underscore the relevance of an approach which 
integrates practice and theory, to creative practitioners by highlighting the 
transformational effect such ideas had on my own development as an artist and 
subsequently, designer.  
 
My undergraduate education as an artist comprised of studio practice with tutorials 
and occasional theoretical seminars and lectures as is typical in the UK. Although 
some effort was made by the faculty to integrate practice and theory, they 
remained formally separated in the both the study timetable and even the locations 
in which they took place (lecture theatres and seminar rooms on the one hand, 
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studio environments on the other). Further, and this experience may be particular 
to the institutions in which I was taught, I noticed that there was a division of labour 
between lecturers; broadly, the practicing artists taught studio, those with Phds 
taught theory. Exacerbating an already disjointed system was the problem that 
there appeared to be no coordinated approach to what kind of theory should and 
should not be taught. Lectures were given on an ad hoc and occasional basis 
reflecting the research interests of particular academics. The result was that my 
practice as an artist was mostly uninformed by theory until my application to be an 
Arts and Humanities Research Council (AHRC) funded, Master of Fine Art student, 
obliged me to reconceive of my practice as research. Around the same time I 
became involved with a new Masters of Research course in Digital Media in 2008. I 
‘sat in’ on classes and began to learn the basics of computer programming and 
electronics. It was through this environment that I became exposed to a real 
research environment for the first time. The lab in which this course was based had 
a wide variety of researchers across Interaction Design, Media Art, Machine 
Learning, and Human Computer Interaction. As the engagement with technology in 
my artwork grew, so did a desire to extend my practice into an engagement with 
others through collaboration. Through such collaboration, I became interested in 
the methodologies of collaborators with different backgrounds, particularly in their 
processes of ideation and prototyping. My art practice became more and more 
integrated with design and an engagement with developing with open source 
technologies caused me to see parallels in technological, conceptual and aesthetic 
development processes. For this reason, throughout this thesis, I avoid making 
strong distinctions between art and design. Although some current threads of 
experimental design practice, in particular Critical Design (Dunne & Raby, 2013), 
exhibit strong conceptual, aesthetic and formal similarities with my work, I do not 
explicitly position my work as Critical Design. In common with Bardzell & Bardzel 
(2013) I am troubled by the basis on which Dunne and Raby’s description of 
Critical Design explicitly rejects a description of their products as artworks. 
(Bardzell & Bardzel, 2013, p. 3299) rightly point out that Dunne and Raby’s claim 
that art is not part of the everyday is demonstrably not true. Bardzell and Bardzel 
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cite examples of “teenagers in high school bands and ballet classes, art house 
cinema, sacred art…” (2013, p. 3299) and I add that this is exactly the juncture at 
which the blurring of design, critical or otherwise, and art becomes interesting and 
provocative5. It is here, at the juncture of everyday life with technologies, art 
practice and design, that this practice-based research is positioned6.  
1.4 Methodology 
Although the road map described earlier indicates a strict formal research 
procedure, this thesis describes the production of a series of artworks whose 
stages of ideation, production, display, and iteration were anything but clearly 
delineated and whose relationship to its formalisation in writing is complex and not 
easily expressed. To describe the process and findings of this research as clearly 
as possible some production timelines have been simplified and their relationship 
to literary research separated into more or less clear themes or implications. In this 
sense the thesis owes much to the definition of an annotated portfolio (Bowers, 
2012)7. The discussion of temporality in the production of Null by Morse is one 
example of such a gathering of implications (see Chapter 4). The production 
process of this artwork was long, technically complicated, marred by imperfect 
knowledge of some electronics fundamentals, assisted by colleagues (as 
described), anecdotal, and driven by a personal interest in the electric telegraph. 
The intention is not to misrepresent the nature of my practical research which is 
inevitably and necessarily messy, opportunistic and occasional, and I have 
preserved the significance that particular practical and theoretical findings had for 
one another. Instead I have attempted to consolidate these findings in ways that 
will make the thesis’ contribution clearer and more useful to other practitioners. The 
                                            
5 Indeed this position is supported (art) historically, in particular by 1970s art 
practices such as happenings and the Fluxus movement which sought to “blur art 
and life” (Kaprow, 2003). 
6 A long term aspiration which is not addressed within the scope of this thesis, but 
which nonetheless motivates it, is to consider the implications of the processes and 
methods described here in the context of pedagogy for practitioners across the 
spectrum of art and design. 
7 This point is expanded later. 
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risk of this approach is of representing my research practice as one of a series of 
logical and inevitable conclusions as an abstract plan rather than a series of 
situated actions8 (Suchman, 2007) and it is this reading which I warn against here 
in the introduction. The framework which is later proposed is not to be taken as 
proscriptive, but rather, productive and as representing a support to a particular 
kind of practice, driven by particular values as described. Despite this lengthy 
series of acknowledgements and concessions, a number of clear research 
methods can be identified. 
1.4.1 Literature Review 
A careful study of relevant literature was undertaken and integrated with practice-
based research. Literature was reviewed firstly which had correspondence with on-
going projects. Work was then was taxonomised and clear aims for the review 
were developed as described in Chapters Two and Three. This provoked further 
reading. The literature review has been formally separated from discussion of the 
practice-based research undertaken for a number of reasons. First, there was a 
desire to investigate existing research on its own terms, reserving close 
comparison to the practice-based research undertaken for later integration with the 
discussion of that practice. There was also a recognition that while this thesis 
supports an understanding of artefacts articulating knowledge (as discussed in the 
following section), there are other modes of producing knowledge which have 
value in themselves and which may complement the former. A two-stage approach 
was consequently adopted where a relatively broad range of work is reviewed in 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, before a more comparative and processual discussion is 
offered through Chapter 4 and Chapter 5. 
1.4.2 Research Through Design 
This practice-based research is in many aspects consistent with a “research 
through design” (Frayling, 1993/4) approach and some key aspects of this 
methodology will now be briefly explored. 
 
                                            
8 Suchman’s work is discussed in more detail in Chapters 2 and 3 
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The development of this thesis has been a gradual one which occurred through the 
practical projects undertaken as well as being informed by findings from the 
literature review. This is stated to emphasize the fact that the practical research 
should in no way be taken as a kind of exemplum intended to illustrate particular 
theories but rather as a way of articulating and producing knowledge. Neither are 
findings post-rationalized by fitting post-hoc categories on to existing artworks, a 
practice which “[detaches an artwork] from the matrix of its production” (Carter, 
2004, p. xi) and reduces them to “mere illustrations” (Gaver, 2012, p. 944). Rather 
the contributions presented here have been a result of thinking though practice as 
described here by Ingold: “To practise this method is not to describe the world or 
represent it, but to open up our perception to what is going on there so that we, in 
turn, can respond to it” (Ingold, 2013, p. 7). These artworks “embody the myriad 
choices made by their designers with a definiteness and level of detail that would 
be difficult or impossible to attain in a written (or diagrammatic) account.” (Gaver, 
2012, p. 944) and as such should be considered an integral, indeed dominant, part 
of this research. Such an approach, as mentioned, suggests a close 
correspondence with a “research through design” (Frayling, 1993/4) approach: The 
relationship between concept and practice in this thesis is consistent with recent 
literature that discusses various possible relationships between theory and design, 
such as (Bowers, 2012; Gaver W. , 2012). Such approaches to design are focused 
on “exploring and speculating, particularising and diversifying, and […] 
manifest[ing] the results in the form of new, conceptually rich artefacts” (Gaver, 
2012, p. 937) [emphasis added]. The works of art and design in this thesis are 
discussed to explore their relationship with an emerging design framework. In this 
sense, earlier works particularly, could also be described as the subject of an 
‘annotated portfolio’ (Bowers, 2012; Gaver, 2012). An annotated portfolio is; 
 
“…a way of organising what can be learned from design in terms of annotations 
which formulate and highlight features of interest in a portfolio, while reciprocally 
gaining their sense and significance from their connection to the artefacts 
themselves.” (Bowers, 2012, p. 76) 
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There is, in summary, a mutually constitutive relationship between the theoretical 
argument and making-practices described here which is, I suggest, ‘written in’ to 
the artworks themselves. For example, it will be later described how an artwork, 
Mark Inscriber, does not simply ‘respond to’ or ‘represent’ material histories of 
counting but rather acts as part of that history. It contributes (in this case) to an 
ongoing research process into the materiality of counting practices. Research 
through art and design is research “where the thinking is, so to speak, embodied in 
the artefact” (Frayling, 1993/4, p. 5) [emphasis in original]. The written thesis which 
accompanies the documentation of practical work is proposed as a compliment to 
the knowledge embodied in the artefacts produced. It is intended to explore them 
at different stages of the process. It is recognized that this written thesis represents 
an opportunity to enhance the value to the academic community of the research 
undertaken by conforming to academic standards and that this is not to the 
detriment of the points made in the preceding paragraphs. 
1.4.3 Media Archaeology 
In later sections it will be described how a clear implication of early practice-based 
research undertaken suggested a strong practical and theoretical focus on the 
history of technological objects. Such an approach is consistent with a description 
of Media Archaeology which investigates, “alternate histories of suppressed, 
neglected, and forgotten media that do not point teleologically to the present 
media-cultural condition…” (Huhtamo & Parikka, 2011). A Media Archaeological 
approach acknowledges the embodiment of knowledge in the artefacts of the past 
and seeks to study it through analysis and also through practice. The 
methodological implications of Media Archaeology will be explored more fully in 
Chapter 2 but at this juncture the points to be emphasized most completely are the 
integration of technical, forensic9 (Kirschenbaum, 2008), investigation and cultural 
analysis. Media Archaeology, while not strictly a single method in itself represents 
                                            
9 Matthew Kirschenbaum’s notion of ‘forensic’ materiality is discussed in more 
detail in 2.1.4. 
   14 
an orientation towards a collection of particular methods of practice based research 
emphasizing hacking, retro-fitting and repurposing old technologies.  
1.4.4 Prototyping 
Prototypes are “a core means of exploring and expressing designs for interactive 
computer artifacts...” (Houde & Hill, 1997) and the works described in this thesis 
have all been developed through an iterative prototyping cycle. Given the 
predominant focus on the making-process throughout this thesis, and the 
emphasis given to experimentation and exploration of materials, as well as the 
previous reference to “research through design” (Frayling, 1993/4), it seems 
appropriate to view works produced as, to a significant degree, prototypical. Houde 
and Hill’s question, “what do prototypes prototype?” (1997) though, is predicated 
on a view of prototypes as part of an industrial development cycle whose eventual 
product will be an artefact for sale. Their approach is of most value once a fairly 
developed sense has been defined of what the object to be designed itself is. They 
propose a three-way axis for prototyping {see Figure 1} with “Role”, 
“Implementation” and “Look and Feel”, given as the dimensions. This model is 
referenced here by way of contrast to indicate that where a more conventional 
prototype is calibrated to ask questions about a design (perhaps of the kind 
suggested by this model), the prototyping process described in this thesis begins a 
stage earlier. In this thesis the “what” of “what do prototypes prototype?” (Houde & 
Hill, 1997) is the relationship between materiality and the making-process itself. In 
this sense it could be considered as a kind of ‘meta-prototyping’ a study of what 
material concerns actually underlie the prototyping sensibility. 
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Figure 1: A Model of What Prototypes Prototype, Houde & Hill, 1997 
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The specific kinds of design and making activities conducted will, of course, be 
described in detail throughout this thesis but, to prefigure this, these can be 
abstracted to the following. 
 
Computer programming has been a core activity throughout the research 
conducted. Projects described have been developed in C, C++, CSS, HTML, Java, 
JavaScript, PHP, and Python. Each project without exception has required new 
technical competencies and from a short, hobbyist background in the Java-based 
language Processing, a range of skills have been acquired. This point is made to 
emphasise that a dominant, daily practice of the experimental making-practice 
described in this thesis has been a struggle with a sharp learning curve with the 
technical demands of the projects described. Many long hours consulting forums, 
writing programmes in pseudo-code before re-iterating designs, asking advice from 
colleagues, and above all practicing and experimenting, have been spent. These 
practices were motivated by a sense that to critically engage with contemporary 
technology demands a ‘below the hood’ understanding of how it works. To re-work, 
re-purpose, mash-up and take apart the aspects which underlie the functionality of 
our quotidian technological world requires that we understand, to the extent that 
this is possible, how it works. Early stages of projects invariably involved (and still 
involve) an integrated technical and conceptual understanding. For instance, the 
research process of Null By Morse (see Chapter 4) required an implementation of 
a Morse Code receiver to be made. This process was closely involved with a 
historical study of the development of communications protocols. These research 
threads were mutually supportive as the historical study brought an increased 
understanding of the technical strengths and weaknesses of the protocol and 
technical work provoked further research questions10. 
 
                                            
10 In this instance these questions concerned the implementation of the protocol in 
different media such as light, radio, and sound. More details are found in Chapter 4 
. 
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A working knowledge of basic electronics was also developed through the research 
process. In exactly the same way that studying communications protocols was 
intrinsic to an earlier research project, the experience of designing, and having 
printed circuit boards manufactured, and interfacing with networking hardware was 
integral to the development of Neurotic Armageddon Indicator. In this case, 
learning about the functionality of the chip which drives the LED display was 
conceived of as an historical material engagement, integral to the research 
process. This is described in detail in Chapter 5. 
1.5 Works Described 
Throughout this thesis the making process of a set of media artworks is described. 
The sections below provide technical descriptions of six works produced. Of these, 
four are described in detail during the thesis: Null by Morse, Mark Inscriber, 
Neurotic Armageddon Indicator and Refractive Index. The development of the final 
two: 1280*1024 and The Quiet Walk contributed to earlier stages of the 
development of the framework of materiality proposed in this thesis but to a lesser 
degree. This thesis attempts to vividly describe the process of making with the 
materiality of contemporary computing technologies with a particular focus on the 
development and guiding influence of material facets. It was essential to preserve 
as much detail of this making as possible in order to avoid a reductive and 
impoverished account of these complex and materially specific processes. A 
decision was therefore taken in favour of depth rather than breadth. The 
development of the facets of materiality is described in Chapter 4 through a 
discussion of Null by Morse and Mark Inscriber. These works were begun early in 
the research period and were vital in developing and understanding this 
contribution. 1280*1024 and The Quiet Walk were produced roughly 
contemporaneously with Null by Morse and Mark Inscriber and were responsible to 
a lesser degree for some of the findings made. Neurotic Armageddon Indicator is 
described in detail throughout Chapter 5. This work was produced in later stages of 
the research and 5.1 describes how findings from the production of Null by Morse 
and Mark Inscriber were applied as guiding principles. Chapter 6 examines 
Refractive Index retrospectively to explore some of the ecological implications 
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raised by a focus on making with materiality. This work was produced over a long 
period of development and was iterated several times for different sites of display 
and exhibition. Because of this long time scale, a discussion of different points 
during the production of Refractive Index could have been included in both 
Chapters 4 and 5. It forms the basis of discussion in Chapter 6 because its 
production provided a number of locations (in terms of the cities and architectural 
contexts where it was shown and in the technical infrastructure supporting it) which 
were particularly resonant with the characterization of ecology proposed. 
1.5.1 Null By Morse 
A series of Morse messages is transmitted automatically by a military signalling 
lamp. The messages are drawn from the history of Morse and telegraphy. A 
custom app for iPhone and Android uses the phone’s camera to identify the 
changing light levels of the lamp and the associated timings. The app then 
decodes the Morse and displays the message on the screen on top of the camera 
image. 
 
Null By Morse (NBM) consists of two main parts: (i) an automatically controlled 
military signaling lamp, and (ii) a smartphone installed on a plinth {Figure 2}. The 
phone’s camera points toward the lamp. A Quick Response (QR) code printed on 
the plinth provides a link for Android phone users to download a version of the app 
that is running on the installation phone. The lamp has been retrofitted. Its original 
incandescent bulb has been replaced by an LED bulb designed for car sidelights, 
which was chosen to allow for faster transmission. The bulb’s flashing is controlled 
with an Arduino microcontroller ( (Arduino, 2014)). A simple circuit uses a transistor 
to switch current on and off to the bulb. On the installation phone, an app that I 
developed (using Openframeworks (2013) wrappers for iOS and Android operating 
systems) uses the phone’s camera to take measurements of pixel brightness. The 
area in which the brightness level is taken is defined by the user, who taps on the 
camera image over the lamp. The software uses the differing brightness levels to 
infer whether the lamp is on or off. The timing interval defines a dot, dash, inter- 
character or inter-word space. The app displays the messages it has received on 
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the screen. In some exhibited versions of the work, users can also download the 
app and use it in the gallery space on their own Android phones. All code for this 
project is freely available on a Github source code repository. See {Appendix 2} for 
code.  
 
 
Figure 2: Null By Morse, Installation View 
1.5.2 Mark Inscriber 
A horizontal linear bearing supports a small metal carriage. On the carriage a 
mechanism causes a small blade to shoot forward and mark the wall. The lateral 
movement of the carriage is controlled by a motor-driven chain. The blade cuts a 
short vertical mark in the wall and the carriage advances a short distance. This 
process is repeated until the length of the bearing has been covered. The carriage 
then returns to exactly the same starting point and the process is repeated. Each 
iteration causes the marks to be cut more deeply into the wall. 
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The cutting blade mechanism consists of a sharpened piece of steel which was11 
welded to a 12v solenoid. An Arduino (2014) microcontroller causes a transistor to 
switch current to the solenoid. The solenoid is actually overloaded with 48v and 
three amps to maximise the cutting force. The movement of the carriage is 
controlled by a stepper motor which, in turn, is also controlled by the Arduino. 
1.5.3 Neurotic Armageddon Indicator 
Neurotic Armageddon Indicator (NAI) is an installation artwork which visualizes the 
‘Doomsday Clock’, a symbolic clock maintained by an academic journal, The 
Bulletin of Atomic Scientists (henceforth The Bulletin) ( (Bulletin of the Atomic 
Scientists, 2013)). The Doomsday Clock represents the proximity to Armageddon 
expressed as minutes to midnight where midnight signals the advent of nuclear 
holocaust. NAI takes the form of a small, 1980s-style wall clock (or on a stand as a 
desktop clock {Figure 3}) with a black plastic shell and red LED, 7 digit numeral 
displays {see Figure 24}. 
 
The artwork is in two pieces. One is a small computer programme running on a 
server which ‘scrapes’ the content of the bulletin’s home page as often as 
possible12. The other is the clock itself. 
                                            
11 I wish to acknowledge the help of Steve Rowarth for his help with the welding 
and also Karim Lahda who improved the circuit. 
12 The meaning of ‘as often as possible’ is discussed in 5.2.5 
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Figure 3: A Neurotic Armageddon Indicator (shown in desktop configuration) 
The software checks the current status of the clock and then sends the results over 
the internet to the second part of the work, a small wall clock which displays the 
time of the Doomsday Clock on a red LED clock display. This process repeats as 
fast possible so that the device shows in near-real-time the status of the doomsday 
clock. This constant process of checking is the ‘neurosis’ of the title of the piece. 
 
The server-side of NAI is written in Python using ‘Beautiful Soup’ ( (Richardson, 
2013)) web-scraping libraries and the Python Socket module for communication to 
the Arduino. The clock device uses an Arduino Ethernet shield to control the clock 
display and LED indicator. I designed a PCB for the clock and the Eagle PCB 
design files are freely available with code and other designs on a Github source 
code repository {see Appendix 2}. 
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Figure 4: Building an Armageddon Indicator 
1.5.4 1280*1024 
1280*1024 is a screen-based artwork which treats each individual pixel of a display 
screen as an individual screen in its own right. The title is derived from the 
resolution of the screen used. Other versions of the piece had different resolutions 
and were named accordingly (e.g. 1024*768). The piece is driven by a data source 
which varied in different versions of the piece. In an initial version, a ‘data dump’ of 
Wikipedia (acquired from (Wikimedia, 2013)) provided the data. In a later version, a 
web spider, which I developed in Python, crawled particular IP ranges of the 
internet and scraped webpages indiscriminately. The visualization is written in C13 
and C++ using Openframeworks ( (2013)) libraries. 
 
                                            
13 I acknowledge the assistance of Daniel Jackson who helped me understand the 
memory management demands of the project and supplied some native C code. 
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Figure 5: Installation Image of 1280*1024 
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Individual pixels are assigned a data item. In the case of the Wikipedia version, this 
item is a randomly selected article. In the version based on the web spider, the 
item is a page of html.  The data is transmitted in Morse code by the pixel flashing 
black or white. The screen begins with no data and gradually one pixel at a time is 
added until all 1310720 (1280*1024) pixels are flashing.  
1.5.5 Refractive Index 
Refractive Index ( (Allen, 2011)) is a multi-site artwork based temporarily on 
permanent, large-scale (approximately 12 square meter) displays, owned by the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC) and based in British town centres. The 
piece is authored by Jamie Allen and I was employed (with Davide Gauthier) to 
write software code for the project. Authorship of the project belongs with Allen. 
Refractive Index was developed in C++ using Openframeworks (2013) libraries 
and code is available publically on a source code repository {see Appendix 2}. 
 
Refractive Index uses the large urban displays as ‘light projectors’. Surrounding 
streetlights, in some locations, are extinguished with the collaboration of local 
councils. The screens’ ‘gain’ or intensity is turned to the maximum and a series of 
different coloured flashes and shapes are displayed in succession. Meanwhile the 
integrated CCTV camera in the screen captures images of the surrounding 
architecture. Algorithms, written by Gauthier, Allen, and myself, examine the 
resulting video footage for variations in light reflection and absorption. New images 
{Figure 6 } representing the results are finally played back on the screen, 
completing the cycle. Allen describes the work as: 
 
“Investigations into the reflective and refractive power of public media displays. 
Imagery and software marks the physical effect that public media displays have on 
city spaces. An art-research project that uses large scale displays as a kind of 
active camera obscura; inverting the usual use of the screen and showing us what 
our screens ‘see’ when they peer into the night sky.” (Allen, 2011) 
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Figure 6: An Image Generated by Refractive Index, Manchester Site 
1.5.6 The Quiet Walk 
The Quiet Walk is a collaboration with sound artist Alessandro Altavilla. Altavilla 
developed the original concept and I joined the project as a collaborator to 
conceptually and practically develop a shared visualization element. I was also 
active in the development of the original iPhone app. 
 
“The Quiet Walk is an interactive mobile artwork that allows users to make a 
walking exploration of urban space, driven by the sonic information captured on a 
smartphone. Instead of using a geographical reference in order to navigate around 
the city, the mobile suggests to avoid particular noisy areas of city, giving directions 
to reach quiet zones. The data collected generates a constantly changing map of 
the city according to its sounds.” (Altavilla, The Quiet Walk, 2011-13) 
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Figure 7: The Quiet Walk Interface In Action (photo copyright Alessandro Altavilla 2012) 
 
“The Quiet Walk is based on a purpose-built app for the iPhone which analyses the 
sounds of the city in real time and suggests for the user to make a deviation if the 
level of noisiness is too high. As the mobile transmits its GPS coordinates in real 
time to the project server, a system of routes and trajectories is drawn, creating an 
acoustical trace of the user’s walk.” ( (Altavilla & Tanaka, 2012)) 
 
The second version of the Quiet Walk app which incorporated visualization 
elements was built by myself 14 using Openframeworks libraries ( (2013)). There 
are a series of server side scripts, written by myself, which collate GPS and 
acoustical data from the apps and produce two online visualizations. The first of 
these marks GPS locations at which people have stopped and listened. It 
                                            
14 Though Altavilla contributed some resources (such as some screen overlay 
designs) and design feedback. Also the php posting code was provided by a third 
party. 
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translates the decibel levels recorded by the app into Italian, musical notation, for 
example ‘ff’ (fortissimo) for very loud. These are written to a custom map marker 
and added to a Google map {see Figure 8}. 
 
 
Figure 8: One of the Two Visualizations in the Quiet Walk. Markers here show “f” (forte) for “loud” and 
“mf” (mezzo forte) “quite loud” 
 
The second visualization adds each new data point (of GPS and acoustic data) to 
a ‘heat map’, a graded map which interpolates values between known data points. 
The more data is added to the map, the more detailed it becomes. The algorithm 
used for this was Shepard’s Method (Shepard, 1968), for which implementations in 
Java (Processing), C++, and PHP were produced by myself during the research 
process (see Appendix 2 : ofxHeatMap). These were released as open source 
libraries. {Figure 9} shows an example heat map, created in Taranto, Italy, early in 
testing. Users of the app could link to the two visualizations from the app itself. The 
intention was that users would be able to view the walks taken by others in their 
vicinity. The project is freely available on a source code repository {see Appendix 
2} 
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Figure 9: iPhone Screen Grab of the Second of Two Visualizations in the Quiet Walk taking during 
testing in Taranto, Italy. 
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Chapter 2. Materiality: a Definition in Action 
This chapter provides a background review to inform the later development of a 
series of facets of materiality. These in turn will form a framework with which to 
approach the making of works of art and design as described in 1.4.2. First the 
principal aims and objectives of the review will be identified and a rationale 
provided for the method used. After the review, a short summary of findings will 
form a precursor to Chapter 4 in which the facets of materiality will be fully 
developed. At this point it is reiterated that while this review is presented here 
before full discussion of the practice-based research, this is not to be taken as 
indicative of the research timeline. As was emphasised in Chapter 1, literature 
research and practical investigation were reciprocally influential and they have 
been separated only for the sake of presenting a coherent account to the reader. 
 
The rationale for an investigation into materiality has already been introduced but 
will be clarified at this point. It has been described how ‘immateriality’ has been 
claimed to be an important defining feature of the digital age (Negroponte, 1996; 
Mitchell, 2000). Even Friedrich Kittler, in many senses a staunch materialist, has 
not proved immune from making unfortunate (and contested e.g. by Kirschenbaum, 
2008, p. 6) claims about digital technologies affording limitless speed and infinite 
interoperability (1987, p. 101). Such a view of digital technologies as immaterial 
gained considerable currency through the successive decade(s) and is only 
recently being substantively challenged. A number of provocative books such as 
(Bennet, 2010; Huhtamo & Parikka, 2011; Ingold, 2013) have, in different ways 
suggested how a conceptual and practical focus on materiality can bringer a richer 
conception to the understanding of technological systems in action, to the study of 
art history, and to understanding making-practice respectively. While these 
accounts are rich in example and strong in their theoretical underpinnings they do 
not offer much practical direction to the maker as to how to conceive of materiality 
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as something which helps them create knowledge through practice (though 
Ingold’s work has this aim (2013, p. 14)). A key finding which motivates this 
literature review is that, so far, there is a discrepancy in the quality of research from 
those actually describing the process of designing and making things when 
compared to accounts which highlight benefits of materiality without, so to speak, 
getting their hands dirty. A principal problem that will be identified through this 
chapter is that much research which claims to discuss materiality in practice, 
particularly in some kinds of Interaction Design, inadvertently produces a ‘thin’ 
version of the concept flawed by an inappropriate use of metaphor (e.g. in Ishii, 
2008) and an exaggerated focus on form and interpretation (e.g. in Jung & 
Stolterman, 2012) to the detriment of philosophical or conceptual investigation 
which could inform and enrich design work.  
 
This claim motivated a further question for this review. Given a philosophically 
enriched conception of materiality and its implications for making-practice, what 
questions or considerations need be addressed for the way makers situate 
themselves in relation to the materials with which they work? In early paragraphs it 
will be argued that with the consideration of particular philosophical stances on 
materiality, pertaining to the origin of meaning, concerns arise for the attitude of 
makers. These provoke not only further philosophical questions (about the 
definition of meaning) but ethical questions about the way that the material world is 
valued. 
 
2.1 Aims and Objectives 
This review chapter has three principal aims, separated into sub-sections. 
 
Section 2.1.1 aims to identify philosophical and ethical dimensions to materiality as 
it pertains to makers. Specifically it works with a particular ontological conception of 
meaning and with some related perspectives on ethics and materiality. It asks, in 
the light of a number of concepts identified, what possible impacts might exist on 
the attitudes of makers towards their work.
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Section 2.1.2 identifies a number of instances where materiality has been invoked 
to theoretically support arguments for specific approaches to the design of 
particular interactions (e.g. in Ishii, 2008) and the design of particular kinds of 
computer systems (e.g. in Weiser, 1991). This section critiques some of this work 
for its under-developed philosophical grounding. It is argued that a philosophically 
“thin” definition of materiality undermines some of the background justifications, 
given by designers for particular approaches. 
 
Section 2.1.3 recognizes that a key problem with research discussed in Section 
2.1.2, was a failure to bring materiality, action and ecologies into a coherent 
picture. It develops a definition of agency, building on previous research, which will 
be taken forward into the thesis as a whole. 
 
Building on the findings of the previous sections, Section 2.1.4 aims to provide a 
more comprehensive survey of the concept of materiality and, with the benefit of 
practical experience, identify relevant existing concepts and research strands 
which might integrate with a proposed framework for materially-informed making. 
Having done so, it notes the concordance of methodologies from the, admittedly 
heterogeneous, field of Media Archaeology with concepts identified here. 
2.1.1 Meaning and Attitude 
As was indicated, the focus of this section is on how a particular philosophical 
approach to the origin of meaning can substantively affect the way that 
practitioners conceive of their engagement with the material world. Specifically, it 
will be argued that if meaning is viewed as an a priori property of being, as 
something existing anterior to interpretation (as in Meillassoux, 2010), the making 
of artefacts should consequently be re-construed as a development or repurposing 
of a range of such pre-existing meanings. It will then be acknowledged that this 
philosophical position carries associated ethical implications derived from our 
ontological connection to the material world and these will be described. 
 
   33 
Materiality and ontology (the study of the nature of being) are deeply, historically 
connected in Western philosophy and it is beyond the scope of this thesis to 
provide even a partial overview of this history. Specifically though, Heidegger 
asserts that to consider the nature of being, is actually to consider the meaning of 
being; 
 
“All ontology[…], remains fundamentally blind and perverts its most proper intent if 
it has not previously clarified the meaning of Being sufficiently and grasped this 
clarification as its fundamental task.” (Heidegger, 1996 (1927), p. 15) 
 
At a casual reading, to consider the meaning of being appears almost tautological: 
being appears to be its own meaning and nothing can be said about it. However 
the status of meaning as something which actually inheres to the world as opposed 
to something applied to it, a posteriori (i.e. in empirical analysis). Or derived from it 
in interpretation, is fundamental to the question of why materiality is a significant 
concern for makers. This claim will now be articulated in some detail making use of 
the work Quentin Meillassoux (2010). 
 
Materiality is employed by Quentin Meillassoux as part of a philosophical argument 
about meaning. He takes materiality as a grounding from which to problematize 
strains of philosophy which are solely based on what is knowable by human 
beings, a position he holds as associated with most of the Western philosophical 
canon since Emmanuel Kant (Kant, 1958 [1787]; Meillassoux, 2010, p. 3). Such a 
philosophical tradition, according to Meillassoux, does not admit meaningful 
discussion about the nature, existence and interaction of objects outside of what he 
calls ‘the correlation' (Meillassoux, 2010), this ‘correlation’ being that between 
objects, ‘out there’ in the world, and the ‘inside world’15 of human consciousness.  
 
                                            
15 I use the terms “inside” and “outside” to clarify this relationship as simply as 
possible. Meillassoux (2010, p9) uses the term “interiority” to discuss this division 
in more detail. 
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“By 'correlation' we mean the idea according to which we only ever have access to 
the correlation between thinking and being, and never to either term considered 
apart from the other.” (Meillassoux, 2010, p. 13) 
 
Meillassoux, however, wishes to at least speculate about the nature of things 
outside of this relationship in what he calls the ‘great outdoors’ (Meillassoux, 2010, 
p. 17) of philosophy. That is to say that he makes an ambitious attempt to 
speculate about things in themselves. 
 
A key consideration which will be developed throughout this thesis is how making-
practices are affected by the idea that one can meaningfully think about the being 
of things without necessarily contextualizing them solely in terms of human 
subjectivity. That is to say, to speculate on the kinds of meaning which inhere to 
them as things. Meillassoux, as it will be shown, suggests some philosophical 
justification for this approach. The motivation to follow him in this regard is partly a 
practical consideration and partly a matter of attitude as a maker. Practically it 
provides a motivation for looking for specific ways in which meaning inheres in the 
world (more explanation on this point is given below). As a speculative attitude 
Meillassoux’s philosophical drive is of interest because it suggests that, at least in 
some senses, meaning is not created by works of art or design, rather it is 
something which is potentially, partially at least, found by them. This is a view, 
radically at odds with what remains a pervasive and insidious view of art and 
design practice; that objects of art and design are representations of ideas16 and 
will now be discussed. 
 
Meillassoux demonstrates his approach to being and philosophical foundations of 
meaning with the example of an ‘ancestral statement’. This is a piece of scientific 
knowledge regarding facts antecedent to human life such as  “the age of the 
                                            
16 This view has been challenged through the concept of performativity, notably by 
(Butler, 1988; Thrift,1996; and Suchman, 2007) and will be discussed extensively 
later in this thesis. 
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universe, the formation of stars, or the accretion of the earth.” (Meillassoux, 2010, 
p. 21). He asks whether, in making claims about such events, we are trying to 
establish an independent truth or merely demonstrating that the effect for us is the 
same as the effect for others; 
 
“One does not validate a measure just to demonstrate that this measure is valid for 
all scientists; one validates it in order to determine what is measured.” 
(Meillassoux, 2010, p. 17) 
 
Meillassoux describes here a goal of approaching objects’ ‘primary qualities’, the 
aspects of themselves ‘in-themselves’, which do not depend on an observer, which 
are to all purposes independent. The essence of his argument is that meaning 
comes from the material world itself, as pertaining to its being.  
 
“This is what we shall express in terms of the ancestral statement's irremediable 
realism: either this statement has a realist sense, and only a realist sense, or it has 
no sense at all.” (Meillassoux, 2010, p. 33) (emphasis added) 
 
In other words, our philosophical interest in meaning, achievable or not, is in 
establishing meaning as a property of being, not in establishing a correspondence 
in our understanding. Ontology for Meillassoux therefore implies a breaking down 
of barriers in our knowing relationship with the world around us. The idea that we 
might have access to objects as they are in themselves rather than through some 
mediated secondhand is attractive for makers whether philosophically justified or 
not. It points to a potentially more authentic17 relationship with materials. 
 
Materiality in Meillassoux’s writing acts as a counterpoint to the idea that meaning 
is necessarily, wholly, man-made. It provides a point of reference outside human 
subjectivity without which, he claims, it is simply not meaningful to describe the 
                                            
17 Authenticity is discussed in more detail in 6.4. 
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world. As part of a making-practice this contradicts the notion that meaning is 
something that is a posteriori to materials as they are used to represent ideas. 
Making is an engagement with meaning, not just a creation of it. 
 
This exposition of Meillassoux’s work is included first because of its immediate 
speculative orientation, which is identified as commensurable with the processes of 
ideation and prototyping described in this thesis, and secondly because it provides 
a philosophical grounding for later concepts which form part of the proposed 
framework of material facets. This will be explicated in more detail but for now, 
suffice to say, this is fundamental to a view of the world where makers exist in a 
dynamic and varied ecology which formulates our understanding of the social. I 
suggest that this characterisation of meaning in materiality remains broadly 
unexplored in frameworks for making and consequently that this is a significant 
aspect of the contribution offered by the facets of materiality which will be 
proposed. 
 
Although the inclusion of this influence from Meillassoux into making-practice is 
posited as an original contribution, there is some precedent to be found in 
Heidegger’s later writings. Heidegger also held the view that the attitude of a maker 
would be affected by his or her understanding of a thing having its own existential 
meaning. His ontological approach to the notion of ‘the thing’ (as in Heidegger, The 
Thing, 1971) involves an explicit discussion of the relationship between a thing (in 
this case a jug) and its maker. He distinguishes between the jug as a “represented 
object” and its “thingly character” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 405) and describes how the 
making-process has the character of bringing out the jug “qua thing” (Heidegger, 
1971, p. 408): 
 
“It is, to be sure, no longer considered only as object of a mere representation, but 
in return it is an object which a process of making has set up before and against 
us.” (Heidegger, 1971, p. 406) 
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As for (Meillassoux 2010, p. 17), the implication for makers is that materiality is 
encountered as an engagement with meaning, not in terms of a construction of 
representations. As Paul Dourish, describing Heidegger’s ontological approach, 
suggests, “[m]eaning inheres in the world as we find it” (2004, p. 108). The 
continuing process of making is to build on such meanings through processes such 
as combination, re-working and juxtaposition. Examples of such processes are 
provided in Chapters 4 and 5. 
 
To understand materiality as discussed by Heidegger, a certain amount of context 
is required. Materiality in Heidegger is part of a particular kind of ontological 
relationship for a particular kind of being of which humans are the known example: 
Dasein (there-being). His tool analysis (Heidegger, 1996 (1927), p. 67) employs 
materiality to demonstrate that the being of the world is always, already in a 
relationship with Dasein. This relationship is a privileged one and is part of the 
primal state of the world. His formulation of two modes of being found in objects, 
“Vorhandenheit” and “Zuhandenheit”18 uses materiality as a place to discuss how 
being is resolved through action19. Heidegger’s ontology is founded in the assertion 
that being is in essence a series of “modes” (Heidegger, Being and Time, 1996 
(1927), p. 7) which are inherent to that kind of being. Being is posited as a question 
of ‘how’ rather than a question of ‘what’. The implications of this approach, which 
have been explored in the context of interaction with technology, (e.g. Dourish, 
2004, pp. 107-108; Winograd, 1995), are to consider being-in-the-world as a kind 
of action in which we are always already involved. This involvement demonstrates 
that materiality, properly construed is already engaged with a sense of one’s part in 
an ecological whole. That action is also conceived of in specifically ethical terms 
(1996 (1927), pp. 169-213), one’s ontological connection with the world motivates, 
                                            
18 Handiness, readiness-to-hand, or Zuhandenheit is the way that we are usually 
involved with the world as part of our attitude of care towards the world. We 
encounter objects in a neutral, useful modality. Un-handiness, presentness-to-
hand, or vorhandenheit is a break in zuhandenheit, the canonical example is the 
hammer which breaks and causes us to examine it closely in its construction. 
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for Heidegger, particular moral attitudes to it. We are morally implicated in the 
world because of our ontological connection to it as part of particular kinds of mode 
of action.  
 
Heidegger’s work then, has ethical implications, derived from his philosophical 
conclusions. However, ethical dimensions of materiality are also explored by Webb 
Keane to question our background assumptions about the relationship between 
materials and meaning (Keane, 2005; 2013) draws from an entirely different 
tradition: semiotics.  Keane suggests that a perception of materiality as somehow 
immoral has influenced Western culture to separate material and meaning. He 
begins by describing how in the protestant tradition, for instance, overt interest in 
the material world is perceived as immoral. 
 
“…the misapprehension of material things is not [perceived as] merely a mistake-it 
has grave consequences. It leads us to invert our values, imputing life to the 
lifeless and thereby losing ourselves. The proper understanding of material signs 
has moral consequences.” (Keane, 2005, p. 184) 
 
For makers, who are constantly involved with materials in their professional lives, 
such an attitude is problematic. Counterpoints can, of course, be found at home 
and abroad. Traditional Japanese arts and crafts, for instance, suffer no such 
moral dilemmas (Tanizaki, 2001). Keane describes how this moral stance has had 
a pernicious influence on cultural analysis. For Keane, background concerns about 
the ‘immorality’ of materials have caused an artificial theoretical rift between things 
and the meanings which they are assumed to represent: 
 
“…social and cultural analysts still find it difficult to treat objects as no more than 
illustrations of something else, as, say, communicating meanings or identities, it is 
because we remain heirs of a tradition that treats signs as if they were merely the 
garb of meaning…” (Keane, 2005, p. 184) 
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A sign therefore, for Keane, in the form of a piece of statuary for instance, is not a 
representation of an idea such as femininity or martial valour. Rather that statue is 
involved in constituting those meanings and associating them with others through 
both the history and future of that object. To compare this approach to (Heidegger, 
1996 [1927]; Meillassoux, 2010), Keane is not presenting an ontological argument 
about the way meaning actually inheres in objects. Rather he makes an account of 
the production of meaning but locates it, not just in human perception, but in the 
complex material interactions that things are involved in. Things become 
associated in the sense of “united in action or purpose” (Oxford Dictionary of 
English, 2010) rather than of “Connected in thought, mentally related” (Oxford 
Dictionary of English, 2010). Their situation in a dynamic world means that they are 
involved with one another and their meaning is affected through these material 
interactions. Human subjectivity is certainly part of the picture, but it is not the 
whole story. 
 
This perspective incorporating the past interactions of objects with one another, 
also offers, through its historicity, a way of considering making-practice as part of a 
continuity. If materials are approached as inherently historical, that historicity 
suggests precedent kinds of engagement with them, for instance through older 
making traditions which can be assimilated into practice. Perhaps most importantly 
for this thesis however, Keane suggests that the embodiment of meaning in 
materiality locates it in a dynamic and combinatory set of relations. The interactions 
of objects mean that: 
 
“…the semiotic character of material things means that outcome is not, in principle, 
settled. It is not simply that their meanings are underdetermined, but also that their 
semiotic orientation is, in part, toward unrealised futures.” (Keane, 2005, p. 193) 
 
To clarify, Keane maintains that not only does our interpretation of, or relationship 
with, things remain unsettled but that their capacity to embody signification means 
that their meaning is wrapped up in future possibility. Added to accounts of 
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meaning as intrinsic to objects in the world (Heidegger, 1996 [1927]; Meillassoux, 
2010), Keane’s work suggests ways of thinking about the future production of 
meaning through engagement with materiality. To summarize, the research 
described here holds that meaning and materiality are closely imbricated. This 
opposes a view (which it will be shortly argued is implicit in much art and design 
work) wherein objects are seen as representations of ideas. This finding is 
identified as significant as it provides a justification for considering materiality as 
central to the design process. Approaches which attempt to impose meaning onto 
artefacts without due attention to the intrinsic meaning of materiality risk implicitly 
denigrating the physical world to a ‘second tier’ status as a proxy for ideas. Such 
approaches potentially ignore both the history of art and design practice as a 
knowledge making activity and richly productive methodologies suggested by a 
historical engagement with technologies. This latter will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
 
There are also, as we have seen, ethical aspects to our engagement with 
materiality both as part of a world with which we are already connected 
(Heidegger, 1954; 1971; 1996 (1927)) and as makers who are proudly involved 
with our craft as in (Tanizaki, 2001).  
 
Lastly, the “unsettled character” (Keane, 2005, p. 193) of material things means 
that our engagement with them as makers is always towards ‘unrealised futures’. 
This point is taken as foundational in proposing that consideration of the 
inescapable future orientation of materiality would fundamentally affect the making-
process. 
2.1.2 Making Art and Technology 
While the previous section examined some foundational concepts for materiality in 
and its relationship to makers, this section examines how materiality has hitherto 
been employed to inform design practice. Research discussed in this section has 
the function of explicitly discussing and informing the creation of works of art and 
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technology. It is situated to provide direction for current or future design work and 
in this respect shares a goal with this thesis.  
 
A principal aim of this section is to describe how some previous applications of the 
concept of materiality in design practice rest on philosophically under-developed 
conceptions of the term and it will be claimed that this has restricted potential 
benefits to design. It will also be explained that many of the underlying problems 
with the view of materiality expressed by some of the research which follows stem 
from a lack of integration between the concepts of materiality and ecology. A key 
area in which this separation occurs is identified within the concept of affordance. 
 
Affordance, a concept that has become vital to Interaction Design, was originally 
defined as a “specific combination of the properties of its substance and its 
surfaces taken with reference to an animal” (Gibson, 1977, p. 67). In essence it is a 
kind of potentiality between the particular qualities of an object and the physical or 
mental capacities of an animal (human or otherwise) to interact with it. 
 
“When the constant properties of constant objects are perceived (the shape, size, 
color […] I have coined this word as a substitute for values, a term which carries an 
old burden of philosophical meaning. I mean simply what things furnish, for good or 
ill.” (Gibson, 1966, p. 285) 
 
In the following paragraphs two contrary positions towards affordance will be 
described, treating affordance as an inherent property of the world, or a product of 
perception, respectively, before a third approach will be introduced as a favourable 
alternative. In this last, it will be described how Suchman’s articulation of “situated 
action” (Suchman, 2007) provides some integration of the concept of affordance 
with an ecological approach, prefiguring discussion of the latter in Chapter 6. Given 
the relationship between affordance and materiality, this point will strengthen the 
overall position of this thesis in establishing the importance of incorporating 
material concerns in making-practice. 
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There is disagreement among some scholars, as to the exact nature of affordance 
and particularly its status as either inherent to objects, or existing solely as a 
mental state of animals (including humans), so called “perceived affordance” 
(Jones, 2003; Norman, 1999). Perhaps the most vocal exponent of affordance in 
its relation to Interaction Design, Donald Norman’s account proposes it as a an 
answer to the question, “When you first see something you have never seen 
before, how do you know what to do?” (Norman, 1999, p. 39). Norman’s rhetorical 
question, however, is revealing of a problem with both of the above understandings 
of the concept. To seriously consider Norman’s question, we would have to treat 
experience as a series of essentially isolated units. To claim that we had “never 
seen something before”, we would have to superimpose a categorization on the 
world which clearly separates individual experiences. Whether we treat affordance 
as inherent to an object or to perception, we implicitly adopt a position which holds 
that the properties of an object are detached from action. It is exactly this claim that 
is refuted by Lucy Suchman. Suchman’s (2002; 2007) work is a lengthy exposition 
of the idea that knowledge and action are inseparable from circumstance. In the 
context of a critique of cognitive science, Suchman points out that “[…f]or cognitive 
science the background of action is not the world as such, but knowledge about the 
world.” And it is exactly this kind of perspective which would allow Norman to ask 
“When you first see something you have never seen before, how do you know 
what to do?” (Norman, 1999, p. 39) The clear implication from that question, is that 
there is a schematising set of a priori rules to which, on some level, we refer. 
Instead, by Suchman’s account, action must be taken in the particular dynamic 
context in which it occurs. This necessarily includes a relationship with materiality. 
 
“…the contingency of action on a complex world of objects, artifacts, and other 
actors, located in space and time, is no longer treated as an extraneous problem 
with which the individual actor must contend but rather is seen as the essential 
resource that makes knowledge possible and gives action its sense. […] A basic 
research goal for studies of situated action, therefore, is to explicate the 
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relationship between structures of action and the resources and constraints 
afforded by material and social circumstances.” (Suchman, 2007, p. 177) 
 
In the following paragraphs, it will be suggested that the application of the concept 
of affordance, without due consideration to materiality itself or its contextualising 
ecology causes problems for design.  
 
Materiality has been explicitly invoked by authors in the domain of Tangible User 
Interfaces (henceforth TUI), a field of computer interface design, who seek to use 
the affordances of physical objects to create more pleasurable or efficient 
interactions. The seminal paper in this field was that of (Ishii and Ullmer, 1997) in 
which they developed a vision of “Tangible Bits”, physical mediators that would “… 
take advantage of natural physical affordances to achieve a heightened legibility 
and seamlessness of interaction between people and information.” (Ishii & Ullmer, 
1997, p. 2). Considering affordance is intended to make designs easier to use, 
reduce cognitive load, and encourage interaction by leveraging a combination of 
the physical properties of objects and their (inherent or perceived) relationships 
with human physicality. Affordance therefore is posited as a way of using 
materiality to design for usability. It is given a function of overcoming a divide 
(between human physicality and information spaces for instance). This view of 
affordance as something which is principally of use value is a factor which 
differentiates the position of this thesis from (Norman 1999; Ishii and Ullmer, 1997). 
In the position adopted by this thesis, affordance is considered as an intrinsically 
philosophically interesting feature, in its relation to making-practice and the 
consequences of this focus will be discussed in 2.1.3. 
 
This use of materiality in the form of affordance described in the research above is, 
however, a thin form. It is asserted here, that the stated aim “to bridge the gaps 
between both cyberspace and the physical environment” (Ishii & Ullmer, 1997, p. 
1) is at best poorly explained and at worst disingenuous. While it is arguable that 
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phicons20, for instance, bridge gaps between human physicality and information 
spaces (Ishii & Ullmer, 1997, p. 1) it is much harder to justify that Ishii and Ulmer’s 
vision engages us in our environments in anything other than token ways. They 
offer “tangible bits” as an instantiation of Weiser’s (1991; Weiser & Brown, 1996) 
vision of ubiquitous computing, a way of integrating computing with the 
environment. It is strongly asserted by this thesis, however that it is not an 
integration of computing with the environment. It is a replacement of the 
environment with computational devices.  
 
“by relying on strategies for mapping via analogues and metaphors, tangible 
computing inadvertently invests in maintaining the separation in order that they 
might cross the divide. Moreover, metaphors and analogues, by definition, operate 
a level up from the basic materials themselves.” (Robles & Wiberg, 2010, p. 137) 
 
The use of phicons in TUI research, is a substitution of one kind of materiality for a 
distinctly different one and relies on metaphor and association (as described 
above) to infer similarities between the two). It is not a way of engaging with the 
former. As indicated, the vision of affordance offered here ignores the situated 
character of the real-world21 interactions, which are effectively mimicked by 
phicons. 
 
There has quite recently been a renewed interest in the explicit application of 
materiality to designing interactions with digital artefacts (such as in Jung & 
Stolterman, 2011; Jung & Stolterman, 2012; Wiberg, 2013). A key feature of this 
research is that it treats materiality as something whose principal utility to design is 
                                            
20 Phicons are physical objects, augmented to serve as interface media, for 
instance by using camera tracking technologies 
21 Clearly interactions with phicons also exist in the “real-world”. Here I intend, the 
already existing interactions which tangible user interaction mimics. Take, for 
example a phicon which serves the function of a volume control. Twisting the 
phicon reduces or increases some variable in software. This interaction is based 
on a “real-world” interaction of twisting a potentiometer. 
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in helping designers to think about the way their products are interpreted by users. 
Materiality in this research is instrumentalized for this purpose, rather than being a 
feature of interest, for research, in its own right. It will be described in the following 
paragraphs how a focus on interpretation has replaced a more nuanced analysis of 
the relationship between the materiality of objects and the way they behave in 
interaction. This analytical oversight, causes problems for the understanding of 
agency as it pertains to design. This assertion will be fully expounded in the 
subsequent section. 
   
“Form and materiality are rather abstract concepts to be purposefully interpreted 
rather than quantifiable properties to be objectively measured. This means that 
research on form and materiality requires hermeneutic approaches to clarify what 
are specifically meant by those terms in a certain context of inquiry and why certain 
perspectives of interpretation are selected out of other existing views before 
applying them to a general research framework or design principles.” (Jung & 
Stolterman, 2012, p. 646) 
  
In other words, the qualities of objects are culturally constructed and context 
specific, rather than in any sense pertaining to the objects themselves. To study 
those qualities, suggest these authors, requires a focus on that context rather than 
on the object as such. Form according to Jung & Stolterman; 
 
“…is based on an artifact-centered and interpretive approach that examines how 
material artifacts are experienced and implicated in personal and social life, 
stressing that the use, display, and ownership of individual artifacts cannot be 
understood in isolation from context and environment.” (Jung & Stolterman, 2011, 
p. 401) 
 
Materiality for Jung, Stolterman, and Wiberg is approached as an expression of 
factors external to the object. Materiality, as has been noted, is instrumentalized to 
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help researchers think about the use of objects, the values that people attribute to 
them or the way that objects express cultural phenomena such as fashion. 
 
The emphasis by these authors (Jung & Stolterman, 2012; Wiberg, 2013) on 
qualities and form is also sometimes related to traditional craft practices of 
reflection upon or through materials but brought to bear on “digital objects”. This 
practice has been referred to as the, “…’sketching in hardware approach’ [which] 
highlights the importance of explorations through an intimate relationship with the 
materials at hand.” (Wiberg, 2013). Although this aim is identified as consistent 
with the aims of this thesis, there seem to be few real examples of this ‘intimate 
relationship’ at work in the research. 
 
In summary, a problem shared by both the vision of ‘tangible bits’ (Ishii & Ullmer, 
1997) and qualities-based, interpretative design approaches to materiality (Jung & 
Stolterman, 2012; Jung & Stolterman, 2011; Wiberg, 2013; Robles & Wiberg, 
2010) despite a putative reliance on materiality, actually see materiality as 
something that is mutable through human interpretation. Ishii and Ullmer’s (1997) 
research implicitly views physical designs as metaphorical replacements for the 
real-world. Such a view ignores the situated nature of affordance (Suchman, 2007). 
Meanwhile, other Interaction Design research described here fails to explore the 
relationship between materiality and interpretation, effectively conflating the terms.  
 
It is asserted at this early stage that the approaches to materiality described thus 
far are reductive, implicitly consigning objects to a role as signifiers; 
representations of something else, be they physical interactions (in Ishii & Ullmer, 
1997), or cultural associations in (Jung & Stolterman, 2012; Jung & Stolterman, 
2011; Wiberg, 2013; Robles & Wiberg, 2010). To overcome this quandary, and to 
form a more nuanced background to our later development of the concept of 
materiality, it is proposed that some initial account for the interconnection of 
materiality and action must be provided and that this must necessarily, following 
Suchman’s comments, integrate an ecological aspect. Such an account will be 
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begun in the following section with an exploration of the relationship between 
materiality and agency. 
 
2.1.3 Agency and Materials 
So far a key finding of this section has been that a more or less exclusive focus on 
interpretation in some kinds of design practice implicitly denigrates the role of 
materiality in shaping our relationship to technology. It is proposed that underlying 
this focus is a particular notion of agency as located wholly with human beings. To 
seriously critique this notion an initial exposition of the concept of agency as it will 
be applied throughout this thesis must be offered. In the following paragraphs, it 
will be shown how an exploration of the relationship between materiality and 
agency inevitably engages both concepts with an ecological understanding. The 
concept of agency is proposed as foundational to ecologies because of its 
significance to the most basic assumptions of what an ecology is: “the production 
of action and what counts as action (and of actors and what counts as actors)” 
(Thrift, 1996, p. 2) that is to say who, or what conjointly compose an ecology and 
how they relate to one another. 
 
A foundational claim for this thesis is that a nuanced philosophical and practical 
approach to materiality is lacking from art and design making-practice despite the 
efforts of some researchers (particularly Ingold, 2012; 2013) to integrate them. it 
will be suggested that at the heart of this lack is a failure to adopt some productive, 
existing approaches, particularly from Actor Network Theory (ANT) (such as Latour 
1988;1993; 2005), to understanding agency into design practice, in a significant 
and methodical way. Some first steps will be attempted here from the discussion of 
this existing ANT research, re-applied to making-practice. 
 
To begin a discussion of the manifestation of agency we will begin with Bruno 
Latour. Latour discusses how materiality is agential to problematize social theories 
which rely on human intentionality for impetus, to the exclusion of the material 
world (Latour, 2005). By doing so he provides a productive, theoretical path 
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through which to integrate our earlier established notions, of the historicity of 
material meaning, into an ecology containing a variety of different kinds of actors. 
Latour achieves this by deemphasising the motivation of actors and turns instead 
to the way that they “modify states of affairs” (Latour, 2005, p. 71). That is to say 
that he looks at what things do and how they do it, without making assumptions 
about why they do it. 
 
“If action is limited a priori to what ‘intentional’, ‘meaningful’ humans do, it is hard to 
see how a hammer, a basket, a door closer, a cat, a rug, a mug, a list, or a tag 
could act. They might exist in the domain of ‘material’ ‘causal’ relations, but not in 
the ‘reflexive’ ‘symbolic’ domain of social relations. By contrast, if we stick to our 
decision to start from the controversies about actors and agencies, then any thing 
that does modify a state of affairs by making a difference is an actor…” (Latour, 
2005, p. 71) 
 
While avoiding putting objects and humans in parity, Latour rejects a priori 
distinctions between “causal”, “intentional” or “meaningful” actions. That is to say 
that he focuses on the way that people and things embody and enact relationships 
“symmetrically” (Latour, 2005, p. 76). 
 
“To be symmetric, for us, simply means not to impose a priori some spurious 
asymmetry among human intentional action and a material world of causal 
relations.” (Latour, 2005, p. 76) 
 
Instead of accounting for what lies behind action, he begins from the position of 
looking at the kind of ‘differences’22 produced by things in networks. Things, like 
people “might authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, 
render possible, forbid…” (Latour, 2005, p. 72). Crucially (Callon, 1991, p. 134; 
Law, 1992, p. 380) agree that the focus on such differences produced, motivates a 
                                            
22 A fuller exploration of such ‘differences’ will be undertaken shortly. 
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stance that agency is as much a product of the network as of the actor. Things are 
able to produce differences because of their embeddedness in a network. Their 
conclusion is that what counts as an actor, is actually the network and vice versa. 
This point is crucial; are we to understand that the capacity of actors to produce 
difference is purely their position in a network? Surely not, since to argue thus 
would be to suggest that objects are entirely interchangeable. To suggest that the 
role of objects is defined purely by interaction generates a significant problem: 
what factors influence or define that interaction itself? The reading of ANT adopted 
by this thesis acknowledges that agency is a production of both materiality and the 
relational position of things within networks. It is added that it is at this juncture that 
the previous discussion of ontological meaning, once again, finds its relevance. If 
things are not to be taken as having generic roles, that is to say as being 
interchangeable, within a network, the only possible approach to accounting for 
their specific role within a network, must be derived from their ontological meaning. 
To propose otherwise would always locate their agency wholly outside them. To 
support this proposition we must however acknowledge a separation of definitions. 
It has been claimed that what counts as an actor is actually the network and vice 
versa (Callon, 1991, p. 134; Law, 1992, p. 380). We have also seen that the 
reciprocity of this relationship is only meaningful if it is shaped by the ontological 
meanings of the actors which constitute that network, together in relation. If we 
consider the actor to be defined by its network we must acknowledge that 
materiality itself is never wholly reducible to the agency expressed as an actor. 
That is to say that materials are not only actors; there must remain a core of 
ontological meaning, held in reserve23. As Whitehead (1919) has it, “Objects are 
the elements in nature which can ‘be again.’”  
 
To further expound this argument by example, let us examine how John Law 
brings this into an explicit discussion of technology noting that previous accounts 
                                            
23 This view is commensurable with Graham Harman’s formulation that the object 
always “withdraws” in causation. (Harman, The Road to Objects, 2011) 
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which attempt to locate dominant agency in either the domain of the machine or in 
the social context in which it is active, are inevitably reductive: 
 
“[these] reductionist versions tell that either machines or human relations are 
determinate in the last instance: that one drives the other. However, though these 
reductionisms are different, they have two things in common. First, they divide the 
human and the technical into two separate heaps. And second, they assume that 
one drives the other.” (Law, 1992, p. 382) 
 
Law’s work can also be compared and contrasted related to previous work which 
dealt with the role of technology inside social contexts such as (Pinch & Bijker, 
1987; Winner, 1980). Such contexts are relevant because they represent particular 
kinds of ecological situation. Langdon Winner’s seminal article “Do Artefacts have 
Politics” (Winner, 1980) begins by staking a claim that artefacts themselves have 
politics while acknowledging that: 
 
“...to go beyond [the] obvious fact [that technological systems and infrastructure 
change the exercise of power] and to argue that certain technologies in themselves 
have political properties seems, at first glance, completely mistaken. We all know 
that people have politics, not things.” (Winner, 1980, p. 122) 
 
To support his claim to the contrary, Winner presents a number of examples where 
technical systems either strongly encourage or actually require particular social 
configurations, thus locating, at first glance at least, a degree of agency with those 
technologies themselves. In this sense his view is consistent with that of Michel 
Callon who argues that “technical objects […] more or less explicitly define and 
distribute roles to humans and non-humans.” (Callon, 1991). Technologies, by 
Winner’s account encourage, and (in the stronger version of this theories) produce 
social arrangements (Winner, 1980, p. 130). For example, in the context of 
architectural technologies; 
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“one can point to Baron Haussmann's broad Parisian thoroughfares, 
engineered at Louis Napoleon's direction to prevent any recurrence of street 
fighting of the kind that took place during the revolution of 1848. Or one can visit 
any number of grotesque concrete buildings and huge plazas constructed on 
American university campuses during the late 1960s and early 1970s to defuse 
student demonstrations.” (Winner, 1980, p. 124) 
 
Their ability to produce such arrangements relies though on their prior 
embeddedness in an existing social milieu. Haussmann’s boulevards were 
successful because the would-be revolutionaries did not have the resources to 
build barricades wide enough to block them. This point is duly acknowledged, but 
what is missing from Winner’s account is a developed picture of the role of the 
material of the technology in the production of agency. That is to say, there is little 
discussion about what it is about that material which causes it to behave the way it 
does, and consequently to encourage or produce (Winner, 1980, p. 130) the 
arrangements it does. This is exactly the point expressed by the previous 
arguments developed, about the role of ontological meaning within networks. To a 
point Winner acknowledges this himself. 
 
“To understand which technologies and which contexts are important to us, and 
why, is an enterprise that must involve both the study of specific technical systems 
and their history as well as a thorough grasp of the concepts and controversies of 
political theory.” (Winner, 1980, p. 135) 
 
To properly integrate the relationship between material, context and agency, we 
must return to Callon, Latour, and Law and specifically the concepts of translation 
and authorship. An a priori assumption of Winner’s account is that politics and 
social organisation on one side, and technological systems on another, are 
fundamentally different things. We have already seen how (Latour, 2005, p. 71) 
rejects this view and similarly Law insists that “society, organizations, agents, and 
machines are all effects generated in patterned networks of diverse (not simply 
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human) materials.” (1992, p. 380). Latour, Callon, and Law would reject the 
distinction given above between the “specific technical systems and their history as 
well as [..] the concepts and controversies of political theory.” (Winner, 1980, p. 
135). We have already developed an argument about the status of the actor in its 
relationship to the network and established that agency relies on this relationship. 
Whether we acknowledge the gap (between technology and social arrangements) 
identified in Winner’s proposal, or not, we must now turn our attention to the quality 
of agencies at work in our ecologies, that is to say to how, exactly, that agency is 
expressed. By doing so we will lend credence to Callon, Latour, and Law’s collapse 
of Winner’s distinction. 
 
Earlier it was noted that Latour expressed agency as the production of “difference” 
(Latour, 2005, p. 72). This process or production is referred to in ANT as 
“translation” (Law, 1992, pp. 385-9). Law notes that within networks, some actors 
appear so embedded as to be, effectively immovable, giving entrenched political 
regimes as an example (Law, 1992, p. 379). Their position comes to appear 
‘natural’ and their internal composition of a heterogeneous range of individual 
actors is reduced to a “black box” (Callon, 1991, p. 152), a unit apparently 
functioning as one, a status referred to as “punctualised” (Callon, 1991, p. 153). It 
is only with considerable force that such black boxes are opened and their 
workings revealed and potentially recomposed or scattered. Callon associates this 
depunctualising force with “authorship” (1991, pp. 135-6). For him, an author is an 
actor able to successfully position itself within a network to overcome resistance to 
change. It is exactly this definition that is held as productive for practice-based 
research. In this thesis, agency is that which is produced between materiality and 
an ecology and is reducible to neither. It is the capacity of things to overstep their 
boundaries (conceived of as their routine interaction with others24) and exercise 
                                            
24 A description of such boundaries as ‘naturalised’ can be found in later 
discussions. 
   53 
translation in their ecology. Agency, in short, is measurable by the degree to which 
an actor is responsible for depunctualising other, strongly embedded actors. 
 
A key finding of this review is that the concept of a making-practice which 
consciously engages with the agential aspects of materiality is absent from design 
literature. Previous research has emphasised interpretative approaches to 
materiality missing benefits to making-practices. This finding will be foundational 
for Chapter Five. 
2.1.4 Critiquing Technologies; Avenues and Methods 
In Section 2.1.2 some design research was criticized for applying a 
conceptualization of materiality which lacked a serious philosophical grounding for 
its approach, and which failed to articulate the interconnection between materiality 
and ecologies. The intention of this final section is to broaden the scope of the 
review by examining a wider range of research identified as a having potential for a 
productive relationship with making-practice. To further ground the later 
development of a number of facets of materiality into a framework for practice, this 
section will begin by examining some relevant strains of research which have 
already identified some particular features of materiality and assess to what degree 
these might be commensurable with a future design framework. Finally, some 
other research, in Media Archaeology, will be examined to ascertain whether its 
methodologies can be conceptually integrated with the developing approaches to 
materiality described thus far. 
 
Matthew Kirschenbaum (2008) has produced an influential (for instance on Berry, 
2011; Drucker, 2013) taxonomy of 'forensic', in the sense of ‘evidential’ aspects of 
materiality (which he describes as physical traces) and formal ones (such as the 
layout of a document)25 which inform his detailed study of hard disk technology as 
                                            
25 Forensic materiality is found in 'the material substrates of computing — its 
drives, tracks, disks, and fundamental physical supports” (Drucker, 2013). Formal 
materiality, meanwhile, is the instantiation of rules (Kirschenbaum, 2008): A CSS 
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a site of writing. His approach is compelling not only for its integration of technical 
detail with conceptual factors but because he has actually applied it in practice. His 
research archival practice (Kirschenbaum, 2013) is strongly founded in his 
conceptual formulation of materiality. His in-depth technical understanding of the 
specificities of particular kinds of storage media (such as magnetic floppy disks and 
VHS tapes) has informed his strategies for presentation and restoration of a 
number of archives of electronic literature wherein the materiality of the storage 
media is intimately connected to the writing process.   
 
“[vintage computing] machines served a dual role: on the one hand objects of 
preservation in and of themselves, artifacts that we sought to sustain and curate; 
but on the other hand, the vintage systems served as functional instruments, 
invaluable assets to aid us in retrieving data from obsolescent media and 
understanding the material affordances of early computer systems.” 
(Kirschenbaum M, 2013) 
 
Kirschenbaum describes the operation of hard disks as part of a process of writing 
emphasizing the similarity between human and machine forms of inscription. In 
Kirschenbaum’s research, erasure and storage are conceived of as contributing to 
a wider process of meaning creation. In fact they are conceived of as part of 
rhetoric. Kirschenbaum describes materiality as a kind of evidential articulation of 
argument whose particular “rhetoric[al]” (Kirschenbaum, 2008, p. 15) mode is 
bound to its material foundations. Electronic literature, according to Kirschenbaum 
is expressive in ways which are inseparable from its material form. 
 
As concepts, forensic and formal materiality have further potential for making-
practice. Forensic materiality highlights the value in working with computer systems 
below the interface level, engaging with their mechanisms (as he puts it). This 
                                                                                                                                     
class which styles a webpage, for example, manifests formal materiality: It applies 
a set of formal decisions to that document and produces a stylistic effect. 
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implies a recognition that this infrastructural level shapes and structures those 
interfaces. Formal materiality affords a way of thinking about the way that 
constraints are introduced into that infrastructure through the application of rules. 
Those constraints may be as simple as styling on a webpage, or as fundamental 
as access restrictions to a computer network which determine one’s interaction and 
experience with it. Both of these aspects present opportunities for intervention in 
design and making. Forensic aspects suggest literal places to work, areas of 
computer systems that can be remade differently with consequences for users. 
Formal aspects can be adjusted, rules re-written to produce different experiences. 
These points will be dealt with more fully in later chapters. Kirschenbaum’s 
categories are exceptional in this review section in that, rather than forming the 
basis of facets of materiality themselves, their use is identified as methodological 
across the thesis as a whole. In many respects, Kirschenbaum’s work is consistent 
with a Media Archaeological approach in his focus on the materiality of vintage 
technologies. The relevance of such approaches will be dealt with more thoroughly 
at the end of this section. 
 
Johanna Drucker adds, to Kirschenbaum’s (2008) formal and forensic categories, 
“distributed” and “performative” materialities (Drucker, 2013). In the following 
paragraphs, it will be shown that these two categories are inter-related, indeed co-
dependent and that they have profound consequences for our relationship with 
contemporary computing technologies. Further, it will be demonstrated that while 
Drucker’s categories provide a solid starting point, there are a number of concepts 
identified by other researchers which have a considerable bearing on these former 
and these correspondences will enrich both concepts. 
 
The concept of distributed materiality “disturbs assumptions of singularity or 
stability” (Drucker, 2013) about technological artefacts and focuses on their 
interdependent and modular character. By highlighting this feature, Drucker aligns 
her research with (Blanchette, 2011), who describes the complex 
interdependencies of contemporary, networked technologies as a paradigmatic 
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form of contemporary technological materiality. Similarly, Nigel Thrift and Mathew 
Fuller provide analyses of the way that software structures contemporary culture 
on an regulatory level through such interconnected and modular systems. For 
instance26, the enactment of finance through stock market algorithms, or the 
enablement (or disablement) of communications, are brought about only through 
the concerted action of a distributed network of computing devices, servers, PCs, 
electronic door locks, or Radio-Frequency Identification (RFID) tags. A co-
dependency exists between the modularity of contemporary computing and the 
power of contemporary software: The relation of these, through both coordinating 
control software, and technical standards for interoperability, for Thrift, is best 
described as “a series of writing acts […] in which language is both message and 
medium” (Thrift, 2005, p. 242). It is in this sense that Thrift and Drucker describe 
the action of software as “performative” (Thrift, 2003). The performative27 capacity 
of software identifies it as a both event and object. That is to say that it has 
material form (in computer memory and processors) but is also embodied in action 
as a series of interconnected processes. The complex relationship between written 
language (in computer code), the act of code compilation, and the processes which 
follow are the subject of Casey Alt’s (Alt, 2011) discussion of object oriented 
programming (OOP) and the definition of computers as a medium (rather than a 
tool). Alt describes how the complex internal relationships of object-oriented 
software form, themselves, a kind of ecology: 
 
“…within this multidimensional space of perpetually unfolding, interacting, affective 
objects, the program feels more like an embodied community and less like a linear 
script.” (Alt, 2011, p. 296) 
 
Spatiality was, of course, intimately involved in the development of early OOP 
languages such as Alan Kay’s Small Talk. Kay’s description of the early history of 
                                            
26 My examples. 
27 A fuller exposition of performativity will be given in Chapters four and five. 
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Small Talk is littered with references to spatial relationships in the form of 
architecture, boxes, cards and so forth (Kay, 1993). 
 
The interaction of such software with the outside world can be seen as an 
integration of distributed and performative materialities. Modularity is present, not 
only in independent, networked devices but in the composition of software itself as 
an ecology of interacting programming objects28. The writing of software which 
brings about such interaction is performative in the sense that it, quite literally, 
‘writes action’. That is the acts of writing and computation are inexorably connected 
through the compilation process of software and through the subsequent 
interaction of integrated software objects and modular computing hardware. 
 
A feature of the distributed and performative aspects of technology is that, for 
users, it is often difficult to actually see it in operation. Contemporary consumer 
technology, in particular, is designed to abstract users’ experience from the 
technical infrastructure on which it relies29. Put differently, software is effectively 
invisible until its effects are made known. Thrift calls this state of invisibility “a kind 
of absorption, an expectation of what will turn up in the everyday world” (Thrift, 
2005, p. 241). Technology continues to operate in the background but meanwhile 
shapes our understanding of our environment and how we interact with it.  
 
Following (Foucault, 2009 [1966], p. 165), and in common with (Fuller 2008, p. 4), 
Thrift, notes the “conditions of possibility”30  (the structural effects that technology 
has on regulating communication, relations, power) brought about by software and 
the way that such conditions become quickly naturalized and difficult to apprehend. 
Fuller suggests that a contributing factor to this ‘naturalization’ process is a view of 
                                            
28 In the sense of an OOP object. 
29 This point is developed further in the next chapter. 
30 The phrase “conditions of possibility” is attributed here to Foucault as integral to 
his exposition of the “episteme”. It should be noted however that this term has a 
longer history, also being associated with Kant. (Russell, 1996, 637-51) 
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software systems as ‘immaterial’ which he finds to be “ultimately trivializing and 
debilitating” (Fuller, 2008, p. 4). He notes that although invisible, software 
materiality causes, 
 
“…events [which] can occur at the level of models of user subjectivity or forms of 
computational power, that exceed those of pre-existing social formatting or 
demand new figures of knowledge.” (Fuller, 2008, p. 4) 
 
This ‘invisible’ aspect of materiality will be theoretically developed in 4.3.3 to 
develop a number of distinct kinds of invisibility. The implication of these for both 
making-practice and ecological aspects of materiality will be discussed.  
 
Like Kirschenbaum’s forensic materiality, distributed materiality also suggests 
technical starting points for makers. In this instance however, those are an 
investigation into the way that computer systems operate in combination. This 
distributed aspect is exploited by some artworks which technically intervene at the 
level of the network. Examples include Julian Oliver’s Transparency Grenade 
{Figure 10}  which captures wireless network traffic and streams it to a remote 
server, (Oliver, 2012) and Jonah Brucker-Cohen’s Wifi-Hog (Brucker-Cohen, 2003) 
which disrupts public access WiFi networks by jamming the signal for other users 
(Brucker-Cohen, Gaye, & Goodman, 2004). These two artworks engage 
subversively with the infrastructure which allows distributed devices to co-exist. 
They are founded in a knowledge of that infrastructure in both its technical and 
performative aspects. Both works are engaged with a political debate about the 
security of wireless networks and the new modes of behavior that have evolved 
around them. The specifics of their politics however, is not the chief motivation for 
their inclusion as examples. Rather, it is that these works, following 
Kirschenbaum’s description, articulate a “rhetorical” (Kirschenbaum, Ovenden, & 
Redwine, 2010, p. 62), material argument. They exploit the technical infrastructure 
to ‘phrase’ their political points, through specific materials. Just as a rhetorical 
speech, relies on particular persuasive modes, or employs motifs to structure a  
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Figure 10: The Transparency Grenade, image and copyright Julian Oliver 2012 
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discourse for listeners, the interventions produced by Oliver and Brucker-Cohen 
use the technical resources at their disposal to reconfigure technical systems to 
embody a critique. 
 
Having discussed various strands of research, tentatively grouped under the 
categories of performative and distributed materiality a final aspect is identified as 
what will be referred to as ‘fragile’ materiality. Some researchers have discussed 
aspects in which the materiality of contemporary technologies renders it fragile or 
vulnerable. Hitherto the main implication of this research has been in informing 
preservation and maintenance but it will be suggested in the following paragraphs 
that this aspect of materiality also has implications for making-practice.  
 
(Manoff, 2006 and Berry, 2011) invoke parallels with the materiality of older media 
to describe the vulnerabilities of electronic objects: 
 
“…critics have acknowledged that electronic objects are as dependent upon 
material instantiation as printed books. We access electronic texts and data with 
machines made of metal, plastic, and polymers.' (Manoff, 2006, p. 321)  
 
Manoff and Berry use this comparison to explore implications for the maintenance 
and upkeep of digital objects asking: “Who will pay to maintain the digital 
resources? […] Will the user forums, and user contributions, continue to be 
monitored and moderated if we can’t afford a staff member to do so?” (Berry D. , 
2011, p.11). Manoff points out meanwhile that the vulnerability of digital media is 
not only due to their dependence on financial support and human maintenance, it 
is also ‘built in’ to the physical materials from which they are made:  “As physical 
artefacts, digital media are prone to degradation over time. This kind of 
disintegration is sometimes called bit rot or data rot.” (Manoff, 2006, p.318). These 
are only two examples of what will be described throughout this thesis as ‘fragile 
materiality’. Their significance for making-practice though is considerable. The 
exploration of perishable, temporary or fragile aspects of non-digital materials has 
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occupied many notable artists and designers including Gustave Metzger (Flailing 
Trees, 2013), and Felix Gonzales-Torres ("Untitled" (Portrait of Ross in L.A.), 
1991), and thus some precedent for the creative potential of fragility exists. Flailing 
Trees (Metzger, 2013) upturned fifteen willow trees in a block of concrete, 
exposing their dying root systems and denying them the chance to 
photosynthesize. Torres’ (1991) work meanwhile, allowed visitors to remove pieces 
of candy from the exhibition space. Representing the body of his dead partner, the 
candy effectively time-limited the exhibition, and brought the theme of loss and 
transience directly into the gallery space. Some artists have specifically taken 
‘digital loss’ as both theme and form in their work. Zach Gage’s Lose Lose {Figure 
11} visualizes a computer’s entire file system (including system files and 
applications) as aliens in a ‘shoot-em-up’ game (Gage, 2009). Successful kills 
result in the file being permanently deleted. The game playfully, and dangerously, 
explores digital fragility by making ‘bit-rot’ an intentional action. 
 
What these works have in common is to use the fragility or vulnerability of the 
material world as an opportunity for the engagement of audiences (with 
environmental destruction, the effects of AIDS, and computer security 
respectively). These works demonstrate, if nothing else, that fragility is an aspect of 
materiality which is affective. However, audience (or user in other contexts) 
engagement is not the principal concern of this thesis. Instead, it is now suggested 
that to consider fragility in the context of making-practice is to acknowledge a 
particular kind of view of technology as inherently fallible. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 
5 this notion will be explored more fully but at this early point it will be limited to 
some brief remarks. There is an interrelationship between fragility and the 
distributed nature of technological materiality described in previous paragraphs. In 
fact the former is, to a large degree, a product of the later. The increasing 
codependence of one technology on another brings about the potential for domino-
effect failure, and with increasing technological complexity, this is increasingly 
difficult to predict. In Chapter 4 some historical examples of this phenomenon will  
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Figure 11: Lose Lose, screen grab. Copyright Zach Gage 2009 
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be described concurrent with a description of how this provided particular 
conceptual and technical opportunities during the process of creating an art work.  
 
To this point, this section has examined research, which has been explicitly 
involved with the theorization of materiality as a concept. Various strands have 
been assimilated and some commonality established. Now a different focus will be 
introduced: Research described in the following paragraphs can all be described 
as falling under the label: ‘Media Archaeology’, although there is no canonical 
definition of the term, and various, diverse theoretical directions exist within its 
rather broad church (Huhtamo & Parikka, 2011, pp. 1-5). What is attractive about 
the field for practitioners is its focus on the artefacts produced by our technological 
past. In Chapter 4, further justification for an ‘archaeological’, or historical approach 
will be provided but in this section, some existing research will be examined for its 
methodological focus. 
 
Friedrich Kittler examines historical and contemporary technologies (notably 
Gramophone, film, and the typewriter (Kittler, von Mücke, & Similon, 1987), fibre 
optics (Kittler, 2010), and computer graphics (Kittler F. , 2001)) to establish, in 
technical detail, connections between technological innovation and systemic, 
formal influences on human culture. He asserts that materiality manifests a cultural 
and historical agency, deterministically shaping the human sensorium and, by 
extension, our cultural imaginary. To provide an account for “the domain of 
technological manipulation of the real” (Winthrop-Young, 2006, p. 87), Kittler points 
out that “we knew nothing about our senses until media provided models and 
metaphors” (Kittler, 2010, p. 34), and that “what we take for our sense perception 
has to be fabricated first” (Kittler, von Mücke, & Similon, 1987, p. 103). As a society 
and as individuals, our ways of seeing and listening, for example, are shaped by 
technologies such as film or the gramophone, which also provide structures (rather 
than simply analogies) through which to talk about them. Kittler provides the 
example of the phenomenon of one’s life flashing before one’s eyes in the 
moments before death ( Kittler, 2010, p. 26). Without the visual forms (in terms of 
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cinematographic convention, position of the viewer and other formal aspects) of 
cinema, he argues, this phenomenon simply would not exist. Kittler claims that our 
studies of history have become too focused on human beings. History is not a list 
of, “directors, stars, studios and celebrities, which in the end remains organised 
around a series of titles” (Kittler, 2010, p. 26).  In other words, to fundamentally 
understand historical phenomena, we must provide a theoretical material 
foundation to the technologies which give them genesis. 
 
Kittler uses materiality to account for the way that our bodies are related to 
technology (such as the ear to the gramophone) and to provide a counterpoint to 
historical approaches which emphasize human agency as the sole or even main 
impetus in history and culture. The main relevance of Kittler’s work to this thesis is 
in encouraging a historical or archaeological study of particular technological 
materialities. Kittler’s analysis is always grounded in specific technologies which 
provide new avenues of thought. A commonality exists between Kittler’s writing 
and the aims of this thesis in that it, methodologically, it begins empirically with a 
study of technology in action before making its claims. In Chapter 4 and Chapter 5 
it will be described how the practice-based research of this thesis adopts aspects 
of this approach, combined with experimental making-practice.  
 
Kittler’s position is considerably more extreme than that given by (Winner, 1980) or 
(Pinch & Bijker, 1987) both of whom take a more balanced view of the determining 
forces at play in the social arrangement of people and technology. Pinch & Bijker’s 
main contribution is, perhaps, to note that “the developmental process of a 
technological artifact is […] an alternation of variation and selection” (Pinch & 
Bijker, 1987, p. 28). Pinch and Bijker discuss the development of artefacts (their 
chief example is the bicycle) as situated in a social context which produces a 
selection from developing technological alternatives. The ‘safety bicycle’31, for 
                                            
31 The ‘safety’ is what we might think of as a modern bicycle with a diamond-
shaped frame and pneumatic tires.  
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instance gained dominance because of its successful adoption into the racing 
market, bringing it to popular attention. In essence the agency of this design is 
located completely contextually. In the terms adopted by this thesis it is successful 
because it is situated in a network, arranged favourably to its success. What is 
dramatically missing from Pinch & Bijker’s account and, to a lesser degree from 
(Winner, 1980), is much developed discussion of what precisely it was about that 
design that contributed to that advantageous situatedness. The role of the 
mechanics who actually built the bicycle and their skills, the advances in steel and 
welding techniques, in short the materiality of the bicycle itself is reduced to a short 
note about the engineers’ disapproval of the pneumatic tire (Pinch & Bijker, 1987, 
p. 422). These vital processes of building are precisely what eludes an analysis 
based on “selection and variation” (Pinch & Bijker, 1987, p. 411). 
 
Wolfgang Ernst uses a technical exploration of storage media (such as recording 
media; discs, tapes or vinyl) to propose new approaches to media history (Parikka, 
2011, p. 53). In line with (Huhtamo & Parikka, 2011; Parikka, 2011) he argues that 
media histories have hitherto focused too sharply on ‘narrative’ approaches. That is 
to say they have sought to describe the effects of media on culture through 
studying both its content (such as the plotlines or imagery of films) and the theories 
of other historians. Ernst’s approach, though applied by himself to historical study, 
is identified as having some methodological implications for this thesis. Particularly, 
his combined technological and conceptual analysis of storage media (which has 
some resonance with (Alt, 2011; Blanchette, 2011; and Kirschenbaum, 2008), 
provides further proof not only that such a combination is possible and productive, 
but that it offers a radically different order of conclusions than research conducted 
without such a close technological reading. Some of such conclusions from Ernst’s 
research will be described in the following paragraph. 
 
Ernst outlines a notion of “media archaeography' (Ernst, 2011) [emphasis added]. 
The ‘-graphy’ refers to histories of technology authored by machines themselves in 
the form of wax cylinders, magnetic tape and patina. In every medium of recorded 
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audio, he argues, a different kind of writing survives. Ernst’s proposition is to 
consider this technological writing not as historical sources, but as other historical 
accounts with particular modes of expression, temporality or spatiality. This 
approach fundamentally refocuses media studies on the specificities of technology 
in terms of its technical functionality. From there it can go on to discuss its place in 
culture, its effect on users and its relationship to other technologies. The emphasis 
though is in the way that technology acts itself rather than in the way that it 
functions as a medium for content. In this sense there are parallels with McLuhan’s 
(1994) work whose descriptions of “hot” and “cold” media emphasized the capacity 
of specific technologies to embody particular modes of communication. Where 
Ernst’s research departs from McLuhan, though, is with an increased emphasis on 
the kinds of meaning produced by technological systems in their own right32. Ernst 
explores the particular configurations of space and time produced by storage 
media in terms which approach the architectural. It is here that real significance of 
Ernst’s work for makers, is located. By undertaking close descriptions of media in 
their spatio-temporal aspects he implicitly encourages makers to treat those as 
working spaces to be explored: 
 
“…the historical mode of describing temporal processes has been confronted with 
alternative modelings of time, When it comes to describing media in time, this 
aporia becomes crucial, since one can no longer simply subject media processes 
to a literary narrative without fundamentally misreading and misrepresenting their 
Eigenzeit33. Historical media narratives take place in imaginary time. Storage 
technologies, on the other hand, take place in the symbolic temporal order...” 
(Ernst, 2011, p. 242) 
 
An “Eigenzeit” for Ernst, is a recognition that computational processes are subject 
to an unthinkable complexity in the relationship between time, space and 
                                            
32 A point commensurable with Meillassoux’s 2010 work already discussed. 
33 Eigenzeit translates approximately to “own” or “characteristic” time. (Oxford 
Dictionaries, 2013). 
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materiality. Alt’s (2011) work noted that the dynamic intra-action, action between 
different parts of the same programme, means that OOP creates, what he calls, 
“communities” of parts. Ernst’s work implies that to map such a community requires 
different tools for the historian, it cannot be expressed as existing on a linear, or 
even branching sequence of time and necessitates new forms of description and 
intervention. 
 
The development of new conceptions of time and space can be shown historically 
to have a reciprocally influencing relationship to creative practice as well as 
scientific research (which of course have at times been integrated)34. It is 
suggested (without necessarily implying a direct relationship) that many aspects of 
Ernst’s “Eigenzeit” are implicit in the sound artwork of Shintaro Miyazaki35. 
Miyazaki sonifies sorting algorithms and computer electromagnetic emissions 
(Miyazaki, 2012) by taking such spaces as both a subject (the pieces are about the 
physical and algorithmic spaces of computers) and a material (they are made in 
and with those spaces). Miyazaki’s treatment is distinctly spatial; Algorhythmic 
Sorting Miyazkai, ongoing substitutes and reorders sounds in a space which is 
both sonic and based on computational processes. Computer Music (2012) 
explicitly deals with the physical extent of a laptop computer and the shifting 
activity, through time, of particular components within that space.  
2.2 Summary: Materiality 
This chapter investigated a broad range of theories and philosophical approaches 
to materiality. A key finding of the review is that there is a richer, more historical, 
more critically informed account of materiality and its implications to be found in 
research which theorises materiality in the context of technology after the making-
process is effectively over. There is consequently an opportunity to develop 
theories of materiality that integrate more tightly with making-processes. It is 
asserted that some research in design (Ishii, 2008; Ishii & Ullmer, 1997; Ishii, 
                                            
34 For instance in Bakhtin (1981). 
35 Miyazaki’s work is of particular interest because of his treatment of the times and 
spaces produced by contemporary computational hardware. 
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Lakatos, Bonanni, & Labrune, 2012; Jung & Stolterman, 2012; Jung & Stolterman, 
2011; Robles & Wiberg, 2010; Wiberg, 2013), has hitherto focused on a narrow 
definition of materiality, based principally on qualities, form (i.e. the aspects of 
materiality which inform perception), metaphor and interpretation, which, while 
useful as described, represents only part of the potential benefits of research into 
the concept as applied to making. Crucially such approaches do not satisfactorily 
account for the agency of technological artefacts and systems. A proposition for 
such an account was offered in section 2.1.3, founded in the discussion of ontology 
in 2.1.1. It was argued first that ontological meaning is an a priori part of materiality 
and being. An integration of that view with ANT was then offered and agency was 
established as the capacity of actors to ‘exceed their limits’ based on a 
combination of their situatedness within a network and the interactions of 
ontological meaning which constitute that network. 
 
The first contribution of this thesis, which has begun in this chapter, is to explore 
how a multifaceted approach to materiality can inform and benefit making-
practices. A synthesis and development of key concepts from works described and 
original analysis of them is now offered.  
 
Drucker (2013) offers the term “performative materiality” to align her theories of 
materiality with previous work (Austin, 1962; Butler, 1988; Searle, 1976) which 
focus on the capacity of utterances to act in the world. Her method though 
inadvertently reduces such action to an effect of language (a tendency criticised by 
Barad, 2003, p. 802). It is proposed that a more powerful conception of the term 
would, drawing on (Blanchette, 2011; Fuller, 2008; Kirschenbaum M. , 2008; Thrift, 
2005), account for the way meaning and action are processually created, how 
technical systems and human creativity combine to produce them. Drucker’s 
formulation of this term is insufficiently founded in specific technological examples 
and the adoption of Media Archaeological approaches such as in (Ernst, 2011; 
Huhtamo, 2004; Kittler, von Mücke, & Similon, 1987) are proposed as a remedy. 
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Better realised is Drucker’s notion of “distributed materiality” (Drucker, 2013) and 
examples have been offered of how some artists (Brucker-Cohen, 2003; Oliver, 
2012) have already produced work which intervenes on this level or “register” 
(Thrift, 2005) of materiality. Distributed materiality emphasises the modular, 
layered (Blanchette, 2011, pp. 8-12) and inter-connected nature of contemporary 
computing technology and the way that it combines to structure or regulate our 
“conditions of possibility” (Foucault, 2009 [1966], p. 165; Fuller, 2008, p. 2). It has 
been noted that there is an interrelationship between the kinds of materiality 
indicated by the previous research and Thrift’s concept of “writing acts” (Thrift, 
2005). Thrift’s ‘writing’ is proposed here as a way of integrating performative and 
distributed materialities as software interacts with modular and networked 
technologies. 
 
Materiality affords a way of thinking of the fragililty of technology. The term ‘fragility’ 
is employed to emphasise the nature of technology as “perishable” or “easily 
destroyed” (Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010). Drawing inspiration from (Berry, 
2011; Manoff, 2006) some contemporary artistic work (Gage, 2009) was aligned 
with examples of older creative practice. These latter, explored the fragility of other 
kinds of material (Gonzalez-Torres, 1991; Hirst, 2009; Metzger, 2013).  It was 
consequently demonstrated that fragility, as a source of creative inspiration has 
precedent. More importantly it was suggested that fragility is a corollary effect of 
the distributed character of materiality and consequently, the understanding of one, 
involves an appreciation of the other. 
 
Ernst’s (2011) work on the “eigenzeit” or distinctive temporalities of recording 
media, together with Kirschenbaum’s account of writing with hard disks as a 
“rhetorical” process ( 2008, p. 15) share a notion that technology creates new 
spatio-temporal arrangements, and both researchers serve as exemplary models 
of integrated conceptual and technical research. An early proposal is advanced 
that the idiosyncratic spatio-temporal arrangements of particular technologies, in 
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the context of practice, can be thought of as working spaces to be explored, re-
shaped and creatively intervened with. 
 
Finally future-oriented materiality is offered, as a way of encapsulating and 
developing a number of disparate threads identified in this review. (Heidegger 
1971; 1996 [1927]; Keane 2005; 2013; Meillassoux, 2010; and Miller 2005) all offer 
distinct ways of considering the production and origin of meaning. The embodiment 
of meaning in the world means that meaning is never ‘settled’ leading to a variety 
of potential futures (Keane, 2005, p. 193). To engage in making, with such a 
perspective on materiality, is to see one’s work as an intervention into the 
production of future meanings, not as a creation of meaning ex nihilo. In Chapter 4 
and Chapter 5 the effect of this understanding on making-practice will be explored 
through an account of the production of a number of works of art and design. 
 
These five facets are presented here at an initial stage. Chapter 4 will develop 
them further describing how they are also a product of practice-based research. 
Having presented some initial descriptions of the five facets of materiality identified, 
in the next section a different focus will be adopted. In the introduction, it was 
suggested that a benefit of materiality, as the basis for a making-process, is that it 
suggests a number of ways that one’s work integrates into the contexts in which it 
is exhibited, deployed or otherwise put into circulation. The next chapter will 
develop some theoretical background for this ecological approach. 
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Chapter 3. In What Sense, Ecologies? 
This chapter provides background review to inform the later development of a 
notion of an ‘experiential ecology’. The previous chapter dealt, at length, with a 
series of conceptual and methodological factors pertaining to the integration of 
concepts of materiality with making-practice. A key finding, particularly from the 
discussions of agency, affordance and the distributed nature of contemporary 
technologies, was that a conceptually developed understanding of materiality 
inevitably engages with an ecological approach. Briefly, it was argued that (a) 
understanding agency involves an integration of concepts of ontological meaning 
and situatedness within a network (b) affordance is a meaningful concept only 
when taken as a product of animal, environment and action (irreducible to rule-
based abstractions) (following Suchman, 2007), and (c) contemporary computing 
creates what are in effect ecologies of interacting objects of software (in the sense 
of OOP) and modular technologies (building on Alt, 2011; Fuller, 2005; 2008; and 
Thrift, 1996; 2005). Thus, there are three initial provocations for further literature 
review into the way that the concept of the ecology has been formulated 
previously. These will be discussed here before being revisited in the final chapter.  
 
In the following sections it will be observed first how (Gaver 1991) notes the 
“continuity of information” in groups of “nested affordances” which are part of an 
ecology of action-cognition. Next, (Sharrock and Anderson 1993) stretch the 
concept of affordance outwards from its earlier application to individual interactions 
and in terms of individual properties of affordance, into an ecological dimension 
involving interconnected and co-dependent individuals, tied together in activities. 
While (McCarthy & Wright, 2004) following (Dewey, 2005 [1934]), provide an 
experiential dimension to ecologies, (Bennet, 2010) attempts a more holistic 
account of the way that humans and objects co-exist in ecologies by describing 
them as ‘publics’. 
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3.1 Aims and Objectives 
Given the findings from Chapter 2 described above, the overall aim of this review 
chapter is to provide an overview of the concept of an 'ecology', as it has been 
applied to technology, to describe the defining features of various kinds of 
ecologies and how they differ, and to identify relationships between theories of 
‘ecologies’ and materiality. This analysis is intended to inform the later 
development of what will be called ‘experiential ecologies’ by asking, for instance, 
how ecologies are formed, how a making-process can be affected by an ecological 
understanding and what, if any, are the aesthetic implications of ecological 
contexts for making. More specifically the objectives are: 
 
In 3.1.1 to re-visit some ontological approaches to materiality and establish their 
rapport with theories of ecology.  
 
In 3.1.2 to examine previous accounts of ecologies in studies of technology and to 
consider their potential applicability to, or contrast with, experimental making-
practice as described in this thesis. 
 
In 3.1.3, by discussing the relationship of cybernetic theories to early 1970s art 
practice, to consider the role of modeling in ecological theories. 
 
In 3.1.4 to begin a discussion of the relationships between ecologies and 
experience and specifically to attempt an integration with aspects of materiality. 
 
In 3.1.5 to consider some ways in which ecologies are formed and delimited. 
3.1.1 Making Ecologies 
Chapter Two began to argue that particular philosophical approaches to the origin 
of meaning, tied to materiality, had the potential to provoke a particular attitude 
from makers. Briefly, it was suggested that viewing meaning as something inherent 
to materiality motivates a methodological involvement with the pasts of artefacts, 
such as that found in some approaches from Media Archaeology (e.g. Ernst, 
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2011), and also brings about a view of them as involved in the production of future 
meaning (following Keane, 2005; 2013). It was further argued that there is an 
ethical dimension attached to this view of materiality and that this latter, is founded 
on an understanding of ourselves as ontologically connected to the ecology in 
which we create things. It is the definition and implications of this connection which 
will be expanded here. This chapter will discuss a variety of approaches to the 
concept of ecology but it will be seen how some common threads emerge. A point 
of concentration for analysis, taken as central in this section, will be the degree to 
which the material world and human cognition are perceived as separate or 
integrated. In short, it is proposed that a central question to be resolved for any 
definition of an ecology is the nature of subjectivity/objectivity within it and the 
relationship of both with the world around us. Disagreements over this fundamental 
issue, it will be shown, permeate many discussions of ecology over the past forty 
years in literature and practice. 
 
Before examining the notion of ecology as specifically applied to technological 
systems and their relationship to human users, the following paragraphs will 
describe how Heidegger conceived of the relationship between people and the 
material world, and building on the discussion in Section 2.1.1, consider their 
implications for making-practice. Heidegger’s perspective will provide a 
philosophical grounding for the particular, materially implicated, view of ecologies 
which will be developed throughout this thesis. Heidegger (1996 [1927]) offers a 
significant disruption to a Cartesian view of subjectivity /objectivity in which the 
internal mind is essentially distinct from world around us. His account of the 
relationship between humans and the world begins by claiming the privileged 
ontological position of a human, or human-like actor: Dasein.  
 
It was described in the previous chapter that materiality in Heidegger is part of a 
particular kind of ontological relationship for a particular kind of being. In 
Heidegger, however, there is also a complex and troublesome mix between a 
dependence on human intervention and an absolute insistence that it is also 
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inherent to beings. For instance ‘handiness’ (Zuhandenheit), the quality of being 
encountered as for a purpose (Heidegger, 1996 [1927], p. 60), despite dependence 
on Dasein is described as  “the ontological categorial definition of beings as they 
are ‘in themselves.’” (Heidegger, 1996 [1927], p. 67) [emphasis added]. For 
Heidegger, this apparent contradiction is resolved by developing an account, or 
rather accounts, of the way things are in a world in which Dasein is involved with 
careful attentiveness. This ‘care’ is part of the ‘primordial’ nature of Dasein as part 
of a connected whole. 
 
“Our absorption in taking care of things in the work world nearest to us has the 
function of discovering; depending upon the way we are absorbed, innerworldly 
beings that are brought along together with their constitutive references are 
discoverable in varying degrees of explicitness and with a varying attentive 
penetration. The kind of being of these beings is ‘handiness’ (Zuhandenheit). But it 
must not be understood as a mere characteristic of interpretation, as if such 
‘aspects’ were discursively forced upon ‘beings’ which we initially encounter, as if 
an initially objectively present world-stuff were ‘subjectively coloured’ in this way.” 
(Heidegger, 1996 [1927], p. 67) 
 
Our ecological relationship with our surroundings, in a Heideggerean mode is 
resolved only through an active relationship with the world. This action for 
Heidegger is part of an on-going attentive relationship with the world. Our 
ontological relationship with our surroundings is actually defined and maintained by 
the kind of engagement with them that we enter in to. This account of action as 
ontologically defining provokes a view of ecologies in which we are always already 
engaged with the world and as such our relationship with it cannot be reduced to 
the ‘them and us’ of Cartesian subjectivity: 
 
“Such a view of ‘engaged agency’ leads Heidegger to jettison the Cartesian way of 
thinking of human beings, as isolated and disengaged subjects who represent 
objects to themselves, and to settle instead for the world-disclosing function of 
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practices which always assumes a background of implicit familiarity, competence 
and concern of involvement.” (Thrift, 1996, p. 10) 
 
More recently Heidegger’s position finds a compliment from (Suchman, 2002; 
2007). Where Heidegger was making claims for the ontological status of the world 
however, Suchman is interested in the way people make sense of it in activity. 
What is common to them both though, and what justifies their discussion together 
here, is that in both there is a constitutive relationship between activity and the 
world that is not divisible to physicality versus conscious thought. Suchman’s 
research is relevant here, although her focus is on social interaction, because her 
account of the social is integrated with an understanding of our relationship to the 
material world. Her account of sense-making, from which an example passage is 
given below is founded on a notion that activity, thought, and the world are not 
meaningful concepts if taken independently. 
 
“The sense of the situation I am after, […], is a radically performative and 
interactional one, such that action’s situation is in significant respects constituted 
through, or stands in a reflexive relationship with, on-going activity. It is through the 
latter that the sense and relevance – just what the situation comprises – is 
produced, re-enacted, contested, and/or transformed.” (Suchman, 2007, p. 125) 
 
Both Heidegger and Suchman, in different ways, treat our relationship with the 
world as one in which we are already engaged. For Heidegger, this engagement is 
part of an ontological relationship. For Suchman the establishment of ‘social facts’ 
“…how it is that the mutual intelligibility and objectivity of the social world is 
achieved” (Suchman, 2007, p. 76), rests on a study of how social experience is 
played out in concrete experience in particular circumstances located in the 
physical world. Suchman (above) suggests that situations are also, in part, 
constituted in performance. That is to say that sense making is only possible 
because of an on-going, iterative, contribution by (in Suchman’s case) people in 
action, to what the world is. The previous chapter saw that ‘performativity’ can also 
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be regarded as a facet of the concept of materiality and this connection between 
materiality, performativity and ecologies, will continue to be developed throughout 
the thesis. 
 
In the previous chapter it was noted that our ontological involvement with materials 
provokes, for Heidegger a sense of moral responsibility for this involvement, and 
this view here has been expanded to look at how our involvement is also, 
inherently ecological. While the previous chapter considered this from the 
perspective of our relationship to materials, it is now acknowledged that such a 
mode of “engaged agency” (Thrift, 1996, p. 10) provokes a view of oneself as 
already ‘carefully’ involved with the ecologies in which one makes. This in turn 
brings about a consideration of the way our making-practice is, in fact, a mode of 
activity through which we express our ecological involvement. This last point is 
presented as a finding of this section of literature review.  
3.1.2 Affordances and Social Ecologies 
The concept of ‘affordance’ has already been examined briefly in the way that it 
has provided designers with a way of thinking about materiality when they design 
interactions. It was asserted at that point that the concept of affordance is, in fact, 
meaningless without a due consideration of its ecological nature and that a failure 
to fully appreciate this undermines the claims of some design activity36. Affordance, 
it was proposed can be thought of as a combination of animal, environment and 
action and this definition establishes its relevance to the concept of an ecology. In 
fact, previous research has, in different ways, attempted to integrate these 
concepts and some of this will be examined in the following paragraphs.  
 
Gaver notes, following (Gibson 1979), that the interplay of perception, action, and 
the environment is fundamentally an ecology. 
 
                                            
36 Reference the discussion of materiality and metaphor in some TUI literature in 
2.1.2 in which it was claimed that by metaphorically referencing the affordances of 
interactions misses the rich and situated character of that interaction. 
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“The notion of affordances is in many ways the epitome of the ecological approach, 
encapsulating ideas about ecological physics, perceptual information, and the links 
between perception and action.” (Gaver, 1991, p. 79) 
 
Gaver goes on to develop a nuanced analysis of how this operates in 
perception/interaction by noting how affordances can be mutually supportive and 
exploratory. Affordances, according to Gaver, combine in objects to form local 
ecologies, what he calls, “nested affordances” (Gaver, 1991, p. 82) of their own 
which provide interactional opportunities to users, that is to say, things to explore: 
 
“In general, the affordances of complex objects are often grouped by the continuity 
of information about activities they reveal. Affordances are not passively perceived, 
but explored.” (Gaver, 1991, p. 82) 
 
Gaver gives the example of the “nested affordances” of a door (Gaver, 1991, pp. 
81-82). The separation of the door from the wall affords movement which in turn 
supports the affordance of the handle which suggests pulling or pushing. This 
model is ecological in the sense that it presents a user located in domain of 
multiple possibilities of interaction. The user is always already engaged in an 
exploration of such possibilities. In the context of the door, they can push or pull it, 
use the handle or ignore it but each of those choices is a kind of ecological 
exploration. The aim of Gaver’s research into affordances is not dissimilar from that 
of (Norman, 1999), already discussed. What separates them is that by integrating 
action and environment through the discussion of exploratory possibilities, Gaver 
does not present us with the false dichotomy described by (Norman 1999) between 
affordances as perceptual or inherent to the world, but integrates the two by 
acknowledging exploratory action as the bridge. 
 
Sharrock and Anderson (1993) develop an unorthodox notion of affordance, and 
apply it to the way that knowledge is distributed around workspaces. Their 
affordances are ‘unorthodox’ inasmuch as they seek to develop a “delineation of 
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the social construction of affordance” (Sharrock & Anderson, 1993, p. 144), 
[emphasis in original] to understand the organisation and distribution of cognition 
within such environments (Sharrock & Anderson, 1993, p. 144). To do so, they 
point out that cognition relies on particular “structuring affordances” (Sharrock & 
Anderson, 1993, p. 147). As an example they describe how an office layout 
embodies part of a social, cognitive ecology (Sharrock & Anderson, 1993, p. 144) 
in the distribution of knowledge around a team, as physical clues such as the table 
or desk one sits at implies ones engagement in particular tasks which form part of 
a chain or workflow: 
 
“We always perceive, see, hear something. One sees a chair; hears a voice; 
touches a surface. But, in that it is intentional, perception involves us, the 
perceiving agents, in a relationship with our environment as an environment of 
perceived objects. Hence Gibsonian theory is ecological. We like to think of this 
relationship as one of ‘structuration’. We do not just see, hear, feel things. We see, 
hear and feel them in a context, against a background of other things and actions.” 
(Sharrock & Anderson, 1993, p. 146) 
 
Sharrock and Anderson’s use of affordance describes the way that physical 
objects, combined with social relationships, structure cognitive processes by 
mediating interaction between team members. This extended or distributed 
interaction is construed as a knowledge creating scenario. Because these actions 
extend through objects into ones relationship with others in a workplace, and vice 
versa, knowledge-in-action is mutually constitutive: 
 
“The connection between knowledge and action is defined in constitutive terms. 
Patterns of knowledge and patterns of action define each other. Hence knowledge 
is seen as social through and through.” (Sharrock & Anderson, 1993, p. 149) 
 
In their examples from the workplace Sharrock and Anderson describe the 
production of knowledge through the interaction of team members. Their 
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understanding of how to accomplish tasks, is imbricated with an appreciation of 
how work flows through a physical and social environment. Sharrock and Anderson 
ask, “what it is about the social worlds in which we all live which enable us to see 
organisational objects in the ways which we do?” (Sharrock & Anderson, 1993, p. 
158), pointing out that to see world as social and organised, provokes a question 
over how inter-subjectivity is embedded in our environments. The first implication 
of Sharrock and Anderson’s work for the notion of the particular sense of ‘ecology’ 
as it will be developed here is in their account for the way that knowledge 
production is embedded in the world and resolved in action. 
 
The wider field of distributed cognition also evokes notions of the ecology. In 
(Hutchins 1995) the concept of a ‘cognitive ecology’ is used to describe 
interactions between a team of sailors, their instruments and the boat itself in “an 
ecology of thinking in which human cognition interacts with an environment rich in 
organizing resources” (Hutchins, 1995, p. xiv). Hutchins’ ecology though while 
seeking to integrate inner cognitive worlds and external worlds of tools and actions 
is founded on the basis that these are separate. When he suggests that, “Every 
argument showing why a particular tool is easy to use is also an argument showing 
why both internal and external tools are part of the very same cognitive ecology.” 
(Hutchins, 1995, p. 114), there is an implicit ontological claim being made wherein 
two opposing kinds of thing (internal and external tools) are described and 
juxtaposed. 
 
The second main implication, for the developing notion of an ecology from this 
work, is the recognition that an environment of things ‘structure’ or ‘organise’ 
knowledge. This indicates an important recognition of a particular kind of role for 
materiality within ecologies in the context of making-practice. Earlier, agency was 
defined in terms of the ability of actors to cause structural changes to a network. 
This was described as an ability of things to ‘overstep their limits’. The concept of a 
‘nested’ or ‘structural’ affordance is another way of accounting for the kinds of roles 
that materiality can embody in this scenario. If materials are taken as being able to 
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redefine a working environment in their own unique ways then they have a role in 
the kind of knowledge that may be produced within that environment. 
 
This thesis aims to develop an understanding of ecological involvement which will 
inform and support making-practice. Although the paragraphs above have begun to 
describe some of the rich scholarly history of the concept of ecology, it asserted 
that there remains significant scope for contribution to be made in the area of 
technologically-engaged creative-practice. Supporting this claim is the fact that 
there are methodological commitments, and elements of professional organisation 
which differ radically from the work described in this thesis, and the research 
referenced above. 
 
Although the structuring involvement with social arrangements or knowledge 
creation assigned to materiality, as described by (Sharrock & Anderson, 1993), is 
significant, it adopts (perhaps appropriately given the field of research in which it is 
located) an anthropocentric approach which is not entirely commensurable with the 
aims of this thesis. The focus on the materiality of contemporary technologies in 
the context of making, here, provokes further reflection of the kinds of roles 
enacted by technology in ecologies. Given the particular nature of the practice 
described in this thesis (as creative and trans-disciplinary) there is an imperative to 
think more broadly about the relationship of materiality and ecology: A key 
understanding, as described in the introduction to this chapter, is that previous 
research into ecologies described in this section, belonged to a particular historical 
period of the study of human computer interactions (the 1980s to mid 1990s) and 
was mostly generated around the field of Computer Supported Cooperative Work 
and associated conferences and journals. This is significant because of particular 
methodological arrangements which accompanied such work. Early ethnographic 
studies (such as Heath & Luff, 1991; Sommerville & Bentley, 1992), in common 
with (Sharrock & Anderson, 1993), attempted to provide accounts for the social 
organisation of work as enacted within an environment. The rich, detailed, 
observations made by such studies certainly produced plausible accounts of the 
   81 
way that social arrangements functioned in the workplace37 and are not 
inconsistent with a definition of those arrangements and the environment in which 
they are enacted as ecological. However the work produced during the period 
identified, referenced here, was intended to describe ecologies with an entirely 
different kind of practice in mind and this motivates new methodological 
approaches. The ethnomethodological work cited above was produced in 
environments where there was a division of labour between the empirical social 
scientist researcher, who was asked, eventually, to extract design 
recommendations, and the systems designer who implemented them. There was 
consequently a temporal, organisational separation between study, design and 
implementation, arranged on a mostly linear transition from one to the next, albeit 
with iteration over various stages. 
 
The transition, described above, from observation to implementation was not at all 
unproblematic as has been noted (e.g. by Plowman, Rogers, & Ramage, 1995; 
Pycock & Bowers, 1996), and this has been a source of some criticism of 
ethnographic techniques. It is also perhaps, a contributing factor to the 
development of more hybrid methodologies, adopting ethnographic approaches but 
combining them with various forms of critique such as (Dourish & Bell, 2011, pp. 
61-90). In addition to the difficulties involved in the transition from observation to 
design there are further motivations for contributing new understandings of the 
ecology into thinking about the process of making art and design. This thesis 
describes a methodology where observation (of technical systems and interaction, 
rather than the social organisation of work), and experimental making-practice are 
not formally separated. The ecological focus suggested by such a practice is 
founded in the working space itself and may precede any interaction with 
audiences or users. An important distinction being made is that rather than 
                                            
37Crabtree, Rodden, Tolmie, & Button’s (2009) reminder that ethnomethodology is 
applicable not only to “work” situations is noted. 
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ecologies around the use of technologies, post design, this thesis examines 
ecologies of technology where making-practice and investigation are integrated. 
 
Until this point understanding affordance has been used as a way of explicating 
user experience, not as a facet through which to study our creative interaction with 
ecologies. However, some attempt to reconcile these different aims can be found 
in John Bowers’ (2002) description of “performance ecologies” in live improvised, 
electro-acoustic music. Bowers describes how the arrangement of various 
instruments both supports his own performance and gives perceptual cues to other 
musicians. 
 
“Guitar to the left and physically manipulable. Computer to the right and running 
composition machines. Synthesiser centrally placed offering knob control over 
noodling patches amongst other things. The point here is that by moving from one 
side of the table to the other I can do different things and be seen to be doing 
different things – different in gesture type, device type and sonic consequence. Not 
only does this organisation of my playing environment make things more effective 
for me, it gives clues to the legibility of my gestures, both for co-performers and 
audience.” (Bowers, 2002, p. 52) 
 
Bowers’ performance ecologies are ecologies of not only musicians but of 
instruments as well. The particular layout, as well as the technical connections 
between one instrument and another form organisational affordances that allow 
different kinds of structure to his actions. These are bound, to the presence of 
objects and their arrangement in space, relative to one another, to him and to his 
co-performers. There is, in this respect, some commonality with Sharrock and 
Anderson’s (1993) work but relocated to creative practice. By invoking the visibility 
of gestures, Bowers implies another kind of ecological analogy with the natural 
world which is also emphasised as potentially helpful to making-practice: An 
ecology of communicating animals in a dynamic interaction with the material world 
around them as well as with each other. Such an analogy serves as a reminder 
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that ecologies are, and should be vibrant, communicative places where choices are 
made and expressed. 
3.1.3 Environmental Ecologies 
Other authors have invoked notions of the ecology to describe a variety of modes 
of interaction between people and their technological environment. It will be 
observed that a recurrent issue for debate in this area is the relationship between 
model/theory and the world which it describes. This issue is pertinent here, since 
creative practice will later be proposed as one way of avoiding this duality. Fuller 
(2005, pp. 3-6) summarises a number of distinct strands of ‘ecology’ which, for him, 
form a useful intersection. First, “information ecologies” is employed to discuss the 
movement of information through an organisation through (human) management 
and computer infrastructure. We might include Sharrock and Anderson’s (1993) 
work in this category. A second strand is a kind of ‘environmental ecology’ inspired 
by the contemporary green movement is relevant first because it provides some 
example of problems encountered in the close application of an ecological model 
to the world itself and second because of its involvement with creative practice. As 
such a brief overview of the field will be offered. 
 
“Such environmentalism also often suggests that there has passed, or that there 
will be reached, a state of equilibrium: that there is a resilient and harmonic 
balance to be achieved with some ingenious and beneficent mix of media.” (Fuller, 
2005, p. 4) 
 
An example of such an environmentally inspired ecology is found in (Nardi and 
O'Day, 1999) and builds partly on the writings of John von Neuman (as described 
by Thrift, 2005, p. 244). This environmentally inspired ecology is beholden to the 
field of cybernetics (for instance in Bateson, 1970; Weiner, 1948; Wilden, 1972) 
which was also influential in early computer art. The idea of the cybernetic system 
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– a self-regulating machine whose goal is homeostasis based on feedback38, was 
applied enthusiastically as a model for nature. The adoption of a techno-
environmental model (the cybernetic system) was, indeed, explicitly referenced in 
the 1968, Institute of Contemporary Arts show Cybernetic Serendipity and Software 
(Shaw, 1968), Jack Burnham’s contribution at the Jewish Museum, New York 
(Burnham, 1970) and Roy Ascott’s ‘cybernetic vision’ (Ascott, 2003, p. 126).  
 
Some stronger versions of the cybernetic model (such as in Weiner, 1948), adopt 
significantly different positions than that adopted by this thesis with regard to the 
nature of intra-ecological communication. Commentators (eg Curtis, 2011; 
Suchman, 2007), have observed that some influential research, both informing 
cybernetics (such as Shannon, 2001 [1948]), and influenced by it more recently 
(particularly in AI research such as Brooks, 1999), adopt a Cartesian dualism by 
treating communication, for example, as a phenomenon which can be described in 
the abstract, without a true, contextualizing situation. The notion that natural 
systems can be reduced to signal processing of the sort described by (Shannon, 
2001 [1948]) is, to some degree, implicit in the metaphor of the cybernetic circuit. 
Such accounts are criticized by (Suchman 2007, p. 251) as fundamentally 
misunderstanding the nature of communication which she describes as a series of 
actions, contingent on both in-the-moment decisions, and as being a kind of 
performative action, similar to that described in Chapter 2.  
 
However, some contributors to the field of cybernetics approach the performance 
of communication and feedback differently and raise points which have potential 
relevance for this thesis. Bateson (1970) discusses the relationship between formal 
abstractions (models) and the world itself, with an awareness of the problematic 
relationship between the two. His definition of ‘difference’, for instance, was 
                                            
38 Cybernetics employed the notion of a ‘circuit’ (in the sense of an electronic 
circuit) as a model for understanding the interactions of organisms within a system. 
Feedback, the capacity of organisms to respond to stimuli, is a key requirement of 
a successful “circuit”. 
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intended to lessen this by noting how abstract the very notion of the difference 
between the physical world and representation is. In the following quote he 
discusses this through an analogy of the territory and the map respectively. 
 
“The territory never sets in at all. The territory is Ding an sich and you can’t do 
anything with it. Always the process of representation will filter it out so that the 
mental world is only maps of maps of maps, ad infinitum. All ‘phenomena’ are 
literally ‘appearances.’” (Bateson, 1970, p. 509) 
 
Bateson continues by proposing various ways that the mind extends into its 
environment, proposing something not unlike the distributed cognition of (Hutchins, 
1995) and though there remains a distinction between the world outside, and the 
mind within, that distinction is conceived of as a matter of degree. Interestingly, like 
(Heidegger, 1954; 1971;1996 [1927]), Bateson conceives of ethical implications for 
this imbrication with one’s environment, suggesting that: “A certain humility 
becomes appropriate, tempered by the dignity or joy of being part of something 
much bigger…” (Bateson, 1970, p. 525) suggesting further justification for 
incorporating ethical concerns into the growing picture, developed through this 
thesis, of an ecological-informed approach to making. 
 
This example of cybernetics applied to artistic practice is significant because it 
represents an ongoing desire to conceive of art and design work in ecological 
terms. Cybernetics offered an analogy by which to position art work in a new kind 
of mutual correspondence with the world. The mistake made in applying cybernetic 
ideals to natural systems is that some versions of those conflated a logical, rule-
based abstraction with reality itself. They in fact, occluded materiality and by doing 
so failed to adequately describe real ecologies. A viable description of an ecology 
must avoid this tendency. Donna Haraway’s vision of the cyborg is a critical 
fictional device proposed to problematize exactly this relationship between the 
technological and organic highlighting a number or ways that this relationship can 
and has become gendered and politicized (Haraway, 1991). 
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It has been shown in this section that there has historically been a motivation to 
see technical systems (as well as artworks) and their interactions with people in 
ecological terms. This establishment of precedent for an ecological conception of 
our interaction with technology is not a justification in itself. However, the 
cybernetics research described above and in the previous section does indicate a 
desire to understand our relationship with technology as a phenomenon which has 
significance outside immediate proximal interaction, in other words, in extended 
networks of material interactions. In later sections it will be seen how a failure to 
understand such extended significances has historically proved problematic for 
both the technical functionality of technological systems and for the experience of 
using them and living with them. This latter focus on the lived experience of 
technology has been the focus of some influential contemporary research. Some of 
this will consequently be examined in the following section.  
3.1.4 Experience and Care 
As has been suggested, the application of the notion of ecology into technology 
indicates a desire to conceive of experience as dependent on an interconnected 
network. Experience, in short, has been conceived of as ecologically implicated. 
Some contemporary research has, in fact, explicitly referenced experience as a 
defining design consideration, and some of this will now be discussed. 
 
McCarthy and Wright (2004) provide a common reference point for what has been 
called the ‘experiential turn’ or ‘third wave’ Human Computer Interaction (HCI). 
Third-wave HCI is “characterised by non-work settings and topics such as lived-
experience, intimacy, pleasure and embodiment.” (Bowers, 2012). Although not 
explicitly invoking ecologies as such, their work nonetheless has a number of 
distinctively ecological aspects. McCarthy and Wright propose that after the first 
and second waves of HCI research (emphasising the active thinking qualities of 
users, and their social settings, respectively), HCI research should focus more on 
the qualities of experience which they break down into threads as emotional, 
compositional, spatio-temporal, and sensual. They build on Dewey’s (2005 [1934]) 
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work to articulate experience as constituted relationally between thinking subjects 
and objects in action (McCarthy & Wright, p. 54): 
 
 “…any experience is simultaneously sensual, emotional, and intellectual-that is 
relational. It attempts to capture something of the relationship between subject and 
object and self and other.” (McCarthy & Wright, 2004, p. 86) 
 
By linking affective, sensual and intellectual modes, the authors try to demonstrate 
that experience is, first a mixture of bodily and cognitive facets and is, second, very 
much a phenomenon founded in the physical world. The authors also point out 
how, for (Dewey 2005 [1934]), experiences are in aesthetic continuity39 with other 
past experiences and indeed with everyday life (McCarthy & Wright, 2004, p. 54). 
This continuity implicitly suggests a kind of extended ecology of objects and 
experience. Like Keane’s (2005; 2013) work in the context of the functioning of 
signs, McCarthy and Wright’s application of Dewey suggests historical and future-
oriented ways that the experiences, the ‘life-histories”, of objects, are wound into 
experience.  
 
While McCarthy and Wright focus on the implications for user experience of 
Dewey’s view of experience, his work has ramifications beyond considering the 
way that objects make us think and feel. Dewey’s work emphasises the fact that 
objects stand as evidence of past interactions with human beings. The appreciation 
of past interventions by craftspeople with objects is a key part of his formulation of 
aesthetic appreciation (2005 [1934], p. 50). However where this thesis departs 
from Dewey’s work (and from McCarthy and Wright’s adaption of it) is to explicitly 
consider the histories of objects as inherently valuable, within themselves, rather 
than as evidence of past human intervention. The arguments presented in 2.1.1  
gave justification for a sense of ethical involvement with the material world 
irrespective of its connection with humankind. Dewey’s work, adapted here, adds 
                                            
39 Aesthetic experience is discussed in more detail in 6.4 
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to that sense a notion of an expanded definition of experience which disregards a 
priori distinctions between the experience of people and artefacts and instead 
focuses on a practical investigation of those experiences. Experience then, as 
articulated in relation to the historically-oriented approach to making discussed 
through this thesis, is a concept for further exploration. The adoption of the term 
‘experience’ for the past histories of objects is intended to emphasise their active 
role in interaction, their potential to manifest agency, and to highlight their 
irremediable realism (Meillassoux, 2010, p. 33), that is to say their irreducibility to 
interpretation.  
 
There are several aspects of McCarthy and Wright’s reading of Dewey that are 
identified as relevant to the development of a concept of ecology in this thesis. 
Already discussed are the application of his work to technology and the alignment 
of experience with our own histories to create meaning and continuity. A final point 
though builds on the discussion of the attitude of makers, begun in 2.1.1 and 
continued in 3.1.1. Where 3.1.1 drew on Heidegger’s notions of subjectivity to 
discuss our ontological involvement with the world as an answer to overcoming 
Cartesian dualisms, a further relationship with Heidegger’s work is suggested by 
McCarthy and Wright. These authors (following Bakhtin, 1993) emphasize the 
importance of ‘concern’, our capacity, through effort, to create meaningful 
experiences. This concern, it is proposed, can also be compared to the concept of 
“care” (sorge) in (Heidegger 1996 [1927], p. 193). Where McCarthy and Wright 
employ ‘concern’ to “bring structure and meaning” (McCarthy & Wright, 2004, p. 
89) to experience, Heidegger defines care as a precondition of the being of Dasein, 
it is its “existential meaning” (1996 [1927], p. 193). Although beings can act in ways 
that are “careless” this is more than a question of superficial emotional attitude. 
Such carelessness for Heidegger is actually a betrayal of Dasein’s fundamental 
ontological orientation. It suggests an inauthenticity of being itself. In ecological 
terms, it suggests another kind of link between people and their environments. 
Care, which in Heidegger is achieved through a kind of independent attitude 
(Heidegger, 1996 [1927], pp. 165-180), is a way of more fully locating oneself as 
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part of the world. ‘Careful’ ecologies, would suggest a relationship between 
ecologies and making. If care or mindfulness are a way of creating a meaningful or 
authentic experience (following McCarthy and Wright and Heidegger respectively) 
then a careful making-practice is one which is more properly ecological. This point 
will be explored further in the final chapter. 
3.1.5 Publics 
The formation of an ecology has been examined by some authors (Bennet, 2010; 
Warner, 2002) as a specifically political phenomenon to which the concept of the 
public is integral. These accounts are pertinent because they further integrate the 
description of agencies proposed in the previous section into the notion of 
ecologies applied here by examining their formation and by providing a way to 
consider how their limits are defined. 
 
Jane Bennett (2010, pp. 100-104) interprets aspects of Dewey’s philosophy to add 
to her own account of ecologies the notion that the interplay of agencies at work in 
ecologies actually exercise a kind of material politics through their various 
groupings, differentiations or arrangements. It is in this sense that she finds accord 
with Dewey’s notion of a public (Dewey, 1991 [1927]). Whereas Dewey, of course, 
was concerned with human politics, Bennett takes inspiration from his account of 
the formation of publics through a shared ‘problem’. She notes that there is much 
in his description of this phenomenon that can actually be applied to ecologies of 
materials, not restricted to humans. Such publics, for Bennett, consist of:  
 
“…confederation[s] of bodies, bodies pulled together not so much by choice (a 
public is not exactly a voluntary association) as by a shared experience of harm 
that, over time, coalesces into a ‘problem.’” (Bennet, 2010, p. 100) 
 
While for Dewey such ‘problems’ are generated and experienced by humans, for 
Bennett this notion is generalizable. For her, a public is a way of viewing an 
ecology that provides ways of understanding its emergence and of accounting for 
its limits, of deciding what is in, and what is out. Some initial directions for this 
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question have already been seen in (Pinch & Bijker, 1987), and (Winner, 1980) all 
of whom produced accounts where the materiality of technology was conceived of 
as affording, encouraging or demanding particular social arrangements. What is 
relevant about Bennett’s publics is that they follow Law in refuting the idea that 
“either machines or human relations are determinate in the last instance: that one 
drives the other” (Law, 1992, p. 382). Instead of focusing on social arrangement as 
the de facto unifying factor of publics, she adopts an ANT-like approach which 
draws on Dewey’s notion of “conjoint action” (Dewey, 1991 [1927], pp. 15-16). 
Conjoint action is the combinatory and distributed effect of actors which transcends 
immediate40 interaction. At the heart of Dewey’s definition of public is the distinction 
between private exchanges and public effects, those latter being defined as having 
the character to involve others indirectly41. In essence the conjoint action of the 
extended implications of interaction is what shapes publics. 
 
Bennett, however, rightly points out that Dewey’s notion of “conjoint action” does 
not preclude a reading wherein non-human actors combine to influence, the 
formation, structure and limits of ecologies calling such networks of agencies 
“political ecologies” (2010, p. 102). She notes (2010, p. 100) (as Dewey42 does 
(Dewey, 1991 [1927], p. 23)), that asking why things come to be associated should 
be abandoned in favour of asking how, a position easily commensurable with 
(Latour, 2005, p. 71). This question of how things are associated, and once they 
are, how they act together in “conjoint action” is political in the sense that: 
 
                                            
40 In the sense of proximal in time and space. 
41 In one example Dewey describes how a blood feud begins between two 
individuals and progressively involves more and more people. (Dewey, The Public 
and its Problems, 1991 [1927] pp16-17). 
42 The formation of publics is caused by a tension between and private exchanges 
and their public resonances, which eventually cause a need for regulation (Dewey, 
The Public and its Problems, 1991 (1927) pp15-16). 
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“conjoint actions generate ‘multitudinous consequences,’ and each of these 
consequences "crosses the others" to generate its own problems, and thus its own 
publics or ‘group of persons especially affected.’ (Bennet, 2010, p. 101) 
 
The political aspect of such an ecology is that members of an ecology are 
connected together through the conjoint consequences of their actions. The 
combination of conjoint action is what delimits that ecology. In this sense an 
ecology is very much like an extended ‘sphere of influence’ and are constantly 
reforming, not unlike Latour et al.’s (following Gabriel Tarde, rather than Liebniz) 
theory of the monad (Latour, Jensen, Venturini, Grauwin, & Boullier, 2012). 
Bennett gives Dewey’s work a material application by arguing that since the 
coalescence of ecologies occurs through contingent circumstance rather than 
rational design, this is a tacit acknowledgement that non-human agency can also 
be responsible for the formation of publics. 
 
“Dewey presents the members of a public as having been inducted in to rather 
than volunteering for it: each body finds itself thrown together with other harmed 
and squirming bodies […] What is more, in naming a problem (rather than an act of 
will) as the driving force behind the formation of a public, Dewey (almost) 
acknowledges that a political action need not originate in human bodies at all.” 
(Bennet, 2010, pp. 102-103) 
 
In summary, Bennett’s ‘political ecologies’ have two significances for the 
development of an ecological theory. Firstly she gives some suggestions for 
understanding how ecologies form. Secondly she provides some justification as to 
why an ecology comprising both people and things, can be thought of as a public43. 
The formation of ecologies which occurs as a response to a ‘problem’ provides a 
way of understanding how an ecology is delimited. In terms of making-practice it 
also provides a practitioner with a way of deciding how to begin, which, it is 
                                            
43 A discussion of the implications of this finding are reserved until 6.4. 
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suggested here, has close similarity with the way that many artists and designers 
thinking about the design space of their work. For instance, it will be described, in 
Chapter 5, how, in developing an art project, Neurotic Armageddon Indicator 
thematic, theoretical and technical research was integrated into approaching a 
number of material aspects of the subject of the work, the ‘Doomsday Clock’. The 
making of this work was informed by a notion that the various technical, historical 
and theoretical components of the clock were part of a limited, local ecology 
through which it produced a kind of performance44. To see an ecology as a public, 
is, as Bennett indicates, to see it as an ecology of consequence in which 
intervention suggests responsibility. Taken together with McCarthy and Wright’s 
“concern” ( (2004, p. 89)) and Heidegger’s “care” (1996 [1927], pp. 165-180), it is 
once again reiterated that a making-practice seen as part of an ecology should 
reflect ethical concerns. This point will be developed fully in the final chapter. 
 
3.2 Summary: Experiential Ecologies Prefigured 
This chapter has examined some existing research into ecologies paying particular 
regard to their relationship with, indeed dependence on, theories of materiality. 
First, it was seen that a key understanding for the development of ecological 
theories is that Cartesian separations between mind and body, between subject 
and object, are not easily compatible with the fundamental notion of an ecology. It 
was suggested that making-practice offers a particular way of participating in 
ecologies, and indeed a way of avoiding this dualism. It was also discussed how 
some research from a certain period of CSCW and HCI research (the 1980s and 
early to mid 1990s) was particularly concerned with similar questions and sought to 
answer them from a social perspective by considering the way that social 
arrangements are expressed through, and founded in, environments (Heath & Luff, 
1991; Pycock & Bowers, 1996; Suchman, 2007). A significant finding of this 
chapter is that this research was intended to describe and inform, particular 
working arrangements, which are in many senses different from the kind of 
                                            
44 The concept of “performativity” will be explored thoroughly in the next chapter. 
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individual practice described in this thesis. There is therefore both a demonstrable 
precedent and a clear opportunity for an ecological account around creative, 
technologically-oriented, making-practice, which integrates research and making-
practice. 
 
The final three sections all, in different ways, explored the dynamics of ecologies, 
considering the way that they might be modelled (or not) (Bateson, 1970), the way 
that they extend into past or current experience (Dewey, 2005 [1934]; McCarthy & 
Wright, 2004) (integrating with notions of distributed materiality), and the way that 
they form and are delineated (Dewey, 1991 [1927]; Bennet, 2010).  
 
In the following chapter, practice-based research will be described for the first time. 
Theories of the ecology will be referred to principally as signposts for later 
discussion in Chapter 6. Instead a focus will be adopted on how the facets of 
materiality, already suggested, were as much the product of an experimental 
making-practice as of theoretical research. 
  
   94 
Chapter 4. Historical Materiality: Finding Facets 
In the preceding two chapters previous research into materiality and ecologies was 
reviewed and some relationships between them were described. It was also 
suggested that materiality is historical in a number of important respects. In this 
chapter the historical aspects of materiality will be explored through specific ‘facets’ 
of that concept. The facets of materiality which will be developed are; performative 
materiality, distributed materiality, spatio-temporal materiality, fragile materiality 
and future-oriented materiality. Some of these distinctions have been previously 
defined by the authors referenced in the previous sections. Some have not. In 
those cases where categories of materiality are borrowed from other authors 
(performative and distributed), it will be described where the definition presented in 
this thesis departs from theirs. These facets should be considered as porous. 
Indeed perhaps the word facet, evoking sharp edges and clear delineation is 
inappropriate for what are, in fact, overlapping areas of reference. Nonetheless, the 
word facet carries the implication of a glass-like lens through which we can focus 
on the topic at hand before replacing it with another, different lens.  
 
The following chapter will explore the historicity of materiality through a close 
examination of two artworks: Null By Morse and Mark Inscriber. Taking each facet 
of materiality in turn, a theoretical discussion will be integrated with a description of 
the making-process of the two artworks. It will be discussed how this process 
informed the further development of material facets sometimes in response to and 
sometimes leading theoretical research. Concurrently, it will be explored how the 
historicity of materiality, particular to the various facets, is not only intrinsic to them, 
but is also potentially suggestive of approaches to making. This latter aspect will be 
developed later in this thesis as a contributing factor to ‘experiential ecologies’. 
4.1 History and Archaeology 
The discussion of the historicity of materiality is intended to support later assertions 
about the value of considering the role of materiality in terms of making artefacts. 
The motivation for this chapter is to emphasise that materiality has had a strong 
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agential presence in the history of technological ecologies and by examining this, 
to underscore its relevance to contemporary making. 
 
A historical, material approach provokes the question, ‘how is an approach based 
on the historical aspect of materiality in ecologies different from other historical 
studies?’ A precedent response to this question can be found in (Foucault 2002). 
The kind of historical research against which this thesis is contrasted is that which 
is focused on the development of a narrative sequence of events, founded in 
evidence but with a focus on the establishment of different interpretative versions 
of that narrative45. Of course, all historians use material evidence, but the 
difference here is that such material evidence is not valued as helping to construct 
a narrative whole, but as a source of understanding those objects themselves as 
intrinsically valuable. The problematisation of history as narrative is precisely what 
provoked Michel Foucault (2002) to turn attention to those narratives (discourses) 
in themselves, rather than in their function as a representation of something else. 
That is to say, Foucault treated discourses as things in their own right rather than 
as signs through which to access some notional historical reality. This shift caused 
Foucault to characterize his work (such as Foucault, 2002) as archaeological 
rather than historical and this thesis strongly identifies with Foucault’s project in 
that regard. 
 
A material approach is historical, not in the sense of providing interpretation or 
narrative but in the sense of looking at historical action as located in ecologies of 
particular materials. It emphasizes a focus on studying (or in the case of practice-
based research, experimenting with) the kinds of agency embodied by materials in 
context. Analysis starts at those materials themselves asking what do they permit, 
or provoke as part of a network. This approach is not, however, incommensurable 
with an appreciation of human intentionality. For example, a soldier who fires a 
shot in the Second World War has a host of motivations for doing so. But, as has 
                                            
45 A notable example of this genre of historical research is (Shirer, W L, 1991). 
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been suggested, following (Latour, 2005, p. 71), this appreciation is balanced with 
a focus on how things act to produce network effects, rather than why. A material 
approach brings into the analysis a consideration of the other agencies at work in 
that ecology. The shot which kills the enemy soldier is only possible though 
because of a combination of the first soldier’s courage or fear, the state of 
cleanliness of his rifle, the distance from the enemy and the weather conditions 
that day. What is lost in some approaches is a sense of the role of things in the 
constitution of events. The examples given here are based in physical causality, 
and indeed, these are perhaps the least controversially explained. What I will 
provoke though, through this chapter, is the sense that things contribute to events 
also through performative functions. “Matter, we will soon realize, is a highly 
politicized interpretation of causality.” (Latour, 2005, p. 76) 
 
The relationship of this approach to archaeology, as I have suggested, is perhaps 
more striking than its resemblance to history, and a clear, methodological 
identification has already been made with the field of Media Archaeology (as 
represented by Huhtamo & Parikka, 2011)46. Archaeology suggests a focus on 
material things as things rather than seeing them as “expressions” of abstract 
cultural values. Even archaeology though, as (Bjørnar Olsen 2003) notes, is not 
immune to an approach where “the hard physicality of the world […] sometimes is 
reduced to little more than discursive objects” (Olsen, 2003, p. 88). He laments 
how even for the “discipline of the spade” (archaeology) “attention turns to thought, 
meta-theories, politics and society, in short, to the ‘noise of discourse’” (Olsen, 
2003, p. 100) Although Olsen acknowledges that he has no real solutions of his 
own, he cites ANT as an inspiration (Olsen, 2003, p. 98) for an approach to 
archaeology which treats things as irreducible to discourse. Ingold, in common with 
Olsen, suggests that the separation of knowledge from the physical world is a 
phenomenon which runs deep in contemporary academia (Ingold, 2013, p. 4). 
                                            
46 It was noted in the introduction that this is a very heterogeneous area and these 
are authors are not proposed as representations of the whole, more of a particular 
grouping. 
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The following account of historical materiality told through the research process of 
making two artworks will attempt to demonstrate some flavor of this irreducibility to 
discourse. 
4.2 Historicity: Background 
A number of authors cited in the previous review of functions of the concept of 
materiality have discussed how their particular perspective on materiality is 
historical. These will be briefly summarised in order to demonstrate that an 
historical approach to making with an historical sense of materiality has precedent, 
particularly with respect to the Marxist notion of historical materialism. It will then 
be discussed where these ideas will be extended, developed and applied. 
  
Keane (2005; 2013) describes how signs are historical through their embodiment in 
objects which have had, and indeed continue to have interactions with other, 
historically related objects, a process which he calls “bundling” (Keane, 2013, p. 
188). A photograph not only embodies a number of significances, through its 
depiction, for example, of one’s long departed grandparent, but also how that 
significance is materially related to other objects. The photograph could be 
duplicated for instance and the copies distributed, creating new spatial 
relationships. The torn edges attest to years of fond handling causally connecting it 
with human physicality. The sense that the pasts of objects are intrinsic to the 
materiality is an idea that has a degree of historical lineage and much influence for 
it can be found in Marx. 
 
Marx’s treatment of “historical materialism” (Marx, 1999 (1887), pp. 29-42) aims to 
elucidate the consequences of the separation of different kinds of value from 
commodities47 (exchange value, and use value) and to relate this to paradigm 
shifts in the history of society. A full discussion of the broader context of Marx’s 
theories, for instance as relating to the connection between commodities and 
                                            
47 commodities being conceived as “an object outside us, a thing that by its 
properties satisfies human wants of some sort or another” (Marx, 1999 (1887), p. 
7) 
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ownership or the division of classes, is outside of the scope of this discussion but 
his work is included because of its seminal relationship to understanding the 
relationship of artefacts and labour which is key to certain configurations of the 
relationship to makers and their materials. A key problem identified by (Marx 1999 
[1887]) is the separation of labour and commodity which is fundamental to 
capitalism. 
 
“If then we leave out of consideration the use-value of commodities, they have only 
one common property left, that of being products of labour. But even the product of 
labour itself has undergone a change in our hands. If we make abstraction from its 
use-value, we make abstraction at the same time from the material elements and 
shapes that make the product a use-value; we see in it no longer a table, a house, 
yarn, or any other useful thing. Its existence as a material thing is put out of sight. 
Neither can it any longer be regarded as the product of the labour of the joiner, the 
mason, the spinner, or of any other definite kind of productive labour.” (Marx, 1961, 
p. 8) 
 
In Marx, the promotion of exchange value (the abstracted relative value of one 
thing for another) over use value subjugates the materiality of commodities as 
physically involved with those who use them. As the use of things is devalued, they 
begin to be seen purely as expressions of something else, i.e. as exchangeable 
forms of capital. Enrolled in this concept of exchange value is that commodities 
become expressions of “homogeneous human labour” (Marx, 1999 (1887), p. 9), 
which have lost the particular specific character of having been made by a 
particular person for a particular purpose. A short discussion of this ‘commodity 
fetishism’ will be offered later in this chapter, but first it is noted that this 
understanding of the history of the object, as a made thing, has a clear relationship 
with Dewey’s formulation of experience which was discussed in Chapter 3. The 
extent to which Dewey was actually influenced by Marxism is doubtful (Westbrook, 
1991), but (Miettinen, 2009) points out a number of similarities, including the fact 
that praxis in Marx is conceived of a way of producing the self “by changing nature 
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and by producing the world of cultural objects”. This is similar to (Dewey’s (2005 
[1934]) notion, already discussed, that careful activity is also a way of aesthetically 
integrating oneself into one’s environment. For Dewey, materiality is a link between 
current aesthetic experience and past processes of production or origin (Dewey, 
2005 [1934], p. 50), exactly the processes Marx criticised as being homogenised 
under capitalism. Our experience of made things, for Dewey, is infused with an 
historical understanding both of their processes of production and our own past 
experiences which are in continuity with the present. One of the things, for Dewey, 
which makes aesthetic experiences aesthetic therefore, is historicity, and therefore 
a Dewey-like reading of Marx would suggest that a generalisation of labour is a 
falsification of this aesthetic historicity.  
 
Kittler (1987; 1992; 2010) has, perhaps most vocally, proposed that technological 
materiality acts as a sense making, cultural force (Partington, 2006, p. 56). He has 
claimed (as was noted in 2.1.4) that “what we take for our sense perception has to 
be fabricated first” (Kittler, von Mücke, & Similon, 1987, p. 103). It has been noted 
that Kittler’s thesis is that the development of our cultural condition and, relatedly, 
the human sensorium is anchored in the genesis of particular technologies. In this 
sense materiality is necessarily historical in the sense of a narrative. The narrative 
of this history is one in which technological development is responsive to material 
contingencies rather than directed by human decision making. The availability of 
new raw materials or the discovery of new properties of existing resources for 
instance provoke technological innovation. According to Kittler, successive 
technologies have iteratively or iconoclastically impacted on humanity through their 
material specificities while concealing that process from plain sight. In the following 
example we see an example of such a specificity while also demonstrating a, 
perhaps the, motivation for a study of this historical materiality, the naturalizing 
effect of material influence on culture. Here certain writing technologies (the pen 
and certain kinds of handwriting, versus the typewriter) are discussed as producing 
a naturalizing effect, a capacity to present themselves as appearing divorced from 
their material origins. 
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“The ‘hermeneutically-conditioned readers’ of 1800 were able to forget the textual 
nature of text, and were able to conceive of it instead as an extension of nature, 
because the discourse network effectively operated to suppress its own materiality 
and origins.” (Winthrop-Young and Wutz xxiv) quoted in (Partington, 2006, p. 59) 
 
In this historical period, textuality, the quality of being a text, had become 
synonymous with a particular romantic mode, emphasising personal expression. 
This mode found its form with “organic, natural” handwriting (Partington, 2006, pp. 
58-59). Crucially this, like all of Kittler’s ‘discourse networks’, became naturalised to 
the extent where only a new technology, the typewriter, could expose the artificial48 
nature of this medium of handwriting. Each technology then, according to Kittler, 
has unique ways of disguising its own particular materiality and it is through 
examination of past ruptures in this naturalization that we can come to terms with 
the culturally-influential material agency expressed by those particular 
technologies. Material for Kittler creates, or at least influences, history itself by 
determining human action. 
 
Where Kittler attempts to describe an insidious determining force to technological 
materiality, Sean Sayers (1990, pp. 148-9), notes that (Marx, 1999 (1887)) also 
proposes a determining capacity to materiality (in the form of instruments of 
production such as factories, in physical labour, and in raw materials) (1990, p. 
144). Such a reading of Marx provides some theoretical precedent to Kittler’s 
views. Unlike Kittler though, and contrary to (Cohen, 2000), Sayers’ reading of 
Marx maintains that the determining capacity of materiality is in a mutually 
constitutive relation with social forces.  
 
                                            
48 I use artificial to invoke “artifice” in the sense of both “cunning, trickery” (Oxford 
Dictionary of English, 2010) and “craftsmanship, workmanship” (Oxford Dictionary 
of English, 2010). 
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“[Marx] maintains that social forms are not merely ‘conventional’ and not 
changeable just at will. Definite material conditions of production impose definite 
social forms, and it is through the development of material conditions that social 
relations change. Man, through labour, alters nature in accordance with his needs 
and is in the process, altered by it. There is an interaction here.” (Sayers, 1990, p. 
148) 
 
Where Kittler see the determination of culture by materials as a essentially a one-
way phenomenon, Marx (in Sayers’ reading) notes that labour provides a way of 
understanding this relationship as reciprocal. This sense of reciprocity is 
particularly significant if we envisage making-practice as a kind of ecological-
material engagement. Such a view will be expounded in Chapter 5. 
 
I have begun with a summary including the examples above for two reasons: First 
to recall some of the ways others have proposed materiality to be historical, before 
I detail my own research through Null by Morse and Mark Inscriber. Second to 
make clear that this following investigation is not intended as an exercise in 
intellectual curiosity but rather as a method of developing critique for the present, 
however tortuous and inefficient. To the discussion of history in relation to 
materiality I have two main contributions: One is a taxonomy of specific facets of 
materiality applied to historical technologies which are then related to 
contemporary ones. These facets enable a more focused analysis of agency within 
the experiential ecologies formed with these technologies. I will explore the second 
contribution in the next chapter. Here I will explore how materiality’s historicity can 
become part of design and making-practice with consideration of the facets of 
materiality developed here. 
4.3 Five Facets of Materiality 
4.3.1 Spatio-Temporal 
Several studies of technology and new media have focused on the capacity of new 
technology to produce new human perceptions or conceptions of time and space. 
(Gere, 2006; Kittler, 2010; Virilio, 2008) have all discussed the warping effect of 
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technology on human understanding of both speed and time. Other authors have 
related this relationship between technology and consciousness to a 
phenomenological strand of philosophy from Husserl through Heidegger and Alfred 
Schutz to Merleau-Ponty (as described by Dourish 2004, pp. 103-116).  
 
In this thesis though, a different perspective is adopted. Rather than investigating 
the ‘consciousness-shaping’ effects of technology, here there will be a more acute 
focus on the way that technology continually embodies new arrangements of time 
and space. To be clear by ‘embody’ I refer not to the human body (as in Merleau 
Ponty, 2002) but to any body, any physically present technology. The emphasis on 
new arrangements of time and space, as embodied in particular technological 
artefacts or systems is intended to inform the approach to such things as spaces 
for work. To approach them as such can be considered analogically as a kind of 
‘site analysis’49 as in architectural practice, a site for qualitative exploration50. To be 
explicit, this focus, while empirical in the sense of being based on observation and 
experience, is not proposed with any claim to objectivity. The understanding of 
systems as sites for exploration necessarily positions them as involved with the 
explorer as sites of situated action (as in Suchman, 2007). In the sense that this 
work is concerned with exploring sites of interest and with establishing situations 
within them by reconfiguring, juxtaposing or rebuilding, there are some parallels 
with methods in Systems Art as described by (Burnham, 1968, pp. 49-50; Ascott, 
2002, p. 106). In the paragraphs that follow, the processes by which I came to see 
technological materials as spatio-temporal spaces for work will be described. 
 
                                            
49 I employ the term ‘site analysis’ figuratively to suggest an “on the ground” 
multimodal exploration. An appraisal of logistical possibilities and a theoretical 
analysis of them. Some student examples which illustrate this idea are found here: 
(Architecture, First in, 2013). 
50 Another analogy for such a working process might be taken from the world of 
music: As an amateur jazz guitarist I improvise melodies based on particular 
tempos and around a variety of scales. Each particular scale has its own mood and 
effectively structures the solo. Within that scale though, the possibilities are literally 
infinite. Such a combination is a spatio-temporal “space for work”. 
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The production of NBM mixed theoretical research and practical prototyping in an 
iterative research process. A key aspect of the research focus of this piece was 
how smartphones (and iPhones in particular) form part of an historical lineage of 
telecommunications, beginning with signal fires and optical telegraph systems. This 
focus provided a set of materials, in the form of codes, historical artefacts and 
contemporary devices to explore. These in turn offered their own particular spaces 
for work. In the next paragraphs I will describe some aspects of the development of 
NBM which were instrumental in formulating the concept of spatio-temporal 
materiality as described in this thesis. 
 
Prototyping NBM in, and with, the times and spaces defined by the technological 
history of telecommunications motivated further theoretical work and vice versa. I 
have claimed that theoretical and practical research have been integrated through 
the development of the facets of materiality and one particular part of the 
production process provides the clearest demonstration of how this iterative and 
reciprocally dependent process was conducted. The smartphone application which 
is the core of the NBM installation is built around particular temporal arrangements. 
To recognize the Morse Code transmission from the lamp I constructed a 
brightness recognition and timing system which is based on a pre-arranged 
agreement, a protocol, on which information will be exchanged. The app relies on a 
given and pre-understood duration for a basic unit of Morse – the dot51. When the 
app detects that the light source has been illuminated, it begins a count. When the 
light source is extinguished, it ceases the count and checks the interval to decide 
whether the previous illumination was a dot or dash duration. A similar process 
checks the interval of the gaps between dots and dashes (these have semantic 
meaning in Morse and define, inter-flash, inter-character or inter-word pauses 
which are of one, three and seven units in length respectively). Given the technical 
integration of this timing mechanism into the piece itself, the regulation of 
                                            
51 An experimental version of the app actually attempts to “learn” the duration of 
this unit in order to be adaptable to different sources of message. Unfortunately I 
was unable to make this version stable and reliable enough for exhibition. 
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information by timing is both the subject of the piece and is fundamental to its 
materiality. This timing structure is written, as code, and physically enacted by the 
phone as the regulating clock signal of the phone’s processor provides a basis for 
mechanisms, defined in software but compiled and then embodied in solid state 
silicon chips. NBM is built to respond to particular spatio-temporal arrangements 
(the particular divisions of time as mediated through light flashes) because these 
are, in this physical sense, written into its system.  
 
In practice, the constant difficulty of programming the system to respond correctly 
to the unpredictable physical circumstances in which the system was embodied 
further cemented the concept that these spatio-temporal arrangements were a kind 
of environment in which I was working. An example can be drawn from the way the 
piece was technically adapted to cope with variable light conditions. I attempted 
several iterations of variable smoothing techniques to adequately cope with the 
irregular light readings from the smartphone camera. Un-weighted-sliding-averages 
of various sizes and update speeds, band-pass filtering and infinite impulse 
response smoothing were all experimented with. Each produced slightly different 
kinds of responsiveness to the lamp, each with its own problems and advantages. 
After many days adjusting, testing, and re-writing code, these various approaches 
began, metaphorically, to take on the feel of a terrain, which I was exploring. This 
impression was, of course subjective, however it must be stressed that it was not 
arbitrary. The particular features of the timing mechanism were distinct features in 
that landscape and were specific to that technology. It is in this sense that I 
highlight that the development of various encodings and communications 
technologies, actually defined new arrangements of spatio-temporal materiality 
which should be considered the object of an archaeological study (not just a new 
narrative). I once again invoke the notion of an archaeological focus to emphasise 
a close attention to the material detail of historical study. A methodological 
commitment to physical experimentation and empirical observation of technological 
action. The playful experimentation with the ‘nuts-and-bolts’ of telegraph 
technologies provoked a qualitatively different experience of that history. 
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The process of building, debugging, testing and rebuilding this app required me to 
understand, implement, and experiment with the material arrangements produced 
by the Morse Code protocol, and the technologies through which it has been 
transmitted, as I described above. Engaging with this literature also generated a 
desire to better contextualize the work, technically and historically. To this end I 
reviewed further historical literature that provided both conceptual development to 
the piece52 and also content for the messages which are broadcast by the lamp. A 
very brief overview of the spatio-temporal-material implications of this history will 
now be offered in order to describe its relevance to contemporary 
telecommunications which were the thematic focus of NBM. Above, I have 
described the spatio-temporal arrangement of the lamp and timing mechanism in 
NBM in terms of its exploration in practice. The following aspects of the material 
history of telecommunications are offered because they highlight other spatio-
temporal arrangements, the consideration of which was seminal in developing the 
notion of spatio-temporal materiality developed here. In many ways the description 
of this history given through the following sections may seem like a digression but it  
                                            
52 Particularly informing the use of a military lamp and later points in which I will 
relate the work to slow technologies (Hallnäs & Redström, 2001). 
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Figure 12: A Chappe Telegraph Tower near Saverne, France (Copyright Office de Tourisme de Saverne 
& sa Région 2013) 
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is included as evidence of the practice-based research trajectory that was 
responsible for informing the development of the facets of materiality described 
here. It is exactly this kind of digression which is often both necessary and, indeed, 
integral to research through design as a methodology. Such research, if it wishes 
to be genuinely experimental, must be prepared to take cues from the material at 
hand, to be, to a large extend, lead by such materials, though guided by 
experience and a research focus. 
 
The first well-documented telegraph system was the Chappe (Standage, 1998) 
telegraph which consisted of series of small towers, on the roofs of each of which 
was installed a contraption of moving wooden semaphore arms {see Figure 12}. An 
operator relied on a series of arm positions to relay encoded letters to the next 
station, positioned within sight of the first and messages were relayed along the 
chain.  
 
The development of this optical telegraph eventually allowed Napoleon’s army to 
manage logistical resources across the expanding French military conquests 
(Standage, 1998, p. 16). The adoption of the optical telegraph network has been 
described as a “strategy which finally released wars from the stone age of 
command flow” (Kittler, 1996, p. 8). For the first time, the speed of transmission of 
complex commands, issued from any start point in the network exceeded the 
speed of a horse (Kittler, 1996, p. 8). The chain of towers was incredibly well 
developed and, at its peak, covered large areas of France through arterial routes to 
Paris {Figure 13}. Around forty years later the development of the electrical 
telegraph was similarly stimulated by military funding. Samuel Morse’s failed 
ambitions as a salon painter diverted his career into that of an inventor at a time 
when the rumblings of war—first between Mexico and the United States and 
subsequently between the North and South—proved to be a financial stimulus for 
his new communication medium (Gere, 2006, p. 49) as the Napoleonic wars had 
for the Chappe brothers’  
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Figure 13: The Chappe Telegraph Network in Napoleonic France (date not available53) 
 
invention. The telegraph broke the reliance on human relays (such as in Chappe 
towers) and brought about unprecedented speeds in information transfer. 
The new spatio-temporal arrangements of the Chappe and electric telegraph 
networks, in the U.S., France, and elsewhere, I propose, established a topological 
                                            
53 I contacted the publisher of this map at École Central Lyon but he was unable to 
provide a date. 
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precedent. The network, as an information highway, replaced the roads as the site 
of information exchange.54 
 
The timing code which forms the core of the NBM app has already been discussed 
but a particular aspect of telegraph history, combined with the process of 
technically producing the app develops the concept of spatio-temporal materiality 
further. Standage (1998, p. 9) describes how the Chappe brothers, before arriving 
at the solution of semaphore arms as the most efficient way of encoding and 
relaying messages, experimented with a combination of synchronized timing 
devices and color-coded discs. The recipient of the message would watch for the 
change between black and white and take a note of the precise position of the 
stop-watch, translating this number via a pre-arranged code. What is historically 
significant about this process, is that by tying the change of a physical state to a 
regular time interval, the brothers introduced two completely new spatio-temporal 
arrangements of materiality, which are exercised, two hundred years later, by the 
iPhone which forms the basis for NBM. First the regulation of information by time 
interval, effectively prefigured the notion of bandwidth (without which, Shannon’s 
seminal (2001 [1948]) work, for instance, would not have been possible). Second 
the notion of a regulating clock signal to manage information processing was 
effectively born with this invention. In integrated circuits, different chips must be 
able to communicate with one another at the right time and for this purpose, a 
clock signal is referred to. It is no exaggeration to say that without the notion of a 
clock signal, there would be no microprocessors and hence, no digital computers.  
However, I do not claim that the Chappe brothers version of serial ‘genealogically’ 
lead to the development of the signal clock. Instead I suggest that this material 
arrangement of physicality and time can be traced back to this historical moment. 
The study of the Chappe’s invention was extremely significant during the 
development of not only NBM itself but of the associated facet of spatio-temporal 
                                            
54 This brought about its own problems, which will be discussed later in this 
chapter. 
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materiality. The commonality between the physical encoding systems of the 
Chappe brothers’ early experiments and contemporary serial engendered a sense 
that this was a reproducible pattern, a kind of motif, that could be implemented in 
artworks, adjusted and refined.  
 
In summary, with the Chappe brothers’ early experiments with discs, with the 
development of Morse Code and with the deployment of new kinds of network 
topology, new eigenzeits (following Ernst, 2011) and new spatial patterns were 
produced. I have suggested that to see these technological artefacts and systems 
in these terms provides artists and designers with a space for exploration, a site for 
work which affords particular kinds of technological experimentation. Phrased 
differently, these spaces can be considered sites in which to intervene by 
mimicking existing functionality (as in NBM), rearranging, deforming (such as in 
glitch art), or transforming them. There is precedent for such an approach. For 
instance; algorithmic art (such as that of Reas, 2012) adopts formal mathematical 
rules and makes small adjustments, deriving aesthetic effects. Similarly spatio-
temporal materiality provides a focus on arrangements of time and patterns of 
space to be ‘tweaked’ or used directly rather like samples in hip-hop music. Spatio-
temporal materiality consequently offers a way of seeing materials as more than 
qualities for interpretation, but as embodied arrangements. 
4.3.2 Performative 
The term ‘performativity’, which was used in earlier sections without substantial 
explanation, has a long and complex history in academic literature. The core 
concept of performativity though involves a breakdown in the notion of language as 
a pure representation, a medium by which ideas are conveyed. Its adoption and 
exploration as a facet of materiality is motivated by findings from integrated 
practice-based research and literature review that it offers ways of integrating 
materiality with the creation of meaning. It was initially suggested, in Chapter 2, 
that there are distinct ways of considering materiality as possessing intrinsic 
meaning. Later sections sought to integrate this concept into an ecological 
dimension by locating the role of such material meaning in an ANT-like approach, 
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where that material meaning was described as a source of agency in particular 
network configurations. Essentially, a mix of the intrinsic, ontological meaning of 
materials, and the particular situatedness within a network, of the same, was 
characterised as a defining aspect of an ecological description. In the following 
sections, it will be shown that performativity is a mechanism through which this 
mixture of material meaning and network situatedness is enacted. Technological 
performativity, as it will be described here, is way of exploring meaning making. 
 
Performativity emphasises that meaning is often created as part of an act where 
context or manner (Austin, 1962, p. 6; Searle, 1976) are conceived of as essential 
to the constitution of meaning. It is in this sense that performative utterances are 
“non-referential” (Butler, 1988, p. 521). They maintain a more complex and 
contextually defined relationship to the world than a signifier/signified connection. 
Crucially, performative utterances are not representations of meanings, they 
mutually create them and iteratively55 reinforce them. 
 
Applied away from language, performativity has been conceptually applied to the 
action of technology (Drucker, 2013; Thrift, 2003, pp. 121-136) to consider how: 
 
“A more flexible sense of what the world is being extemporized by ‘nonhuman’ 
actors which are increasingly acting within the corral that used to be called human, 
making new materials that are not one thing or the other but weave together 
elements of both.” (Thrift, 2005, p. 233) 
 
Thrift is suggesting that technology is creating meaning through new forms of 
action. He has described, for instance, the operation of software as “writing acts” 
(Thrift, 2005, p. 242) (presumably in response to Austin’s 1962 “speech acts”) 
wherein computers are imbued with performative power to shape the world around 
                                            
55 Butler gives the example of women’s identities being iteratively reinforced 
through gendered language (Butler, 1988, p. 521). 
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them. Performativity, “properly construed” to borrow Barad’s (2003, p. 802) (rather 
sharp) phrase, refers to the idea that technology actually contributes to the 
constitution of meaning within particular contexts. For Thrift the integration of 
written language (in the form of computer programmes) and its instantiation in 
physical, technological action (as computer hardware computes, stores, 
communicates, or actuates machinery) is illustrative of a key benefit of 
performative approaches. When Butler (1988, p. 521) calls utterances “non-
referential” and Thrift and Barad call systems “anti-representational” (Thrift, 1996; 
Barad, 2003, p. 808) they offer a way of thinking about design which integrates its 
material with an environment in which cultural and technological action are 
interleaved. Consider, for instance, the first item of the list above, to “compute, 
store, communicate, or actuate”. To compute is to enact mathematical meaning. It 
is based on physical, material, processes but acts in a mathematical tradition with 
its own culture, practices and materials. As such it is responsible for an ongoing 
construction of what maths is and does. Although performativity stresses a sense 
of activity, it is exactly this iterative constitution of meaning which marks it apart 
from a plain sense of action. 
 
The production of Mark Inscriber (henceforth MI) offered a number of specific ways 
in which performativity was developed as a concept to inform a practice-based 
approach. The work was produced in dialogue with theoretical research into 
historical (and pre-historical) counting and inscription processes. The following 
paragraphs describe this research and in doing so provide evidence of the 
development of the concept of performativity to technologies (in this case of 
counting) informed by an archaeological approach to these. 
 
MI was inspired by the premise that technologies of representation are also 
technologies of storage, (recalling Barad, 2003, p. 808; Butler, 1988, p. 521; Thrift, 
1996) and that this is, perhaps, never more apparent than in the context of 
technologies of counting and inscription. To illustrate this point, in the context of the 
pre-historical development of counting and mathematics, some research has 
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described how counting objects, props used to support counting or represent 
numbers (such as tally sticks {see Figure 14}), were not mere representations of 
counting, but rather, aspects of embodied or distributed cognitive processes, as in 
(Wilson, 2002). Counting is physically instantiated in records of accounts, livestock 
or calendars. These artefacts support cognition certainly, but also perform other 
kinds of action. Such records are not ‘representations’ of abstract numbers but are 
active as parts of ecologies of commerce and exchange culture. This material 
interleaving with every day practice, over time, evidences counting technologies as 
embodying specific kinds of historicity.  
 
 
Figure 14: Tally sticks in the Alpines Museum der Schweiz, CC Sandstein 2009 
 
Counting, I argue, is objects and practices together: The adoption of material props 
for counting (such as stones, scratches, baked pots, fingers and toes, grains of 
rice, or dots on stone tablets) was essential for the development of mathematics: 
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Historically, the verbal expression of numbers in many cultures was derived from 
the objects themselves. Mayan and Aztec languages for instance, maintained the 
word ‘stone’ in their counting words. So instead of ‘one, two, three’, we have ‘one 
stone, two stone, three stone.’ (Mohanty, 2010, p. 4). In modern Japanese, 
materiality and counting are similarly caught up through the use of ‘counting 
particles’ or ‘counters’. These suffixes are added to numbers and give additional 
information about the thing being counted. A selection are listed in {Table 1}: 
 
Mai (	)56 Thin or flat things (such as 
paper) 
Hon (
) Tall round things (such as 
bottles) 
Dai () Large machines (such as 
cars) 
Hikki () Small animals (such as 
squirrels) 
Satsu () Books 
Ko () Small things (such as eggs) 
Table 1: Japanese Counting Particles 
With the use of such counting particles, counting is inextricably57 linked to physical 
form. For some cultures counting remains so tied to objects that they remain 
unable to count past ten (fingers) or twenty (fingers and toes) (Mohanty, 2010, p. 
7). This combined status as object and practice is even reflected in the etymology 
of the word ‘to tell’: 
 
                                            
56 All the counters would normally change pronunciation depending on what they 
are suffixed to. Here only one pronunciation is given. 
57 Although generic counters (as well as ordinal and cardinal numbers) do exist in 
Japanese, using them as when a specific counter is available sounds very 
unnatural.  
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“To tell, we learn, as a transitive verb does not mean only ‘a live account in speech 
or writing of events or facts’ (that is, to tell a story), but also ‘to count things’ (to tell 
a rosary, for example). The very nature of digital operations and telling thus 
coincide.” (Ernst, 2003, p. 32) 
 
In summary, the materiality of counting objects58 is inherently historical in the 
sense, described at the opening of this chapter, of embodying historicity. Research 
through MI provided a way of thinking (and acting) about inscription as a counting 
event. The machine performs counting through its dramatic and futile mode of 
operation. Because it does not count any thing, it effectively turns attention to the 
thingness of counting, its material historicity. The physical marks left by the 
machine echo historical tallying practices but the machine is purposefully over-
engineered. By juxtaposing contemporary computing and historical counting, MI 
attempts to align the two on the same material-historical trajectory. Through these 
aspects, MI provided an approach to thinking about the material significance of 
numbers in contemporary computing technology.  
 
Following (Ernst  2003, p. 30), the historicism embodied by MI, is not only in the 
way that it can be positioned as part of a historical narrative. That historicism is 
materially inscribed. As a machine driven by a computational device, its own 
materiality, in the form of memory cell transistors embedded in chips, has formal 
relationships with tallying practices59. In the building process of the machine, this 
concept was made apparent through one particular aspect of the build, the control 
of a stepper motor to drive the chain mechanism. Stepper motors rely on 
coordinated sequences of activating and deactivating electro magnets, which, 
according to their polarity, brake or drive a ferrous core in rotation. The particular 
stepper used for MI had two of these magnets, which were controlled with signal 
                                            
58 Both in the sense of ‘counting (verb) objects (noun)’ and ‘counting objects 
(compound noun)’. 
59 By formal materiality I refer to Kirschenbaum’s (2008) notion of logical 
arrangements, rules or orderings described in 2.1.4. 
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codes sent to a microcontroller. The following code lines from the software show 
the assignation of a control pin to each of the wires connecting to the magnets 
(each magnet has two wires). 
 
“AccelStepper(uint8_t interface = AccelStepper::FULL4WIRE, uint8_t 
pin1 = 2, uint8_t pin2 = 3, uint8_t pin3 = 4, uint8_t pin4 = 5, 
bool enable = true);” (McCauley, 2008) 
 
To correctly run the motor, one must understand which connecting wires pertain to 
the same magnet by testing for a valid circuit with a multi-meter. Another, more 
brute force way, is to apply a current to one wire, while connecting the other to 
ground. If the wires are connected to the same magnet, an audible click can be 
heard, indicating that the magnet has activated and is attempting to rotate the core. 
This explanation is provided to explain that even during the testing of components, 
the conceptual development of MI was integrated. The technical development 
incorporated a material investigation of digital counting. Understanding the physical 
set up of stepper motor wires was actually a way of understanding the 
arrangement of rules and components which produced a count.  
 
During this process, I became conscious that once again, I was relying on an 
encoded signal to activate the piece. By applying the current, manually, I was 
effectively defining two bits (as shown in Table 2), valid only in the context of the 
machine.  
 
CODE RESULT 
00 NO CHANGE 
01 MAGNET POLARISES POSITIVELY 
11 NO CHANGE 
10 MAGNET POLARISES NEGATIVELY 
Table 2: States When Testing a Stepper Motor 
   117 
The states of the wires as zero or one was only relative to one another and the 
magnet itself – one wire was more grounded than the other, and a certain potential 
difference (and current) was enough to power the magnet to overcome friction. In 
essence I had created a tiny space of performativity, in which my understanding of 
an encoding (binary) was being put into action in a technological context. 
 
Similarly, in the computing hardware driving MI, the internal spatial arrangement of 
chips is directly comparable to the use of space to infer order and magnitude in 
tally marks. In this sense the machine actually articulates its own formal, material 
history, doing for counting what Parikka describes below in the context of media 
storage. 
 
“…the archive is not only understood in the macro-historical fashion of past media 
excavations but increasingly as tapping into the machine itself as a layered, 
temporal and time-channelling machine of synchronization of culture and its 
structures of power. A historical mode of writing finds itself rejuvenated not in a 
narrative historical interest of knowledge not only writing counter histories of media 
but in looking at temporality as a complex object of media cultural analysis ….” 
(Parikka, 2011, p. 70) 
 
The performativity described here is approached quite differently to Drucker’s 
(2013) description. Although Drucker emphasizes the importance of material 
“substrates” of technology she treats these principally as “points of departure”: 
 
“Material conditions provide an inscriptional base, a score, a point of departure, a 
provocation, from which a work is produced as an event.” (Drucker, 2013) 
 
Drucker’s approach is, in this sense, comparable to those from (Jung & Stolterman 
2011; 2012; Robles & Wiberg 2010; and Wiberg 2013), examined in Chapter Two, 
which focus on a hermeneutic approach to qualities and form. This work is 
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referenced again here to stress that material qualities, in that research, form a 
basis for meaning making where meaning is understood as: 
 
“…a subjective interpretation about qualities and values of a material artifact, 
indicating how material artifacts are experienced and understood in personal and 
social life.” (Jung & Stolterman, 2011) 
 
To genuinely focus on the ways in which material performs acts, we must escape 
from the, implicit or explicit, notion that its agency is limited to an initial provocation 
which is then carried forward by human actors who then produce interpretation 
among themselves. Materiality does not ‘fade away’ while we conduct our analyses 
or interact with objects. This fact is demonstrated through further aspects of 
research undertaken in the production of NBM: In an early development of the 
work, the signal lamp was hand operated and the piece conceived of as a 
performance (in this case literally as distinct from being ‘performative’). My 
colleague60 and I both learned Morse Code through practice sessions during which 
I noticed that the iPhone app would ‘misread’ our individual transmissions in quite 
consistent ways. I had discovered a problem with our ‘Morse fists’. It has been 
remarked (Kirschenbaum, 2008, p. 3) that the view of ‘abstract ones and zeros’ 
comprising the realm of the digital is technically naïve. At the level of electronics, 
there are only relative voltages (which are, of course, better referred to as potential 
difference) and the difference between a one and a zero is a convention that must 
be supported by electrical components61 whose function it is to maintain the 
difference between them. The logical abstraction of the code is, in this sense, in 
tension with its material form which labors to support the former. Similarly with the 
                                            
60 I acknowledge the invaluable help of Kole Chen in testing this working with me 
and providing feedback on appropriate transmission speeds. 
61 I acknowledge the contribution of John Bowers in kindly explaining the Schmidtt 
trigger to me which has this function in analogue to digital conversion. 
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Morse telegraph, the quinary logic62 represents only one aspect of the system. The 
code is, in fact, a practice which is not expressible in five bits. Morse operators 
develop what is known as a ‘fist’; small idiosyncrasies in the lengths of their dots, 
dashes and pauses which can actually identify them to another (experienced) 
operator. The recognizability of various operators by their fists came to have 
strategic significance in wartime, since the origin of messages could be associated 
with the operator.  
 
“…in a moment of crisis, when someone very high up asks, ‘Can you really be 
absolutely certain that this particular Luftwaffe Fliegerkorps [German air force 
squadron] is outside of Tobruk and not in Italy?’ you can answer, ‘Yes, that was 
Oscar, we are absolutely sure.’” (Gladwell, 2005, p. 29) 
 
In this sense, the Morse fist is an instance of technical performativity at work. A 
combination of the bodily attitude63 of the operator and the particular straight key 
{see Figure 15} used, and the environment in which the operator works, is 
responsible for the production of meaning. The messages transmitted by the 
operator certainly have their own sense but I argue that their embodiment in this 
particular technical system equally defines that meaning. 
 
Performativity summarised, in this context, has a number of features and 
implications. Performativity, as expressed in this thesis, is not just linguistic, 
interpretative or representational.  
 
“Performativity, properly construed, is not an invitation to turn everything (including 
material bodies) into words; on the contrary, performativity is precisely a 
                                            
62 Morse Code has five states; dot, dash, inter-flash, inter-character or inter-word 
pauses. 
63 By which I intend their physical, ergonomic form, their training, personality and, 
no doubt, a host of other factors. 
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contestation of the excessive power granted to language to determine what is real.” 
(Barad, 2003, p. 802) 
 
 
Figure 15: A Telegraph ‘Straight Key’ (the finger position shown is unfortunately incorrect, keys were 
actually used with a grip between thumb and index finger) 
 
The concept provides a way of construing meaning, not with reference to some 
anterior reality which is then carried forward in representation (Butler, 1988, p. 521; 
Barad, 2003, p. 804) but as part of processes which are materially produced. The 
material foundation of counting practices, as well as the agential capacity of a 
Morse fist are proposed as demonstrations supporting this claim. 
 
Performativity is also iterative and reifying. It is an “ever-reiterated assertion” 
(Butler, 1988, p. 520) (following Merleau Ponty, 2002). Part of the trouble with 
seeing materiality in purely (or mostly) interpretative terms, is that it tacitly 
undermines its cumulative agential potential. Just as Butler describes the body as 
a continual and incessant materializing of possibilities.” (Butler, 1988, p. 521) 
(emphasis in original), I suggest that technological materiality constantly reasserts 
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its own potential, building up iterative patterns of material. In the history of counting 
and inscription for instance, the development of counting is bound to iterative 
material processes as one counting prop is replaced by another and surrounding 
contexts of exchange and barter develop to match in sympathy. 
 
For making-practice these main performative aspects of non-representation, 
iteration and reification, suggest an historical (or more properly archaeological) 
theoretical and experimental/practical engagement with the materials with which 
one is working. A kind of constructive archaeology in which historical research is 
revitalised by being remade in new combinations. This strongly implies a particular 
kind of making-practice which is agile, iterative, and speculative. Given its basis in 
material (as described here), action and context, performativity construed as for 
practice, emphasises the need for functional prototypes whose actions can be 
studied, and whose materials are carefully chosen. To appreciate their 
performativity, new material combinations must be set up, turned on and examined 
in operation. In the pieces above this prototyping process was integrated with the 
media-archaeological research described so that material (in the forms of 
smartphones, lamps, codes, wires, circuitry, solenoids, computers) was put into 
action (through building, testing, exhibition), and contextually explored (through 
integration of historical research into the former two processes). This process was 
exemplified by the description of the process of testing stepper motors. The next 
section will describe how the concept of materiality as distributed was developed in 
practice. 
4.3.3 Distributed 
The next facet of materiality developed here is, again, drawn initially from Drucker’s 
(2013) two identified categories. Distributed materiality refers to the host of 
interdependencies in which digital objects are enmeshed. It was suggested in 
Chapter Two that there are a number of interconnections between the concepts of 
performative and distributed materialities and this section will build on this, 
highlighting aspects of practice-based research which influenced and developed 
this notion. The development of NBM as well as providing a process through which 
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to think about material performativity also, unsurprisingly (given the context of 
telecommunications), was significant in developing a notion of distributed 
materiality in the context of creative practice. To explain this, a short reminder of 
some of the core ideas outlined in 2.1.4 will first be offered, before its relationship 
to NBM is described. 
 
In her 2013 definition of distributed materiality, Drucker leans heavily on the work 
of Jean-François Blanchette (2011) whose long and technically rich account 
proposes modularity64 in computer design as a connecting framework through 
which to conceptually integrate notions of digital materiality within an ecology, an 
economy even, of finance, skills, hardware and efficiency. Blanchette’s influence is 
also acknowledged by this thesis which builds on his work by both relating it to 
other facets of materiality (and other similar research such as Thrift, 1996; Fuller, 
2005), and by exploring its relevance to creative making-practice. In the quote 
below, Blanchette highlights how considering the distributed character of 
materiality, also motivates an understanding of it as ecological. 
 
“A material analysis foregrounds how systems design must necessarily engage in 
the oldest political problem in the world: the allocation of scarce resources among 
competing stakeholders.” (Blanchette, 2011, p. 2) 
 
                                            
64 Blanchette (2011) in, almost exasperating detail, notes how the technical 
infrastructure of modern computers (in the form of von Neumann architectures) is 
reliant on modularisation of the hardware stack – a way of separating the various 
layers of software abstraction from the their existence as electrical or magnetic 
charge, to binary code and thence ‘upwards’ until they eventually reach the 
application layer. This modularity has deeply material implications since it involves 
a continual trade off between efficiency and ease of access for programmers, 
which is protected by international standards (such as transmission protocols like 
TCP). The so-called ‘abstraction penalty’ (the inefficiency implicit in higher level 
programming languages) is itself a powerful argument against the putative 
immateriality of digital technologies. If digital technologies were truly immaterial, 
their language of expression and mode of execution would have no bearing. 
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Blanchette’s example seeks to describe the integration of distributed and 
interconnected materiality, with a wide variety of different kinds of actors. Drawing 
on Latour’s focus on the way that actors “modify states of affairs” (Latour, 2005, p. 
71) rather than on a priori ‘motivations’ for action, Blanchette’s identification of the 
material components of his “problem” is proposed as related here, to Latour’s 
investigation of what “might authorize, allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, 
influence, block, render possible, forbid…” (Latour, 2005, p. 72). Similarly the 
various groupings, alliances and relationships between them strongly resemble 
Bennett’s description of publics. His notion of layering is therefore enriched by a 
connection to ideas of agency, derived from ANT and developed in Chapter 2. 
 
If distributedness for Blanchette is expressed as layered modularity, a way of 
designing for impossibly complex wholes with thousands of inter-relating parts, I 
propose that a corollary effect of this aspect might be called ‘infrastructural 
invisibility’. Invisibility, in this context, is an overlooking of those material agencies 
described above by Latour (2005, p. 72), a failure to look for action in the right 
place, and I will describe a specific example in the history of the telegraph network 
in later paragraphs. In fact, this kind of infrastructural invisibility can be understood, 
in ANT parlance, as punctualization, the capacity of network actors to appear 
naturalized and inextricable from their network situation (recall Callon, 1991, p. 
152; Law, 1992, p. 379).  
 
In the period discussed below, a lack of technological precedent caused 19th 
Century British Imperial policy makers to misunderstand the nature of 
vulnerabilities in the electrical telegraph network. In the following paragraphs I will 
describe a number of ways that distributed materiality played a role in this 
scenario. I will show that there was, in essence, a kind of educational invisibility 
brought about by a lack of familiarity with the performance of complicated, 
distributed, technical systems. Following this arose a kind of infrastructural 
invisibility, related to what Fuller (2008, p. 4) calls “naturalization” and which is 
implicit in Kittler’s (1992) “discourse networks”. I provide some initial background 
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for these ideas before relating them more closely to the study of the 19th Century 
electrical telegraph. 
 
Kittler describes how technologies effectively disguise their artificiality65 by 
influencing culture to the extent where they seem inseparable from it66. Such 
attitudes invite direct comparison to Marx’s critique of commodity fetishism (1999 
(1887), pp. 29-35). Cohen (2000, p. 116) describes how, for Marx, commodities 
come to appear to have exchange value in their own right because the social 
milieu effectively disguises the fact that this exchange value is a product only of 
labour.  
 
“It appears that men labour because their products have value whereas in fact they 
have value because labour has been bestowed upon them. Men do not recognise 
their own authorship of the value through which alone they relate, and which 
therefore regulates their lives as producers. They are thus in a quite specific sense 
alienated from their own power which has passed into things.” (Cohen, 2000, p. 
116) 
 
Marx’s example is acknowledged here as a theoretical foundation for this principle 
of infrastructural invisibility but I build on this to propose some particular technical 
senses in which it is brought about in terms of distributed materiality.  
 
The study of a particular instance of ‘infrastructural invisibility’ became part of the 
development process of NBM through a material-historical/archaeological study 
and influenced the final installation. In the following paragraphs I will describe at 
length how a strain of such invisibility, related to immaterial thinking was part of the 
history of telecommunication67 and how the study of this, integrated with the 
                                            
65 “artificial” in the sense of being made things, things made with artifice. 
66 This was described in Chapter Two 
67 Later I will compare this phenomenon to contemporary critiques of ubiquitous 
computing (as in Dourish & Bell, 2011, Star, 1999). 
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development of NBM, provided rich material for understanding how distributed 
materiality can inform practice. Although much of the discussion below is not 
directly drawn from the physical prototyping process of NBM, I continue to claim 
that it was an aspect of practice-based research. Although the general focus of this 
thesis is on the during-the-build, hands-on development, I have also stated that 
literary research was often initiated following, and directed by, that building 
process. The concepts developed by comparing contemporary and historical 
communications networks, described below, were only possible because that work 
was scaffolded and supported by on-going technical experimentation.  
 
Central to this critique of attitudes to infrastructural invisibility is the notion that 
users and developers of the expanding international telegraph network in the mid 
19th Century saw its materiality as subjective. That is to say they considered it very 
much as something which is done to, rather than something with potential for 
agency of its own. The telegraph network was seen as something essentially 
pliable, subject to feats of human engineering. Such a subjugation of materiality is 
also implicit in Morse’s moniker of the ‘Lightning Man’ and his telegraph the 
‘Lightning Wire’ (Gere, 2006, p. 47). I suggest that the adoption of metaphors of 
light and speed are telling because they implicitly abstract the massive (in the 
literal sense) physicality of the technical infrastructure of the telegraph system 
focusing only on its effects for users. This abstraction, of the entire system is core 
to its achieving a state of punctualization. I am arguing that one of the things that 
allowed the technical materiality of the network to become, in essence, a black 
box, was its status in the public imaginary (mostly through hyperbolic newspaper 
descriptions) as an effect of speed. Not only was speed a key figurative trope in 
describing the electric telegraph, a new sense of connectedness was also given 
much media attention (Gere, 2006, p. 48)). The laying of the first transatlantic 
telegraph cable in 1858, for example, heralded massive celebrations and prompted 
the famous New York hotel, Astor House, to produce a banner reading, “The 
Atlantic Telegraph transmits the Lightning of Heaven, and binds together 60000000 
of human beings” (Gere, 2006, p. 48). To summarise, I propose that a focus on 
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figurative descriptions of the growing telegraph network was both a product of, and 
a contributor to, an immaterial stance towards it by public and policy makers alike. 
 
The telegraph network though, in contrast to these figurative media tropes, was a 
product of industry. It required new construction materials (Tully, 2009, p. 57) and 
new kinds of understanding to deal with the interaction of what was a network of 
unprecedented complexity and decisions faced in the 19th Century and which are 
as relevant now as then because of the irremediable realism (Meillassoux, 2010) of 
their materiality. There remain, phenomena which pertain to particular materials, in 
action, and together in combination. It is exactly these moments at which the 
ontological meaning of those objects is at its most evident. In the context of the 
international telecommunications network this is most obvious when considering 
the physical distribution of the network. Considered from a topographical 
perspective we can observe that the similarity between the international telegraph 
network in 1869 {Figure 16} and the {Figure 17} map of contemporary internet 
submarine cables is not coincidental. Even a casual inspection reveals that the two 
maps are literally grounded by material features of geography (note the stopping 
off points at mid-Pacific islands for instance). The high cost of laying undersea 
cables continues today to afford new kinds of advantageousness as proximity to or 
isolation from major data hubs contributes to the effectiveness of businesses now 
in the internet age as then in the age of the telegraph68. 
 
                                            
68 So significant is this that some more geographically isolated states, such as 
Iceland, have formed consortia to finance the laying of new cables (Farice 2013). 
The “seamless connectivity”, afforded by such cables then comes at a price tied to 
the raw material of the cables, cost of shipping fuel and work-hours (most recently 
costing around $300m from London to New York (Williams, 2011)). 
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Figure 16: Map of Telegraph Lines in 1869. HH Lloyd & Co Publishers 
 
 
Figure 17: Submarine Cable Map. Copyright PriMetrica 2013 
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The increasing distributedness of the telegraph network brought about a series of 
problems, founded in material issues, whose nature was consistently 
misunderstood. The expansion of the British empire was logistically supported by a 
corollary growth in the international telegraph network. The telegraph cables were, 
for the most part, private enterprises (Kennedy P. M., 1971, pp. 729-30) which 
leased them along with the corresponding relay stations making them directly 
comparable to contemporary Internet Service Providers (henceforth ISPs). When 
the British military began to more fully understand the strategic advantage afforded 
by telecommunications (to themselves and to their enemies) they began to push 
for more and more cables to be laid underseas, since this would avoid having to 
cross the territory of other nations over land with whom they might later be in 
conflict.  
 
“…the British government could hardly be expected to look with enthusiasm upon a 
system in which the link with their most vital possession passed through several 
foreign countries, and they therefore warmly welcomed the laying by the Eastern 
Telegraph Company of a submarine cable which virtually avoided all contact with 
Europe.” (Kennedy P. M., 1971, p. 731) 
 
The fear of foreign interference on land pushed the cables underseas where they 
would be relatively safe from sabotage. Here they could benefit from existing 
defence infrastructure and the weak points where they came on land could be 
effectively fortified. 
 
“Some incidental protection would be offered, the Colonial Defence Committee felt, 
by the fact that the cables took the normal shipping routes, which were patrolled by 
the Royal Navy's cruisers; in addition, the deployment of a few guns near cable 
landing-stations would deter raids upon those lines lying in shallow water. 
Nevertheless, the navy would not always be on hand and a later body of experts 
recognized that.” (Kennedy P. M., 1971, p. 731) 
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This eventually lead to an infrastructural ‘push’ to bring the cables under 
centralized British control of an ‘all red line’69, which would be managed and 
defended by the Empire and would serve to further consolidate its power. 
However, this project was misguided for a number of reasons. By consolidating 
their communications infrastructure, the British actually made themselves more 
vulnerable to the point of sabotage and accident becoming “almost tempting” 
(Kennedy P. M., 1971, p. 732). Earthquakes and ship accidents (Holpuch, 2013; 
Johnson, 2008) continue today to disrupt the contemporary internet infrastructure 
and the effect is exacerbated by what is, actually, a legacy network topology. In 
essence the British failed to understand the significance of what was a material 
topological problem, a question of a kind of distributed materiality, where the 
functioning of every node (in this case relay station or telegraph office) is 
dependent on others. What had started as a mesh {Figure 18}, with multiple 
potential routes from A to B, was redefined as a bus (with branching tree 
elements). As such the network was only as robust as the weakest point on the 
main trunk lines, cables which were thousands of miles long.  
 
The contemporary internet architecture is designed to avoid this problem. With the 
advent of algorithmic routing, data packets are able to reach their destination via 
numerous routes dependent on the current state of traffic and consequently cut 
offs (due to accidents for example) and bottle-necks should be avoidable70. 
 
                                            
69 The “red line” was the name given for the British telegraph network. “Red” 
recalled the colour usually chosen for the Empire on maps of the world.  
70 The entire system has vast amounts of built in redundancy (data packets are 
frequently duplicated, and many many multiple routes exist between end points). 
   130 
 
Figure 18: Some Simple Network Topologies. Copyright Sudarshan Softech 2013 
 
The architecture is designed to balance out traffic but it operates in a physical 
infrastructure which is centralised and vulnerable. The internet, is not a topological 
drawing but a dynamic and unbalanced system. The sheer quantity of packets 
travelling to and from popular servers creates particular demands in terms of, for 
instance, electricity supplies, quantities of switches or numbers of strands in a fibre 
optic cable71.  
 
I have suggested that there were two, related, paradigmatic attitudes inherent in 
historical conceptions of the electric telegraph network which had negative 
consequences for its administration. These were first, that figurative visions of 
infinite speed and connectivity replaced understanding of the foundation of the 
telegraph network in an unbalanced and dynamic material world. Secondly, on the 
level of policy, an assumption that the main danger to the telegraph was sabotage 
                                            
71 The topology of the internet has developed such that ISPs have become the 
major customers to the owners and leasers of what has become known as the 
“internet backbone”, the 1st tier massive “trunk lines” . The term trunk line, while 
drawn from the days of telephony, is appropriate since it continues to be telephone 
companies such as AT and T who build and operate such services. This has in turn 
led to a whole economy of exchange and traffic trading between these operators. 
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brought about a topological error of consolidating network branches. This account 
has been included to evidence that material thinking, or lack of it, is a historical 
paradigm.  The attitudes described above indicate a failure to see the materiality of 
the telegraph network as something which possessed significant agency as part of 
a dynamic ecology.  
 
I will now go on to describe some of the contemporary ramifications of these 
historical attitudes. It is this contemporary relevance which is explored not only 
through the theme of NBM but by a choice of materials, namely the use of the 
smartphone itself and also the selection of messages which are broadcast in the 
installation. 
 
The use of a smartphone as the receiver of messages in NBM has two particular 
significances. Firstly, I proposed that the iPhone functions as a what might be 
described as a metonym for futurity. It is continually evoked in the media and in 
Apple’s own advertising as futuristic. As the continual market leader, it sells on a 
promise of ‘always on’ infallible connectivity. Secondly, I suggest that smartphones 
are the most visible and concrete example of (Weiser’s 1991) vision of ubiquitous 
computing (henceforth ubicomp) and that consequently, adopting them as a 
material for making is a way of engaging with and critiquing this vision72. 
Supporting this claim is Adam Greenfield’s (2006, p. 167) observation that some 
Japanese ubicomp research avoids the term smartphone, preferring “ubiquitous 
communicator”. In the following paragraphs I will describe how both of these 
aspects relate to the 19th Century telecommunications history described above. 
 
Mark Weiser (1991) outlined a vision of a ‘ubiquitous computing’ which would 
pervade our daily lives through instantiations at different scales - tab, pad and 
                                            
72 This is consistent with my earlier claim that this thesis was both for and with 
contemporary computing technology. 
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board being the canonical examples (Weiser, 1991)73. Weiser’s scenario 
emphasizes interconnectedness both between various computing systems or units 
and also between one’s daily life and the multiple instances of technology designed 
to support it. This vision (criticised as a myth by Dourish & Bell, 2011) of an 
overarching, seamless interconnectivity finds contemporary expression in the 
phenomenon of ‘Cloud Computing’ and also the near-ubiquitous adoption of smart 
phones and other mobile devices such as tablets and is directly comparable to the 
figurative tropes employed to describe the telegraph network. The choice of an 
iPhone is intended to simultaneously position NBM in relation to this ubicomp 
vision and align the same with a particular attitude towards technology, the 
punctualisation of complex distributed technology into black boxes,74 which has 
been discussed as paradigmatic of the development of the 19th Century telegraph. 
NBM, therefore, uses an iPhone as a rhetorical device employed to invoke notions 
of futurity and seamless connectedness. By doing so it mimicks the rhetoric of 
some ubicomp research with technology proposed as calm, unobtrusive (Weiser & 
Brown, 1996) and indistinguishably woven together with life (Weiser, 1991). I have 
suggested that Apple, as a brand, sells on this vision. The company’s 2011 
message, “It just works,” repeatedly emphasized the infallibility and seamlessness 
of their technology (Siegler, 2011). Apple’s ‘iCloud’ cloud computing service can be 
considered as perhaps the most visible example of the effects of cloud computing 
to consumers as their advertisements slickly demonstrate how a photograph, for 
example, taken on one’s iPhone, syncs automatically across all of one’s other 
Apple devices. As such, Apple as much as anyone, perform a function with these 
adverts of developing in their audience a particular understanding of the world 
connected, in specific channels, through technology. Crucially though, the 
                                            
73 To call this research ‘seminal’ barely approaches the truth, standing as it does at 
over ten-thousand Google Scholar citations at the time of writing (the follow-up 
paper Weiser & Brown, 1996 has nearly 800). 
74 In the next section, I will describe in more detail how this vision of distributed 
materiality carries with it particular kinds of fragility and how these form part of the 
functionality and theme of the piece. Dourish & Bell’s (2011) criticisms will be 
addressed in more detail at that point. 
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understanding brought about by such demonstrations is completely a-technical. It 
focuses only on the effect of such technological systems while disguising the vast 
physicality that they imply. As such it has much in common with the rhetoric 
employed in describing the ‘lightning line’. The system is presented as an effect, 
that of speed and connectivity, rather than as a physical thing. By adopting a 
historical messaging protocol and transmission technique (the lamp) juxtaposed 
with the iPhone, NBM is intended to critique the ‘black box level’ engagement with 
communication systems which is implicit in the kinds of user experience proposed 
by Apple, as seamless, hyper-connected, and futuristic. 
 
In summary, the research process of NBM involved a technically-focused, 
archaeological study of telecommunications history which highlighted some 
specific effects of paradigmatic attitudes to distributed materiality. I have proposed 
these as objects to be critiqued through practice and described how NBM 
embodies such a critique by literally putting contemporary and historical 
technologies into communication. Through the previous paragraphs I have 
attempted to highlight how distributed materiality describes the technical 
interdependence of the many heterogeneous materials which contribute to a 
technological system. In the context of early telegraph networks (optical and 
electrical) I have named only a few of these materials as including islands in the 
Pacific, submarine cabling, routers, and mobile phones. The combination of these 
materials causes new and unexpected events to occur and I have suggested in this 
section that lack of awareness of the interactions of these various materials has 
both contemporary and historical relevance. These effects, though, unpredictable 
as they may be, can also be productive for art and design not only from the 
perspective of critiquing the cultural phenomenon which gives them a particular 
reading but also as producing new spatio-temporal arrangements as described in a 
previous section. These can be creatively exploited and, indeed, this is the basis of 
Brucker-Cohen (2003) and Oliver’s work (2011; 2012) described in Chapter Two. 
Such works exploit kinds of fragility which are produced alongside distributed 
materiality. In the next section I will develop some theoretical concerns 
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approaching a definition of fragile materiality and begin to consider what it might 
offer to makers. 
4.3.4 Fragile 
In Chapter Two I gave examples of how fragile materiality has afforded creative 
opportunities to artists. This section will build on those initial points, describing how 
a number of integrated practical possibilities and theoretical concerns around 
fragility were a product of the research described in the previous three sections. 
Earlier, I undertook a media-archaeological study of the telegraph. Central to that 
examination was the proposal that there was a reciprocal relationship between 
literary and practical investigation in the research process of NBM. The study of the 
development of the electrical telegraph network was initially motivated by a 
technical interest in how Morse and Vail’s system operated, which in turn, was a 
consequence of an earlier iteration of NBM’s design involving a wire transmission 
rather than an optical one. The course of that research in literature, though, 
suggested particular ways in which fragility might be used and thought of through 
practice and these will now be discussed. 
 
Materiality implies fragility in a wide variety of ways. I have already mentioned the 
phenomenon of ‘bit rot’ which is offered by (Manoff 2006) as a counter argument to 
the putative immateriality of digital artefacts. In the previous section I described 
how the telegraph and contemporary internet are fragile through vulnerability to 
physical accident (such as the severing of submarine cables by ships’ keels) and 
also through data bottlenecks caused by legacy network topologies. I also 
suggested that the use of the smartphone positioned NBM in relationship to 
research into ubiquitous computing and now add that there are particular kinds of 
fragility associated with this paradigm which might be called combinatory or 
algorithmic. By algorithmic or combinatory I mean the capacity of software and 
hardware to produce unexpected effects, magnified by the mass interaction of 
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modular components75. Pervasive systems, of which smartphones form a part, are 
particularly vulnerable to such fragility. Not only is the combinatory interaction of 
modular parts a problem for distributed materiality, their very heterogeneity carries 
with it an inherent fragility. In a world of ubicomp, different brands coexist, varying 
technical standards are in place, and old and new equipment sit side by side. 
Dourish and Bell (2011) describe how the “myths” of pervasive computing, those of 
seamless integration of ubiquitous computers, have necessitated a state of 
blindness to the defining characteristic of interconnecting technology: messiness. 
 
“The lesson of the real world of ubicomp is that we will always be assembling 
heterogeneous technologies to achieve individual and collective effects, and they 
will almost always be messy”. (Dourish & Bell, 2011, p. 26) 
 
For these authors and for (Star, 1999), mess is an intrinsic feature of 
infrastructures which must be maintained, regulated and worked in. The fragility 
here is derived from maintenance, regulation and use, all of which have the 
potential to go awry. As (Berry, 2011; Manoff, 2006) have noted, maintenance 
requires money and systems are only as robust as they are well maintained. In the 
context of the 19th Century telegraph network, the relationship between money, 
vulnerability and maintenance was involved in a complex interchange between the 
material infrastructure of the network and its situatedness in a tense period of 
global political power. The agency of the infrastructural materiality was therefore 
implicated in a broader (and messy) context of extremely heterogeneous agents 
and actions. 
                                            
75 For instance, at the time of writing, several large scale temporary failures of 
computing infrastructure have occurred, including Microsoft’s Exchange 
ActiveSync (which manages email and calendar synchronisation), the Nasdaq 
stock exchange, Google Search, Amazon, and Apple iCloud (Garside, 2013). The 
problem with Microsoft’s servers was short-lived but the problem persisted for three 
days as mobile phones stepped up their attempts to communicate. The problem 
was therefore greatly exacerbated by the behaviour of thousands, perhaps 
millions, of individually “greedy” programmes. Such a fragility is brought about by 
the interaction of millions of interacting ‘rules’. 
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An additional fragility suggested as inhering to distributed materiality, particularly in 
the form of infrastructure, is regulation. Regulation is intended to produce 
consensus on technical standards and requires institutions to propose and enforce 
it. The material demands of a complex and interdependent set of material 
relationship necessitate a supporting regulatory infrastructure recalling (Winner, 
1980, pp. 130-131). Star also points out that a close examination of infrastructure 
involves an understanding of it as a site of relational, professional, practice pointing 
out that: 
 
“…infrastructure is a fundamentally relational concept, becoming real infrastructure 
in relation to organised practices…” (Star, 1999) 
 
Even in the context of building NBM regulation was an issue. The extent of the 
modularity of the work is only partly represented by the physically separate phone 
and lamp in the exhibition installation. In its development a number of additional 
modules existed including an app for “spoofing” the lamp by flashing a white circle 
on a computer screen as well as iPad, iPhone and Android emulators to which I 
would regularly deploy the software during testing and debugging. Because of the 
various sites of testing and their particular technical performances I encountered 
constant problems with version control and regulation. Most versions of the 
software relied on a pre-given timing variable defining the length of one Morse dot. 
In some versions this was defined in milliseconds but in others as a given number 
of frames. The differing performance of various hardware meant that I was 
constantly adjusting this in different versions and in some cases actually defining 
ratios comparing one set of hardware with another (such as an iPad running at a 
frame rate 1.7 times the speed of a particular iPhone). In essence I was obliged to 
create a regulatory infrastructure in the microcosm of the build! 
 
Infrastructure, in summary, is a lens through which the fragility of distributed 
materiality can be examined and a number of features discerned. The particular 
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sense, which I emphasise, is that to technically integrate distributed technologies 
requires particular kinds of work. The smooth functionality of technical systems is 
artificially76 maintained through specific kinds of professional practice, in terms of 
regulation and maintenance. There is a tension between the material demands of 
the system and the use it is being put to. In relation to making-practice, this work 
can be seen as an on-going negotiation with the irremediable realism of the 
system’s materiality. That is to say that such work can be seen as a reaction to the 
fact that materiality defines particular kinds of physical arrangement and that to 
bring different materials into correspondence demands a corresponding amount of 
work to bring this about. In Chapters 2 and 3, I proposed a view of making with 
materiality as exactly this kind of engagement with pre-existing ontological 
meaning as a matter of attitude for makers.  
 
NBM contributed to the development of these understandings of fragility into the 
installation in two ways – firstly by acknowledging fallibility as part of the work itself, 
and secondly by thematically referencing historical moments in which fragility has 
become manifest. I suggested earlier that there was a tension between the logical 
abstraction of Morse code and its deployment as part of a technical practice in a 
broader system. I now add that even the development of the code itself was 
enmeshed in material concerns. Where Morse relied on a single wire transmission 
for his telegraph system, the Cook and Wheatstone model (in its most successful 
instantiation) made use of a parallel system of five wires which, in combination, 
caused a needle to point to the appropriate letter. These differing systems of 
communication strongly resemble current serial and parallel systems and with 
similarly counter-intuitive efficiencies. Parallel systems that have the potential to 
transmit several (usually eight) signals at the same time often turn out to be less 
efficient than serial systems because the increased complexity causes unexpected 
effects (such as interference). Similarly, Morse’s telegraph succeeded because its 
                                            
76 Again, I use artificial to invoke “artifice” in the sense of both “cunning, trickery” 
(Oxford Dictionary of English, 2010) and “craftsmanship, workmanship” (Oxford 
Dictionary of English, 2010). 
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design, while inefficient, was simple and adaptable. This fragile aspect of 
materiality therefore has a throttling effect on communications, now in 2013 as then 
in the 1830s. In the installation design of NBM the serial communication is both 
slow and fallible (as visitors walk between the lamp and phone, occluding the 
lamp). However, it also demonstrates the practicality of the code – a parallel 
system would be extremely difficult to implement in a signal lamp. In this sense 
NBM embodies historical, material dilemmas which are demonstrated by the serial 
versus parallel efficiency trade off. Efficient versus cheap. Logically elegant versus 
materially stable. Simple and adaptable versus fast. Redundant and repeated 
versus independent and safe. Such distinctions are perhaps similar to the 
development “iron triangle” (cheap, fast or good: choose one) as described by 
(Greenfield, 2006, p. 166). As Blanchette suggests (here referring to inescapable 
features of contemporary technologies), “[there is a] dialectical tension with the 
evolution of […] material resources and with the efficiency trade-offs their 
abstraction requires.” (Blanchette, 2011, p. 2). In all of these tensions we 
encounter the intractability of the material world. 
 
NBM in the gallery installation also references examples of fragile materiality. I 
have already suggested that the use of the iPhone, considered as metonymic of 
futurity, was a rhetorical device intended to provide a kind of impressive 
persuasion. The recorded history of telecommunications is also rich in rhetorical 
flourishes. Significant technical tests or public demonstrations were often 
accompanied by grandiose, almost bellicose, language. The drama of these 
pronouncements is matched only in the records that survive of messages 
describing how materiality has proved fatally fragile. A mixture of these messages 
are transmitted by the signal lamp. 
 
1. “If you succeed you will bask in glory” (Sheppard, 1986, p. 10) (message 
sent by the Chappe brothers during testing) 
2. “What hath God wrought?” (Gere, 2006, p. 48), (message sent by Morse 
and returned by Alfred Vail at the opening of the Baltimore Telegraph line) 
   139 
3. “Come at once. We have struck an iceberg. Sinking.” (distress call from the 
Titanic) 
4. “Europe and America are united by telegraphy. Glory to God in the highest; 
on earth, peace and good will toward men” (Sheppard, 1986), (first message 
to be sent across transatlantic telegraph cable) 
5. “TORTURE” (Kennedy J. D., 1974), (distress signal blinked by US Airforce 
Commander Jeremiah Denton during a television “confession”. Commander 
Denton was shot down and held captive by the North Vietnamese in 1966) 
6. “Congratulations and success to the Pacific cable, which the genius of your 
lamented father and your own enterprise made possible. Theodore 
Roosevelt.” (inaugural message for the opening of the first transpacific 
telegraph cable) 
 
From these six messages above we can observe the two different strains. 
Messages one, two, four, and six are expressions of technological triumph. Three 
and five signal catastrophic technological vulnerability and failure (in example five, 
Denton’s helicopter was shot down and he was lucky to survive). The sharp duality 
between a hubristic belief in the power of technology as an expression of 
mankind’s effort and God’s will and the terse defeated tone of the distress call is 
employed for dramatic effect in NBM.  
 
There is a final fragile materiality embodied in NBM. The Victorian telegraph 
network, like contemporary smartphones, was reliant on scarce resources. In order 
to supply sufficient qualities of a naturally occurring plastic, gutta percha, which 
was used as an insulating material for the transatlantic cables, the British telegraph 
builders were to completely denude various forests in South-East Asia. So 
essential was this plastic to the success of the submarine cables that, had it not 
been ‘discovered’ (which is to say taken forcibly from the local populations who had 
been using it for centuries), there would have been substantial delays to the 
telegraph’s development until a synthetic substitute could be developed (Tully, 
2009, p. 57). The over-foresting of this resource, as well as decimating local 
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habitats, eventually caused a supply crisis for the material, again prefiguring other 
kinds of contemporary fragile materiality through the use of scarce resources, 
unsustainably extracted. Today the publicity around mineral extraction for the 
production of Apple iPhone components has been explored in photographic and 
theoretical work (e.g. Holmes, 2011). 
 
In summary, fragile materiality has a number of features: The distributed and 
modular nature of technological systems, such as the electrical telegraph network 
and the contemporary internet, means that they are subject to two particular forms 
of fragility: heterogeneity and scarcity. The sheer heterogeneity of materials, each 
with its own physical properties and frailties, combined in varying technological 
standards, presents a massive design challenge to have them work predictably 
both individually and in concert. This is exactly the challenge which Dourish and 
Bell (2011) suggest is being conveniently overlooked in the context of designing for 
ubiquitous or pervasive systems. Such distributed systems also have the capacity 
to suffer what I have called combinatory or algorithmic fragility, a kind of material 
butterfly effect77. Fragility is also implied by the dependence of technological 
artefacts and systems on resources. I have given illustrative examples of how 
particular artefacts (iPhones and telegraph cable insulation) are (or were) 
enmeshed in broader ecologies of agriculture and mineral extraction and supply 
chain logistics.  
4.3.5 Future-Oriented 
The final facet of materiality that I will discuss is its future orientation. Future 
orientation, as I suggested in Chapter Two, suggests that if meaning and 
materiality are related, then to make with materials is to accept an involvement with 
future meanings, and that to do so carries an sense of ethical responsibility. This 
position was founded (following Heidegger, 1971; Meillassoux, 2010) in an 
                                            
77 Bennet (2010, p. 27) gives a detailed of example of such fragility in the form of a 
catastrophic power outage in the U.S.A. in 2003, in which a variation in demand 
caused successive failures of equipment which, in turn, put greater strain on the 
remaining network. 
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understanding that meaning is ontologically grounded, suggesting a view of making 
as a kind of ‘intervention’ into pre-existing meanings. I also described how Keane 
(2005; 2013), notes that the binding of semiotics to material causes meaning to be 
always orientated towards unpredictable futures. The interdependence between 
signs and the world means that signs are processual:  “signs give rise to new 
signs, in an unending process of signification” (Keane, 2013, p. 413). Signification 
is bound with materiality in mutually dependent processes. 
 
This previous review work was reinforced by the process of working with an 
antique artefact, the signalling lamp. The lamp itself, as a messaging medium 
clearly has an explicit relationship with the creation of meaning through encoded 
language. Perhaps a more interesting approach, though, is to consider, as I did, 
how its own materiality produces its own kind of meanings, rather as was noted in 
the discussion around the Morse ‘fist’ in 4.3.2. To become part of the installation of 
NBM, the lamp was retrofitted. An LED bulb replaced the original (broken and 
obsolete) incandescent and a control circuit linked the trigger to a microcontroller. 
This process physically combined the long history of the lamp with other material 
pasts embodied by the bulb and circuitry. The lamp was effectively reformed as a 
new hybrid object. Its potential for action was altered and consequently so was its 
capacity to produce different kinds of meaning. Whereas previously, the reliance 
on a human signaller restricted the speed and complexity of messages sent, the 
lamp could now potentially transmit at very high frequencies78. Because it could be 
far more quickly extinguished and illuminated than an incandescent bulb, the LED 
bulb, combined with the control circuit, afforded this feature. In essence, the nature 
of the lamp’s agency was reconfigured which led me to consider how the concept 
of agency itself is fundamentally future-leaning. The production of action in the 
world necessarily involves contingency and knock-on. Building on Latour (2005, p. 
76) we can begin to define a more detailed account of the particular kind of future-
reaching effect produced by material things.  
                                            
78 Although the low camera frame rate would prevent them being interpreted.  
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“…the ‘matter’ of most self-proclaimed materialists does not have a great deal to 
do with the type of force, causality, efficacy, and obstinacy non-human actants 
possess in the world. ‘Matter’, we will soon realize, is a highly politicized 
interpretation of causality.” (Latour, 2005, p. 76) 
 
To decode, or at least observe the particular ways that matter “might authorize, 
allow, afford, encourage, permit, suggest, influence, block, render possible, forbid, 
and so on”  (Latour, 2005, p. 72) is, in short, to be always already in a conversation 
about the future. 
 
This intervention into the near future through the remaking of an historical object 
caused me to contextualise this process in relationship to design practice. Design 
is a future oriented activity. This takes two forms. First there is the immediate, and 
perhaps more prosaic, sense of imagining shortly-to-be-made objects. Second 
there is a wider more ambitious view of design as a “world-making” activity (Agid, 
2012). Such worlds are worlds of the future. However, implicit in this view is that 
design is as an essentially abstract activity, divorced from the contingencies of 
material engagement. To ‘make worlds’ is to imbue the maker with unrealistic 
mastery over materials. This tendency has been criticised recently. Ingold (2013, p. 
69) describes it as a “hylomorphic” fallacy in design methodology, pedagogy and 
theory. Hylomorphism, by Ingold’s description, is the view that in “the making of 
artefacts, practitioners impose forms internal to the mind upon a material world ‘out 
there’” (Ingold, 2013, p. 20). He proposes a more nuanced expression of future-
orientation in relation with materials. In this, designers employ a kind of “foresight” 
(Ingold, 2013, pp. 66, 69-72) wherein experienced practitioners plan ahead in 
response with materials. Such a view has obvious commonality with Suchman’s 
(2007) notion of situated action in which plans are conceived of as “cultural 
resources produced and used within the course of certain forms of human activity” 
(2007, p. 13) as opposed to “cognitive control structures that universally precede 
and determine actions” (2007, p. 13). Indeed, Suchman chooses to introduce her 
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(2007, pp. xi-xii) reworked account of situated action by invoking both (Bowers, 
2002, pp. 32, 44) and (Ingold, 2000, pp. 312, 413). 
 
Dourish and Bell have also noted the problems associated with what I characterise 
as a kind of extreme form of hylomorphism, the common trope in design research 
of designing for proximate futures (2011). They observe that in ubicomp research, 
some designers effectively sidestep fundamental design obstacles by locating the 
design in some notional future scenario where the obstacle has conveniently been 
overcome. Bluetooth pairing is tricky? No problem. In the proximate future we will 
have newer, more seamless peer-to-peer phone communication protocols. Mobile 
phone battery life is too short to take phones into the wilderness? No problem, in 
the proximate future, battery life will be extended even as batteries become 
inconceivably small and light. It is not coincidental that all of the problems 
ostensibly overcome by this trick are exactly those identified by (Fuller 2008; 
Blanchette 2011; and Dourish and Bell 2011) themselves, as irredeemably 
material. 
4.4 Facets as Framework 
In this section I have given a short introduction and definition to the five facets of 
materiality which I have developed both from literature and through my own 
practical research. This research combined experimental making and historical and 
theoretical research in an integrated process. Not only did this process shape the 
development of the facets, it began to suggest practical examples of how they 
might be applied to other making-processes as a framework. The development of 
the facets of materiality was integrated with an archaeological approach examining 
historical materiality in action, providing rich examples which could be compared to 
contemporary artefacts and systems. Historicity was also proposed as inherent to 
materiality in its performative, distributed and future-oriented aspects. 
 
The integrated development process of the material facets with NBM and MI was 
necessarily partial and opportunistic. Based, as it was, on a materially-focused 
making-process, it was subject to the availability of resources and constrained by 
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money and technical know-how. It was lead by particular opportunities, described 
in 4.3.1 as ‘spaces for work’. This process was acknowledged as messy and 
opportunistic and while the relationships between facets and design process was 
expressed clearly, in many cases this development was both lengthy and iteratively 
reinforced by other aspects of the build. Correspondingly, the result of this method 
is that the descriptions of the facets of materiality developed are not intended to 
exhaustively pin down all possible implications or applications of them. The next 
chapter follows the application of the facets, as a framework, to the production of a 
third artwork and consequently further develops the facets themselves. Its main 
focus, though, is on their application. 
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Chapter 5. Material Design and Making 
The previous chapter tried to describe specific aspects of making-processes which 
played a role in the development of the five facets of materiality proposed: spatio-
temporal, performative, distributed, fragile, and future-oriented. The convoluted and 
occasional nature of the making-process was acknowledged and it was again 
stressed that there is a tension between the formal description offered in this thesis 
and the day to day practice of programming, sketching, laser cutting, data 
scraping, soldering and wiring, which I attempt to address partly by including as 
much of the practical details of the activity as possible. In the sections that follow, I 
will describe the application of the facets of materiality in the form of a design 
framework to the making of a separate work, Neurotic Armageddon Indicator 
(henceforth NAI).  
5.1 Research and Frameworks 
At the time of making NAI, the production of MI and NBM had contributed to the 
development of a series of concerns which were loosely formalized under the facet 
names described. I have already noted that there are many correspondences 
between the various facets (particularly between distributed and fragile) and it was 
only at the writing up stage of this thesis that these were so definitively 
taxonomized. Similarly, in this chapter, I describe the application of these facets as 
a design framework but rely on the term’s connotations of guiding principles rather 
than strict rules. The solidity of the framework, therefore, continued to be 
developed through the research described below. As such the main factor 
separating this chapter from the previous is an understanding that the facets 
developed were something with a more detailed conception of their application 
rather than being primarily features of description. It is in this sense that they 
began to be applied as a framework and in this way that their continued 
formalization and exemplification throughout this chapter hopes to render them 
most useful to other practitioners. 
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It has been repeated throughout this thesis that a key methodology employed was 
research through design, and justification for such an approach was provided in 
Chapter 1. In order to remain as close as possible to the practice described, this 
chapter will be organized by the developmental processes involved in making the 
artwork rather than according to some other conceptual schema. Taking the works 
themselves as things from which to begin, what began in the previous chapter as 
annotations (Bowers, 2012), will be developed and explored for their potential 
usefulness to other designers and makers.  
 
Before describing the application of the facets of materiality as a framework, 
building on remarks in 1.4, I will first suggest some ways in which a practice-based 
approach is congruent with the broader subject of materiality. 
5.1.1 Making-processes 
Ingold’s (2013) account of making-practices emphasises the way that the process 
of making can be lost when looking at ‘finished’ artefacts. 
 
“Much can ride, in English on the indefinite article. Building is an activity; it is what 
builders do. Add the article, however, and the activity is brought to a close. 
Movement is stilled, and where people had once laboured with tools and materials, 
there now stands a structure - a building - that shows every sign of permanence 
and solidity.” (Ingold, 2013, p. 47) 
 
An identical point is made by (Dewey 2005 [1934], p. 53). This view of objects, in 
design, as static and permanent, Ingold maintains, is problematic because it 
disregards their location in dynamic environments in which they continue to evolve, 
decay, warp, leak water or fall down. I add that this view of dynamic, vibrant 
(Bennet, 2010) material allows for a particular aesthetic connection with making-
practice. If we recognise that design processes do not end with ‘static’ objects then 
our crafting activity can also be seen as part of a continuity of aesthetic experience. 
That is to say that in a sense we are constantly engaging with both past and future, 
we are already ‘repairing’ what we build. The frequent use of the term ‘tinkering’ in 
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the world of DIY electronics79 already carries a suggestion of interaction with a 
world of vibrant agency during the making-process. To tinker is to make with things 
which are already in process. Part of the process of making things then is an 
understanding that one is intervening in an already dynamic system. This 
observation builds on the points made in Chapter 2. 
 
I have used the building process of the artworks described here to conduct a 
particular kind of research through design (Frayling, 1993/4). This took the form of 
not only theoretical research, in the form of reading and writing, but in the 
production of what might be called ‘critical objects’. A critical object is one which 
does something oppositionally in order to find things out. It is a reconfigured, 
repurposed, rebuilt or recombined technology which embodies a critical response. 
It is a thing which does something new. As such there are similarities in this 
approach with that of Dunne and Raby, (Dunne, 1999; Dunne & Raby, 2001; 
Dunne & Raby, 2013). In the final chapter I will highlight some differences between 
the approach taken here and these last. Where there is commonality though is in 
the use of objects to intervene in the development of technological culture. Some 
possible results of this intervention will also be discussed in the final chapter.  
 
I assert that an approach which articulates criticality through objects of art and 
design is fundamentally different from one based on ‘critique’. By ‘critique’ I mean 
an approach which is based on using only what are essentially linguistic, discursive 
devices (such as dialectics for example) to ‘deconstruct’ objects of discourse. Part 
of the argument presented here is that certain kinds of criticality can only be 
produced by a material engagement with the subject at hand and that in the 
context of contemporary technology (at least) this material engagement must 
physically rework that subject. This claim is justified by the assertion that, 
particularly in the context of technology, the main advantage of a practice-based 
                                            
79 See for example the pages of http://instructables.com, or http://makezine.com. 
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approach is that it provides an opportunity80 to genuinely remake and study the 
object of interest. To ‘take apart’ technology (as I attempted to take apart the 
electrical telegraph) encourages exactly the kind of integrated theory and practice 
promoted by this thesis. The previous chapter was, as much as anything, intended 
to demonstrate that without the physical building processes of NBM and MI, the 
theoretical findings described would not have been achievable. 
 
This approach, based on building rather than critique, is aligned with Latour’s 
assertion that “what performs a critique cannot also compose” (2010, p. 475). 
Latour (2010, pp. 475-6) argues convincingly that a problem with critique (which he 
identifies with much modern contemporary academic scholarship, particularly in the 
humanities) is that it is often predicated on a belief that with a successful 
deconstruction, a truer reality will be revealed81 (Latour, 2004). Latour’s 
‘compositionalist’ stance, by contrast, emphasises that there is no such reality 
calling attention instead to the construction of differences (as described in Chapter 
2) which allow such realities to be made possible. This position is highly 
comparable to (Barad, 2003). It is in this sense that Latour discusses a transition 
from “matters of fact” to “matters of concern” (Latour, 2004). These latter exactly 
focus on the active construction of difference. These constructions are our 
concerns. 
 
“While critics still believe that there is too much belief and too many things standing 
in the way of reality, compositionists believe that there are enough ruins and that 
everything has to be reassembled piece by piece.” (Latour, 2010, p. 476) 
 
To take Latour’s ‘compositionalism’ so literally (as a building practice) may not be 
perfectly in the spirit of his intention but I argue that there is a strong commonality 
                                            
80 I do not claim that such a process inevitably leads to criticality. 
81 For Latour, critique “ran out of steam” (Latour, 2004) with postmodernism which 
was “fully equipped with the same iconoclastic tools as the moderns, but without 
the belief in a real world beyond.” (Latour, 2010) 
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between his method and the particular kind of making proposed here in response 
to the facets of materiality and in the later discussion of experiential ecologies. 
Latour’s description of the practice of knowledge construction (in the sciences 
particularly) emphasizes the importance of the role played by material (such as 
papers, instruments, laboratories) in the activity of constructing knowledge (1987; 
1988; 1993). It is exactly this sense which is sought after in this practice-based 
research. These objects are proposed as critical, not in the sense of ‘critique’ but 
as essential. They are proposed as constructing, as part of an ecology, new 
arrangements of knowledge, however limited. After a brief description of the 
artwork discussed throughout this chapter, the following sections will attempt to 
describe this process of construction, paying particular regard to the guiding role of 
the framework for materiality proposed. 
5.2 Neurotic Armageddon Indicator 
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Figure 19: Cover of the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists showing the Doomsday Clock, Copyright Bulletin 
of Atomic Scientists 1 
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5.2.1 Background 
To discuss the research process involved in producing NAI the history and 
operation of the original Doomsday Clock must first be briefly described, and with 
it, its host journal, The Bulletin. In line with earlier arguments that materiality is 
inherently historical, motivating a media archaeological approach, a short 
background will now be described against which later points can be related. 
 
In 1945 The Bulletin was created as a monthly newspaper by a group of scientists 
who had been or were still involved with the Manhattan project. 
 
“To explore, clarify and formulate the opinion and responsibilities of scientists in 
regard to the problems brought about by the release of nuclear energy, and To 
educate the public to a full understanding of the scientific, technological and social 
problems arising from the release of nuclear energy.”  
(Bulletin of Atomic Scientists of Chicago, 1945)   
 
The Bulletin is not peer-reviewed but publishes articles by “leading scientists and 
security experts” (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 2013) that seek to present 
persuasive arguments to the lay person. In 1947 with the transition from a 
newspaper to a journal format, The Bulletin began to feature the Doomsday Clock 
on its cover {Figure 19}  
 
The clock “symbolizes the urgency of the nuclear dangers that the magazine's 
founders--and the broader scientific community--are trying to convey to the public 
and political leaders around the world.” (Bulletin of Atomic Scientists) It is ‘set’ at 
irregular intervals by the Bulletin’s board of sponsors which includes eighteen 
Nobel laureates. The closest that the clock has ever been to midnight was in 1953 
when the United States chose to pursue the hydrogen bomb (two minutes to 
midnight). The furthest away was in 1991 with the end of the Cold War (17 minutes 
to midnight). 
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5.2.2 Anti-representation: Performances 
A key concern which arose during the production of NAI, and in response to the 
original Doomsday Clock, related to the distinction between representation and 
performativity. I have already described a series of related ways in which 
materiality can be approached as performative and some of these are now applied 
as a concern informing practice. Taking the research and production of NAI as a 
focus, I will now describe some of the material factors which constitute 
performativity in the context of both NAI and the original Doomsday Clock, and how 
their consideration affected the making-process. In doing so, I will attempt to 
highlight how this performativity can be read not only as something manifest for 
human consciousness but as it “becomes reified in actions, body stances, general 
anticipations” (Thrift, 2003, p. 241). That is, as part of an event in which the clock 
effects different kinds of agency, building on the account given for networks of 
agency in Materiality: a Definition in Action. The focus of this section’s analysis will 
be on the consequences for making in this context of performative events and I will 
describe how I developed NAI in response to the various performative materialities 
of the Doomsday Clock. 
 
The performative approach to the clock adopted while making NAI is cast against a 
“representational” perspective wherein a pre-existing ‘thing’ (in this case an idea 
about proximity to nuclear Armageddon) is “expressed” in a representation. To 
describe the Doomsday Clock as a “representation” of proximity to Armageddon is 
to suppress its performative functions. This, of course, is a question of focus. This 
thesis describes a particular kind of working methodology which is centred around 
a set of material concerns. Performativity offers a way of studying the operation of 
media as it plays out on a techno-cultural level. A “representational” approach to 
NAI might have suggested a more developed analysis of the use and experience of 
the particular visual form of the clock across different media. It may have focused 
on audience reactions to its form, or its associations in different cultural contexts. 
These are all significant aspects of the work and I acknowledge that my adoption of 
the particular physical form used was informed by a particular personal taste and 
   153 
design language. Such points are de-emphasized in the following discussion 
because although they affect some of the choices of materials in the specific, they 
do not substantively affect the methodology. For instance, in later paragraphs, I will 
discuss the material history of the LED 7-digit display. It is acknowledged (in 5.2.3) 
that the Doomsday Clock itself exploits a filmic trope (of the ticking countdown to a 
bomb) which has significance as a recognizable representation of danger or 
catastrophe. The discussion that follows; however, rather than focusing on this 
trope per se, for instance by tracing its history in visual culture, focuses instead on 
how the material of such displays affords particular kinds of statement82. The 
findings of this analysis are specific to the kinds of material involved but the 
approach is not. 
 
To ask what those functions include is to ask what the Doomsday Clock does and 
through that activity, following (Barad 2003), what it actually is. A short summary of 
the clock’s performative functions might include the following:  
 
• It quantifies the level of nuclear threat in an easy-to-understand visual 
metaphor supported by clear design language. 
• Its distribution across television news, print and the web brings the journal 
itself to a broader audience than might normally be expected of an 
academic journal. This is facilitated by its uncomplicated design which is 
reducible to a small size while remaining recognizable. 
• It contextualizes the work of the journal as being both about and against 
nuclear proliferation. 
• Through its design language it represents the journal and itself as having 
historical roots in the 1940s or 1950s and this contributes both to its context 
(of having relevance to war time) and its legitimacy (i.e. it has a 60 year 
pedigree). 
                                            
82 Much as Kittler does with his analysis of the gramophone, film and the typewriter 
(Kittler, von Mücke, & Similon, 1987). 
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The list of performative functions of the Doomsday Clock above is not intended to 
be exhaustive but rather to demonstrate how a concern with performative 
materiality differs from an approach based on representation. While the latter might 
focus on the clock as a figurative trope, the former emphasizes the particular kinds 
of actions afforded by the clock’s material form, and the network in which it sits. 
 
The making-process of NAI began from this point and continued by focusing on 
specific material aspects of the Doomsday Clock and asking how they might be 
adapted or reconfigured to produce a different performance. To develop this 
aspect, I included reflection on aspects of spatio-temporal and fragile materiality. 
By combining these three facets, performative, spatio-temporal and fragile, I aimed  
to creatively explore the material foundations for the Doomsday Clock’s 
performative functions and rearrange or replace them in a critical object. The NAI 
project was not begun with the intention of ‘critiquing’ the Doomsday Clock in the 
sense of evaluating it on moral, political or cultural grounds. Instead, the 
Doomsday Clock was investigated because there were a number of interesting 
material issues involved in the various physical forms the clock has adopted, which 
are clearly vital to its role as an actor, particularly as regards its success in the 
media. Particularly rich for investigation is the way that the construction of 
knowledge embodied by the clock is easily describable as a process conducted 
between various sites, people and materials. In this sense it represented an ideal 
fit for examination (and reworking) according to Latour’s ‘compositionalist’ stance 
(2010) described above. 
5.2.3 Foundations 
If the Doomsday Clock is not to be seen as a representation of an idea then an 
account must be made for its performance as a thing, the material basis for this 
performance must be uncovered. The performativity of the Doomsday Clock itself 
is founded in a number of material factors which provided me with sites to 
intervene as described in Chapter Four’s exposition of spatio-temporal materiality. 
Earlier I described a significance of spatio-temporal materiality as the way that new 
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arrangements of space/time are embodied by new technologies and suggested 
that the implication for makers of this view was that they could be adopted as literal 
places for work, configurations of various materials to be explored and 
experimented with. An exploration of one such spatial arrangement in the context 
of NAI came with the comparison of the form of the clock, as a minimal wall clock 
design, to a filmic vision of a typical bomb timer. 
 
The Doomsday Clock itself exploits a filmic trope, that of the ticking countdown 
timer (to a bomb explosion). In the print journal itself, the clock takes the form of a 
minimal, 1940s-style clock of which only a section is shown {Figure 19}. A very 
similar design is reproduced on the Bulletin’s website {Figure 26}. This clock 
design performs as a kind of recognizable trade mark across different media and 
serves to associate them as different parts of a whole. An initial question for 
making NAI was how the physical form of the clock could be altered to both 
maximize the impact of its message and in doing so to explore how that message 
is materially performed in the Doomsday Clock itself. In popular film culture, the 
ticking time bomb, commonly takes the form of an LED display (usually red) such 
as those shown in {Figure 20 to Figure 23}. Given the strong association between 
the form of the red LED display and the recurrent plot element of the ticking time 
bomb, it would seem logical for the Bulletin editors to have used such an LED 
display as the image of the clock. In 1947 however such displays were not yet 
commercially available (Zheludev, 2007). I took a creative decision to ‘update’ the 
clock to this technology and explore this, as an alternative site for intervention, 
which could simultaneously serve as a lens through which to re-examine the 
Doomsday Clock itself. 
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Figure 20: Bomb Timer from the movie, “Predator”. Copyright 20th Century Fox 1987 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Bomb Timer from the movie, “The Fifth Element” Copyright 20th Gaumont 1997 
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Figure 22: Bomb Timer from the movie, “Broken Arrow” Copyright 20th Century Fox 1996 
 
 
Figure 23: Bomb Timer from the movie, “Batman the Dark Knight” Copyright Warner Bros 2012 
 
 
 
 
  
   158 
  
 
 
Figure 24: A Seven Segment LED Display (this particular model combines four displays in one 
package). Copyright Sparkfun 2013 
 
I have suggested that a purpose of rebuilding the Doomsday Clock was to actually 
investigate it as a performative artefact rather than as a representation of an idea. 
Earlier I described how the Bulletin journal was the location of a fairly complex 
series of processes which culminate in the setting of the Doomsday Clock: First a 
basis of evidence is established through the commission and publication of articles. 
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Then a panel is convened to discuss this evidence83 and agree an assessment of 
the level of current threat. Finally, this assessment is quantified as a metaphorical 
expression – the number of minutes to midnight. The Doomsday Clock itself is in 
this sense, future-oriented. Its expression of the time as well as the events it was 
created to prevent are all in relation to the future. 
 
I claim that the translation of discursive processes to a single number presents an 
opportunity to rework this process of quantification and to try to associate it more 
tightly with its physical form. This multi-sited production of the clock, in Latourian 
terms, should be seen as a process of knowledge construction. The painstaking 
work which must be undertaken to produce this knowledge relies on the 
affordances of a wide variety of heterogeneous materials. Examples include 
transportation to allow the committee members to meet, telecommunications 
networks, their server which must be robust enough to cope with the traffic 
resulting from media attention to the clock and so forth. To investigate every aspect 
of this process of construction would be an impossible task, nonetheless the 
building process of NAI explored some of its later stages particularly regarding the 
internet infrastucture. 
 
The LED displays described earlier, as well as having particular figurative 
associations afford particular kinds of action. Crucially, it is impossible (or nearly 
so) to use them without some kind of control software and hardware. As such they 
define a design space which is necessarily computational. Not only do they ‘evoke’ 
a mechanistic sensibility, they actually rely on control mechanisms to function 
correctly. In this sense, LED displays are also future-oriented because of their 
‘expectation’ of computational control. 
 
A clock of this sort is a mechanical (or electrical) device. It is necessarily causally 
connected to the physical world. I conceived of this necessity as part of the spatio-
                                            
83 The Bulletin does not describe this process in any detail. 
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temporal arrangement of that technology (of LED displays). A dependency on 
computer (or electronics) control is an identifiable feature which marks it apart from 
other similar technologies (such as a single LED for instance) and motivates an 
adoption of this feature as prominent in the design. 
 
This aspect of the materiality of the 7-segment LED provided an opportunity to 
present a particular kind of fiction through the artwork. That was that the NAI is part 
of a real mechanism actually connected to the end of the world, even though that 
mechanism is not itself articulated through the design. This idea was described in 
gallery interpretation in direct relation to the original Doomsday Clock in an attempt 
to highlight the value of exactly that lack of mechanism in the original! I argue that 
such a fiction would not be possible with an image of a clock. 
 
Returning to the Doomsday Clock itself, the image of the clock (such as that on the 
cover of the journal) by contrast is therefore always, in some senses, a metaphor, 
referring back to some anterior materiality rather like the phicons which function as 
“icebergs”  in a metaphorical “ocean” (Ishii, Lakatos, Bonanni, & Labrune, 2012, p. 
38). A virtual clock (such as the one presented on the Bulletin’s website) however 
is something else once again. It may be causally, programmatically connected to 
time keeping software, or some algorithmic process or it may be solely an image 
which must be replaced to give an illusion of time84. What appears to be the same 
clock in interpretation is in fact only the effect of two completely different 
materialities. 
 
NAI was designed to exploit this ambiguity (between a clock which is a function of 
code mechanism and one which looks identical but is not) and to make that 
ambiguity manifest. By parodying the ‘mechanical’ aspects of a clock, NAI seeks to 
                                            
84 To break this down further, the ‘mechanical’ ‘programmatic’ clock could also 
function by defining shape translations which are eventually rendered to pixels or 
by loading a number of pre-rendered images – this, in fact, appears to be the case 
with the Doomsday Clock. It is produced by a JavaScript programme. 
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transcend a status as a representation and embody a kind of material critique. It 
attempts to construct a particular kind of new version of the Doomsday Clock while 
making that process of construction its own subject. It is in this sense that it is 
aligned with Latour’s (2010) proposal of compositionalism over critique. Rather 
than being, in any sense, positioned against the Doomsday Clock, NAI takes new, 
related materials and arranges them in complement to the original. The use of 
optoelectronics constructs NAI as explicitly and necessarily part of a system of 
technological intra-communication between the scraping server, the microcontroller 
and the display. The aesthetic claim of the work is dependent on the technical, 
causal connection between these technologies. 
 
5.2.4 Fragile=Hackable 
A second beginning point for a materially-oriented engagement with the Doomsday 
Clock was suggested by an application of ideas of distributed and fragile 
materialities to the context of the web edition of The Bulletin. From a material 
perspective, the transition of the journal from print to web was a fundamental one 
with implications as to how, when and by whom the journal is viewed, where the 
data is stored and, crucially, how its content is disseminated and protected. I have 
described how the clock image hosted on the website bears only a superficial 
resemblance to the print version and is, in fact, produced by a set of inter-
connecting browser functionalities. Similarly, the text, images and other content of 
the journal may have stylistic commonality with the print journal but their foundation 
in different kinds of materiality means that they are open to a very different kind of 
making intervention. In the following paragraphs I will describe how a fragility, 
inherent to the systems composing the Doomsday clock and the context in which it 
sits on the web, afforded such an intervention. Crucially, I propose that a 
generalizable feature of this intervention is an expectation from providers of web 
content that clients will conform to particular rules or expectations. The subversion 
or disregard of such expectations affords ways of articulating a critical response to 
these fragilities, which have implications for our use of such technologies. 
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The server-side part of NAI ‘scrapes’ the webpage to check the clock time. In 
technical terms, the programme that does this actually conducts a very similar 
function to a normal web browser. It requests html content from the server (via 
HTTP) and then renders it according to a set of pre-determined rules. The ‘giving 
over’ of content is implicit in the functionality of a web browser and the implicit 
expectation of the host is that that content will be displayed according to world wide 
web rules which are defined by W3C85 standards. That expectation though is a 
point of fragility. The system relies on an unknown, anonymous client requesting 
data which is served according to agreed technical standards. Beyond those 
standards (HTTP protocols) there is a messy technical ‘grey area’ which can be 
creatively intervened in. The distributed nature of the webpage’s materiality – the 
division between client and server sides is what allows web scraping and 
consequently is what affords the repurposing of website content into creative 
projects like NAI86.  
 
Websites also operate an ‘honor’ system to attempt to regulate this client/server 
relationship by using a ‘robots.txt’ file {see Figure 25}. This file sits at the root 
directory of a site and provides codified instructions to machines accessing the 
system as to where they can and cannot go and how often. These rules however 
are rarely enforced as to do so requires specialist technical implementation. The 
fragility of the system is also therefore connected to the financial or skills resources 
of the institution involved who may be more or less able to detect and repel 
intrusion for instance through IP address blocking87. 
 
                                            
85 W3C “is an international community where Member organizations, a full-time 
staff, and the public work together to develop Web standards” (W3C, 2012) 
86 Arguably this opportunity is also implicit in the creative use of application 
programming interfaces (APIs). APIs are normally intended to supplement web 
pages with data. The Twitter API (Twitter, 2013) is an example in point where a 
wide-spread adoption by media artists has resulted in the data provided by it being 
leveraged into a wide variety of unforeseen uses, often off the webpage.  
87 The ‘robots.txt’ file for the Bulletin asks (among other things) that there is a delay 
between crawling this of 10 seconds, and disallows various queries. 
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Figure 25: A Screen Grab of the Robots.txt File from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientists Website 2014 
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The combined process of research and making described here was enabled by 
approaching The Bulletin’s home page with a view to the fragile and distributed 
aspects of its materiality. The practical process of developing a simple Python web 
scraper also helped to develop ideas of how fragile and distributed materiality 
might be practically applied as a framework. For instance acquiring the basic skills  
necessary to scrape the bulletin’s page made me aware of the existence of the 
‘robots.txt’ file. This in turn contributed to a theorization of the client-server 
relationship as a messy, distributed and fragile one which could be creatively 
exploited. In this way a reciprocal relationship between framework and application 
was developed. 
5.2.5  ‘Live’ Data 
A final aspect of the Doomsday Clock’s materiality is also related to the 
client/server division which I have been describing as an example of distributed 
materiality. In addition to this latter, there is a related, spatio-temporal approach to 
the materiality of the Doomsday Clock which I explored through the design of NAI. 
In this final, spatio-temporal aspect of the Doomsday Clock’s materiality I used the 
making-process of NAI to construct a material critique of notions of ‘liveness’ in 
visualisation. Visualization is referenced because its purpose is to represent data in 
understandable ways. There is therefore congruence with the motivation behind 
the Doomsday Clock itself. 
 
Many seminal visualizations (such as, Koblin, 2005; Stamen Design, 2006) rely on 
live data, and point to ‘liveness’ as a key point for engaging audiences. Viegas and 
Wattenberg, for instance, describe their Wind Map as a “living portrait” (Viegas & 
Wattenberg, 2013) using liveness as evocative of the relationship between 
visualization and the real world. Taking the concept of liveness as central to their 
work, Lise Autogena and Josh Portway created a simulated ‘live’ ecosystem in 
their work Black Shoals which was driven by live data from the stock market. 
 
“Digital creatures, a form of artificial life, inhabit this world, feeding on the light 
released by the stars, breeding, dying and slowly evolving – while trying to learn to 
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live in this strange artificial ecology into which they’ve been born.” (Autogena & 
Portway, 1996) 
 
Jacobs et al. describe how central the concept of liveness was, for the experience 
of an artwork driven by environmental data. 
 
“…the artists also emphasized how it was vital that the work should make a live 
connection […] in order to support a localized and viscerally real experience.” 
(Jacobs, Benford, Selby, Golembewski, Price, & Giannachi, 2013, p. 135) 
  
They also describe how the artists involved struggled with what was effectively a 
moral dilemma. The live feed for their project was occasionally unreliable and their 
solution was to ‘patch’ the data feed with pre-recorded data when the feed 
connection failed. Some participants however reported that this undermined the 
artistic and ethical integrity of the project (Jacobs, Benford, Selby, Golembewski, 
Price, & Giannachi, 2013, p. 135).  
 
Liveness, while seen as crucial for Jacob et al. is not examined by them from a 
material standpoint. The authors and artists above discuss liveness in the way that 
it is relevant to engaging audiences and by doing so, focus on liveness as a 
phenomenal event. I suggest that a more detailed analysis of the material basis for 
liveness might enrich the concept88. I will now discuss some material aspects of 
liveness as they related to making NAI and in doing so hope to both contribute 
some further nuance to this concept, and describe how a focus on spatio-temporal 
materiality suggested this additional research direction. 
 
                                            
88 Other aspects of liveness – for example the appreciation of live vs pre-recorded 
music have been the subject of recent research into public interactions e.g. 
(Reeves, Benford, O'Malley, & Fraser, 2005), (Hook, Schofield, Taylor, Bartindale, 
McCarthy, & Wright, 2012)  
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There are two distinct material temporal aspects to ‘liveness’ which I identify: 
latency and sample rate. By latency, in this context, I refer to the delay or ‘lag’ 
between an event occurring and its representation being manifest in a 
visualization. Wind Map (Viegas & Wattenberg, 2013) for instance, has a latency of 
about an hour – the weather data is processed by the visualization engine around 
an hour after the wind was detected by a network of sensors89. In NAI the latency 
is the time taken for the scraped data to be downloaded from the server and 
processed by the microcontroller. This latency is represented visually by an LED 
indicator light at the bottom right of the unit, labelled ‘CHECKING WITH BULLETIN 
OF ATOMIC SCIENTISTS’ which flashes when a new packet is received {Figure 
3}. In NAI this latency also defines the sample rate, as soon as one packet is 
returned, another is sent. Any digitally encoded data is sampled at a given rate. On 
a commercial CD for instance a measurement is taken 44100 times a second. The 
combination of sample rate and bit depth determines the fidelity of the recording 
(Roads, 1996). In visualization practice however, these ‘sample rates’ differ 
enormously from project to project depending on the hardware involved (in the 
form of sensors and microcontrollers for instance) and the programming rules set 
up to control and ‘poll’ the hardware. As Jacobs et al. (2013, p. 135) describe 
though, these material specifics are unlikely to be visible to audiences, in fact they 
may be purposefully obscured. Although connection failure is not made explicit in 
the design of NAI, it is implicit in the minimal indicator light which flashes only when 
a packet is requested. 
 
NAI performs a parody of liveness by continually, visually90 polling a static data 
source (the Doomsday Clock webpage). It goes through exactly the same 
technological processes (such as HTTP requests, data processing) as would many 
                                            
89 The designers make this latency clear on the project’s home page (Viegas & 
Wattenberg, 2013). 
90 The indicator light is intended to emphasise the live connectivity. It flashes 
irregularly depending on the timing of the data packets. The concept of latency as I 
apply it here is as a variable delay in the reception of data rather than as a 
comparison to some standard. 
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live data visualizations based on remote data. However, by relying on a data 
source which will almost never change its performative function is affected, 
becoming a kind of meta-commentary on liveness itself. With the continuous, 
‘checking’ of time, I attempted to introduce a fictional, anthropomorphic quality to 
the clock. This is the ‘neurosis’ of the piece’s title. This ‘neurosis’ is intended not to 
refer only to the proximity of Armageddon which it is ostensibly checking but also to 
a state of temporal uncertainty. This fictional ‘uncertainty’ is proposed as the 
clock’s reaction to the fundamental incommensurability of the different kinds of time 
with which it interacts. Those kinds of time are; an audience expectation of 
liveness; a latency in updates, the possibility that the clock may actually change 
very occasionally, the opposition between the high speed of the internet connection 
and the slow update cycle of the Doomsday Clock. By adding this 
anthropomorphized persona to the clock I identify with Bennett’s suggestion that: 
 
“A touch of anthropomorphism, then, can catalyse a sensibility that finds a world 
not with ontologically distinct categories of beings (subjects and objects) but with 
variously composed materialities that form confederations.” (Bennet, 2010, p. 99) 
 
The resulting neurotic personality which I developed for the device was a useful 
tool in thinking about the materiality of liveness in relation to the clock. Bennet’s 
“confederations”  
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Figure 26: A screen grab of the current journal featuring the Doomsday Clock timeline. 
  
   169 
5.3 Framework Summarised  
This chapter has described how research described in the previous chapter which 
developed ‘facets’ of materiality was applied to a particular artwork development 
process as a framework.  
 
• Spatio-temporal materiality was discussed in relation to the concept of 
liveness in data-driven artworks. 
• Performative materiality informed the development of NAI in contrast to the 
original Doomsday Clock and its representation across different media. 
• Fragile and distributed materialities afforded an understanding of 
infrastructural weaknesses in web technology which encouraged the ‘hack’ 
behind NAI. 
• Future-oriented materiality contributed to an understanding of the 
connection between LED displays and computational control. 
 
I claimed that this process would demonstrate how such a framework could be 
applied in practice and that this would be potentially useful for other makers. The 
process described here is obviously specific to the thing which was being creatively 
explored; the materiality of the Doomsday Clock. As such the particular making 
tactics employed to re-purpose the clock’s sense of liveness, or fragility, for 
example, are not likely to be directly repeatable. The value of the framework 
described however, is that it is adaptable to a variety of design scenarios and as 
such there is an implicit expectation to generalise methods by which it can be 
applied. There are some aspects of the methods adopted here which are 
generalizable (and I have provided some brief examples of areas where they might 
be applied) but I am resistant to the idea of a series of methodological 
recommendations for the following reason: An important appeal of materiality as a 
basis for an approach to making is that, as Ingold has suggested, it offers a way of 
integrating thought and action in the context of the physical world. A material 
approach, rejects the dualism of ideas and material and I have cited a number of 
authors who offer their own justifications for why this dualism is artificial. Some of 
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those justifications are ontological, as in Heidegger’s ‘thrownness’ (1954; 1996 
[1927]). Others are phenomenological as in Merleau-Ponty’s bodily approach to 
meaning (2002). If the ‘hylomorphic’ tendency of some design practice is to be 
avoided, making-practice must be responsive to the performative materialities with 
which it is involved rather than trying to idealise materiality to fit convenient 
conceptual structures. Instead, the practice proposed by this thesis is intended to 
restage various performative materialities, creating new correspondences and 
consequently, new meanings. 
 
In the context of NAI, I have described how this ‘responsiveness’ afforded two 
interconnected ‘places to start’. These were; a theoretical and thematic focus for 
research; and a set of materials and technologies to use. The facets of materiality 
which I have proposed provided a way of both finding these ‘places to start’, and of 
providing a basis for analysis. For example the concern with the way that 
technology brings about new divisions or definitions of time (part of what I have 
defined as spatio-temporal materiality) informed the making-process of NAI firstly 
by influencing the selection of the Doomsday Clock as a base, and then by 
suggesting ways that its particular kind of temporality was materially embodied 
through scripts, files and client/server relationships. The spatio-temporal facet also 
suggested the relationship between this small ecosystem of technologies and the 
time performed by them, and other practical projects (particularly the visualizations 
cited) and the concepts developed with them.  
 
The value of the facets of materiality as a framework, is in the way that they can 
inform different stages of a making-process from inception to development. I have 
shown how they were useful for provoking initial research, for choosing which 
technologies to work with, and for deciding how to intervene. In the following, final 
chapter, I will explore materiality after the making-process of these artworks. I will 
offer a retrospective look at how materiality, taken as a central concern in an art 
and design practice has broader implications into the way that such a practice and 
the things produced with it, fit into an ‘experiential ecology’.  
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Chapter 6. Conclusion: Experiential Ecologies 
So far, the development of five facets of materiality (spatio-temporal, performative, 
distributed, fragile, and future-oriented) has been described through literature 
review and practical research. Their application as a framework has been detailed 
and the implications of such a framework for other makers has been discussed. In 
this final chapter, developed after the practical research was completed, a 
developing series of implications of this research will be explored through a central 
question, ‘if makers adopt a materially-centred approach as described, what are 
the implications for the ways made things form part of wider ecologies, and how 
does, or should, this affect the research process?’ This question will be 
approached first by asking why makers could or should think about their work in 
ecological terms. Justifications given will subsequently be discussed in relation to 
the experience of research and ethical implications, already introduced, will be 
revisited from this perspective. Lastly, implications on how such a consideration 
may actually influence methodology will be discussed. After the exploration of 
these key themes for the chapter, some checks and balances to the concept of 
experiential ecologies will be offered, and some directions for future work 
proposed. For the purposes of this analysis a retrospective discussion of Refractive 
Index will be undertaken to ground and illustrate how ecological concerns already 
inflect the work produced.  
6.1 Why Ecologies? 
At different points within this thesis a variety of terms describing interconnected 
groups of people and things (often without a priori differentiation between the two) 
have appeared in references to existing research. Ingold, for instance, describes 
both meshes (2009) and lines (2007) to invoke his particular characterisation of the 
relationships between material and practice. Latour discusses not only “networks” 
(2012, p. 3) but “entanglements” (2005, p. 84). Winner mentions “configurations” 
(1980, p. 135). I employ the term ecology because it suggests a number of 
features which were both reflective of, and productive for, the practice described in 
this thesis and these will be briefly outlined in the following paragraphs. In doing so 
   172 
however, I qualify the use of this term by stating that its application is exactly as 
relevant as it proves useful. There are no doubt phenomena evoked by the term 
which are not reflective of the practice described here and this is duly 
acknowledged.  
 
A starting point for an ecological perspective in this practice-based research was a 
reaction to the sense of being as a lab researcher (literally, physically) surrounded 
by an array of technological components, various in, for instance, size, shape, 
power consumption, and composite material. There was, and is, a sense that not 
only were these items connected to one another (both literally as in the networking 
technology and more loosely in their potential for correspondence) but that those 
particular connections were an emergent feature of the particular combinations 
present. In this sense, the comparison with an ecology in the sense of, for 
instance, a micro-climate seemed apt. Similarly my own position in, and 
engagement with this ecology as exploratory (recalling Gaver’s 1991 work on 
affordances) and interventional felt congruent with the dynamic interactivity 
suggested by the term. In common with (Sharrock & Anderson, 1993) I use 
‘ecology’ to evoke a navigable environment of artefacts whose organisation is itself 
a feature of interest. In summary, I use ‘ecology’ for its resonance with a world of 
‘vibrant stuff’, messy, lively, explorable and never abstractable. That ‘stuff’ is the 
materiality which I have attempted to engage with. 
6.2 Experience 
The experience of ecologies is not only our own, but that of objects themselves. As 
unfamiliar as it may sound, objects do have experience. Experience is both the 
subjective understanding of what one has undergone and the state of having being 
enmeshed (as in Ingold, 2009) in affairs. To make, and perhaps to interact with 
technologies in an experiential mode is to adopt an orientation concerned towards 
the histories of objects and to a treatment of them with care and attention. It is 
undeniable that this engagement adopts an ethical position which is, in fact, 
contrary to some Western traditions (following Keane, 2005) as was discussed in 
Chapter 2.  A suspicion of our materials as being somehow, implicitly unethical is, I 
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maintain, disruptive to making-practice. Not only does it lead to a view of the 
material as a site on to which to project interpretation (as discussed in Chapter 5), 
it forces makers into a disjointed relationship to their own practice. Makers, 
adopting the views described by (Keane 2005), would need to reconcile their daily 
tasks of cutting, measuring, coding, soldering, and sawing with a criticism that such 
tasks are secondary to particular kinds of knowledge expressed only in literature 
(and perhaps through drawings). This denigrates the knowledge making embodied 
in such activities. 
 
Experiential ecologies are proposed as a way of thinking about the integration of 
practice, through materials, into larger contexts. They are a way of recognising that 
practice is always, already historically engaged and that such engagement can be 
a source of both inspiration and responsibility. The ‘experience’ of ecologies, in 
summary, is conceived of as both the experience of practice and the experience of 
artefacts. 
6.3 Motivating Factors: Behind Ecologies 
To this point, I have offered a number of methodological and theoretical 
imperatives for the foundation of making-practice in material concerns. In the 
previous chapter, particularly, I described the specific research directions which 
were suggested by facets of materiality and used these to demonstrate their value 
to making. At the very beginning of this thesis though, I offered some 
contextualization to my art and design practice in the form of motivating factors. In 
particular, I suggested that making has been seen as a particular form of arriving 
at, and contributing knowledge to the world. In the following paragraphs I will 
propose that the sense of creating knowledge through practice is, itself, a form of 
ecological engagement and that this in turn supports particular attitudes for makers 
with implications for methodology. Heidegger provides a clear starting point for this 
discussion: 
 
“From earliest times until Plato the word techne is linked with the word episteme. 
Both words are terms for knowing in the widest sense. They mean to be entirely at 
   174 
home in something, to understand and be expert in it. Such knowing provides an 
opening up.” (Heidegger, 1954) 
 
To produce artefacts with this perspective, I have argued, is also to engage with 
meaning and I have discussed a range of research which contributes to an 
understanding of the blurred distinctions between making, objects, action and 
thought. Made artefacts, we have seen, embody historical meaning (Keane, 2005), 
produce action in performance (Barad, 2003), and support the organisation of 
knowledge (Sharrock & Anderson, 1993). Latour, offers a description of the result 
of the many ways in which objects come to play a role in an ecological 
‘entanglement’ noting the problem with tight distinctions between these realms: 
 
“It would be incredible if the millions of participants in our courses of action would 
enter the social ties through three modes of existence and only three: as a 
‘material infrastructure’ that would ‘determine’ social relations like in the Marxian 
types of materialism; as a ‘mirror’ simply ‘reflecting’ social distinctions like in the 
critical sociologies of Pierre Bourdieu; or as a backdrop for the stage on which 
human social actors play the main roles like in Erving Goffman’s interactionist 
accounts. None of those entries of objects in the collective are wrong, naturally, but 
they are only primitive ways of packaging the bundle of ties that make up the 
collective. None of them are sufficient to describe the many entanglements of 
humans and non-humans.” (Latour, 2005, p. 84) 
 
It is perhaps the contested nature of the role of objects as part of our ecologies 
which prompts Haraway to claim that “What counts as an object is precisely what 
world history turns out to be about” (Haraway, 1988, p. 588, quoted in Barad, 1996, 
p. 164). The principal motivating factor behind an exposition of ecologies in the 
context of making with materiality then is the recognition that not only is techne a 
form of knowledge production but that the production of artefacts is also involved in 
the production of society, in the broadest sense, as an aggregate of agential 
relationships. 
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In early Chapters I defined agency as the capacity of materials (related to their 
ontological meaning), within a particular network context, to ‘overstep their limits’. 
That is, in ANT terms, to depunctualise strongly embedded actors91. Informed by 
the definition of material facets and a description of their application I have tried to 
show how making-practice can recombine and reapply materials to effect this kind 
of agency. The understanding of this kind of intervention as an ecological 
contribution as well as a way of constructing knowledge substantively affects this 
process insofar as the mode of practice, that is the attitude of makers is (potentially 
at least) affected. This argument was begun in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 but in this 
final chapter, I will assimilate a series of points, raised separately throughout this 
thesis to offer some specific ways that this mode of practice might manifest itself in 
methodology. Before doing so, though, I will explore in more detail some of the 
philosophical precedent for a particular notion of mode or attitude, providing 
background justification for the claims to appropriate methodology which will follow. 
6.4 Ecological Attitudes: The Experience of Research 
I have claimed that the understanding of a materially-informed practice-based 
intervention as an ecological engagement motivates a particular kind of attitude in 
the practitioner. I would, in fact, go further and suggest that this notion of ecological 
engagement is highly commensurable with a making-practice which seeks to 
embody a critical response to contemporary technology, to be for and with it as 
discussed. Over the next paragraphs, I will discuss a number of precedential 
approaches to the relationship between making-practice, and ecological role. In 
doing so I will show how this relationship has been conceived of in political, ethical 
and aesthetic terms. Building on these points will allow me, in the following section, 
to discuss their implications for methodology. 
                                            
91 Although this relationship of agency and punctualisation might be considered 
canonical ANT (such as Callon, 1991; Law, 1992; Latour,1987), I restate, that my 
contribution is in attempting to reconcile this position with attitudes to the 
ontological foundation of meaning found in some speculative realist philosophy 
(Meillassoux, 2010) and in (Heidegger, 1927; 1996 [1927]). 
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In Dewey (2005 [1934]) and in his interpretation by (McCarthy and Wright 2004), 
fulfilling and authentic engagement with art or technology is derived through 
aesthetic continuity, through experiencing artworks (or technologies) as related to 
past experiences. It is ecological inasmuch as the past experience of things 
necessarily contextualizes them in accordance to their past relations. We 
experience a work of joinery, for instance, with knowledge of carving and craft 
tradition which is, in turn, contextualized in terms of the particular situations in 
which it occurs, for example as part of religious practice as with Shaker furniture. 
Dewey also points out that to make, is to attempt to fit future experiences (2005 
[1934], p. 54). The ecological aspect of Dewey’s work is consequently future-
oriented. For Dewey, aesthetics is a connecting factor which unites both the 
practice of making and the materials involved in a connected whole. 
 
In a different context, Dewey (1991 [1927]), in describing the essence of a public, 
noted that public action is spurred by a recognition that connections have been 
formed between people beyond those originally involved. In this sense our 
behavior (including our practice of work) is implicated with notions of responsibility 
for its consequences. 
 
“When [...] consequences are intellectually and emotionally appreciated, a shared 
interest is generated and the nature of the interconnected behaviour is thereby 
transformed.” (Dewey, 1991 [1927], p. 27) 
 
Dewey was speaking very specifically about a kind of reaction to the unintended 
consequences of actions in human communities but an ecological perspective to 
making suggests regarding such an “appreciation of consequences” (Dewey, 1991 
[1927], p. 27) in broader terms. To see an ecology as a ‘shared interest’, as a 
‘public’, is to care about what happens in it, to see it as a mesh of things in which 
one is actively involved. To make in such a context is to take responsibility for an 
intervention in the production of meaning. As I suggested, this notion of 
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responsibility seems more than appropriate for a practice which is engaged in a 
material investigation of the historical and contemporary action of technology. 
 
Heidegger’s suggestion, meanwhile, is that an authentic relationship with 
technology, is to be achieved through avoiding the “enframement” of nature 
(Heidegger, 1954, p. 9). This enframement can be described as a ‘cutting off’ or 
diversion of nature’s energetic potential, what Heidegger calls a “setting upon” 
(1954, p. 12) or a “challenging forth” (1954, p. 7): 
 
“…the sun’s warmth is challenged forth for heat, which in turn is ordered to deliver 
steam whose pressure turns the wheels that keep a factory running.” (Heidegger, 
1954, p. 7) 
 
For Heidegger, engagement with technology, in ecological terms, is fraught with 
ethical problems. It frequently implies an inauthenticity of encounter to the extent 
where it conceals fundamental “truths”92. (Heidegger, 1954, p. 15). The ethical 
implication of designing for materiality is to decentralize human beings from a 
privileged moral superiority. This ethical aspect is exacerbated by the fact that art 
and design are not theories or objects but practices intended to produce action in 
the world. They embody and promote the ethical values with which they are made. 
Values are implicit in the production and deployment of objects which reify 
particular cultural standpoints. Although I have repeatedly asserted that things are 
not ‘representations’ or ‘expressions’ of social or cultural forces, they nonetheless 
interact in, and are products of, ecologies alongside people. and their relationships 
with those people are drawn together in what Bennet (after Dewey 2005 [1934]) 
has called political ecologies. There is therefore an inescapably ethical dimension 
                                            
92 This, Heidegger relates to an interruption of poiēsis the transformational coming 
into being of things from a state of primordiality (1954, p. 18). Full discussion of this 
cannot be offered here so I restrict my remarks to acknowledging the positive but 
risky processes of techne as they appeared for Heidegger. 
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to making. Dourish and Bell note (2011, p. 166) for instance how the meme of the 
smart house implicitly promotes an artificial norm of a large, modern American-
style house with a married, white, heterosexual couple with two kids living in it. 
Such visions have been critiqued for being both androcentric (Berg, 1999) and 
ignoring cultural difference (Lee & Šabanović, 2013). This norm becomes part of 
an on-going design practice, an ecology in fact. This practice in turn seeks to 
design for an ideal rather than with notions of materiality in mind. Dourish and Bell 
point out that it is exactly the questions of material infrastructure that derail such 
idealism. In the example of the smart house, this infrastructural problem is in the 
messiness, expense and specificity involved in trying to retro fit smart technologies 
on to 100 year old British housing stock. They observe that smart home projects 
frequently embody “visions of domestic life that celebrated technology and its 
transformative power at the expense of home as a lived and living practice” 
(Dourish & Bell, 2011, p. 166). I add that it seems ironic in the extreme that by 
being un-adaptable to other housing typologies, these projects fail even to fulfil 
their own visions of the “transformative power of technology”. At work is a kind of 
fetishized technological ideal which I connect to design practices which are 
disconnected from making relationships with materiality. 
 
I have also suggested that an ecological engagement with materials implies a view 
of making as a combination of existing meanings with a view to their future 
orientation. This idea is also suggested by Heidegger. 
 
“Technē […] reveals whatever does not bring itself forth and does not yet lie here 
before us, whatever can look and turn out now one way and now another. Whoever 
builds a house or a ship or forges a sacrificial chalice reveals what is to be brought 
forth” (Heidegger, 1954, p. 6) 
 
Heidegger, however, claims that ‘modern’ technology ‘challenges’ this process of 
revealing by unnaturally forcing nature into new configurations. I have some 
sympathy for Heidegger’s, admittedly romantic, ideals of connection to nature 
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through craft (Heidegger, 1954, p. 8) but recognize that to realize them would take 
a fundamental reorientation of the world’s economy. What is perhaps most 
valuable about Heidegger’s approach is first his recognition of the role for techne 
as a privileged kind of engagement with our environment, and added to this, his 
exposition of this process as having potential to damage that relationship in 
fundamental ways. In summary, a making-practice, particularly one involved with 
contemporary technologies, is already fundamentally involved with a challenging of 
the natural world. 
 
The preceding paragraphs have provided a background summary of literature 
which describes a series of attitudinal considerations for making. In all of them, I 
have suggested ways in which they resonate with ecological ideas, or indeed, 
reference them more or less explicitly. The stated purpose of this thesis though is 
to provide a useful resource for creative technologically-engaged practice in art 
and design and consequently a discussion of some methodological implications 
seems appropriate. As with the applications of the five facets of materiality 
identified, the discussion in the following section is not to be considered exhaustive 
but rather, following the features of ecologies identified as helpful (i.e. as 
emergently organized, messy, navigable) and the literature review undertaken in 
Chapter 3, to provide a number of productive points of interest. 
6.5 Methods of Experiential Ecologies: The Research Process 
I have said that the aim of this section is to take a number of concerns developed 
from both literature review and some of the attitudinal concerns discussed above 
and consider their implications for methodology. Chapter 3 found that much 
previous research (including Bentley, et al., 1992; Heath & Luff, 1991; Pycock & 
Bowers, 1996; Sharrock & Anderson, 1993 and Suchman, 2007) discussing 
notions of the ecology was concerned, in different ways, with avoiding Cartesian 
dualisms between mind and body, between subject and object. This objective was 
approached in different ways from social, cognitive, and systems-oriented (as in 
cybernetics) perspectives with varying degrees of correspondence or tension 
between these. A key finding from this research though was that much of this 
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previous research, thanks to its disciplinary position, described particular 
professional arrangements of work and the consideration here of a different kind of 
practice motivates new methodologies. Particularly, I have described how 
ethnographic research such (Bentley, et al., 1992; Heath & Luff, 1991) was 
positioned in an era and context where ethnographers and sociologists were 
professionally distinct from the software engineers who would be asked to 
implement their recommendations. There was consequently a formal separation 
between research, design recommendations and software engineering. Over the 
past chapters I have outlined a particular mode of practice which integrates the 
three. Crabtree et al. (2009) present a strongly-worded critique of methodologies 
which effectively mix ethnographic techniques and humanities-inspired notions of 
critique that is “theoretically generated statements about the social and cultural 
world” (Crabtree, Rodden, Tolmie, & Button, 2009, p. 886), for example in their 
discussion of (Bell & Dourish, 2006). To be explicit; this is not what I propose. 
Instead, I sympathise with much of the rich background informing the 
ethnomethodological studies of the era, and in particular the view of the world 
informing descriptions of situated action (Suchman, 2007) whose emphasis on an 
active, contingent, sense-making engagement with the world has rapport with my 
understanding of critical making-practice, with my definition of ecologies (given 
above) and with the definitions of agency and affordance developed throughout 
this thesis. Given the positive motivations for considering ecologies in the context 
of the practice described in this thesis, which build on findings in Chapter 3, it 
seems congruent to explore their implications for research methodology. 
 
Some precedent for such an approach may be found with Tim Ingold who provides 
some excellent examples of the interaction between materiality and making. I 
identify strongly with Ingold’s position but outline significant contributions beyond it, 
which are described below. Ingold implies, in his descriptions of the interaction 
between materiality and making, ecological aspects, not least through his 
evocation of Heidegger’s (1971) “things” (Ingold, 2013, p. 85) and their 
etymological connection with ‘gatherings’ or ‘meetings’. However, the close 
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relationship between making and specific features of materiality, together with their 
ecological implications is not explicit in this work. Ingold (2012) is at pains to 
describe ecologies which emphasise the ‘thingness’ of non-humans and in 
particular their definition of  “gatherings of materials in movement, as distinct from 
objects” (Ingold, 2012, p. 439) but does not provide specific indication as to how 
one makes with them. For instance in (Ingold, 2013, pp. 47-59) he provides an 
excoriating critique of the failures of architects to design understand that; 
 
“…buildings are part of the world, and the world will not stop still but ceaselessly 
unfolds along its innumerable paths of growth, decay and regeneration…” (Ingold, 
2013, p. 48) 
 
However after a lengthy and rich description of how Renaissance craftsman 
distinguished themselves from the architects of day by their specific, materially 
engaged, making-practices he does not return to the original problem, offering little 
way forward. In that sense Ingold has two halves of the puzzle. On the one side he 
provides a description of how some making-practices react to materiality. On the 
other, a sense of how materiality can be considered part of an ecology. What I add 
is specific approaches to materiality which bridge the gap between those two 
halves by building on the points made in the previous section.  
 
I identify with Ingold in agreeing that making, as an activity undertaken with a 
materialist perspective should approach the future users of a thing through an 
engagement with that thing’s thingness. This may be an awkward construction, but 
with it I indicate the following. Through a careful attention to the ecologies in which 
things are constituted, and in particular their historical and future oriented aspects 
designers may avoid making well-meaning but hylomorphic practices. Any design 
practice which is founded principally on verbal discourse is, as I have already 
suggested, doomed to attempt to express ideas produced in material form. This 
fundamentally mischaracterizes the making-process. To reiterate, making should 
not be understood as a process of ‘realizing’ an idea. Rather, ideas are realized 
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throughout processes and in continuation with past experiences. They are 
extended through physical making and do not exist in ‘dialogue’ but in coextension. 
That is to say, ideas and making are not just inseparable but are mutually 
constitutive. This characterization has much in common with Donald Schön’s 
notion of the “reflective practitioner” (Schön, 1995). Schön’s detailed description of 
the design processes of architecture students (1995, pp. 79-92) is a telling 
example of the way that the process of design develops with and responds to the 
constraints and demands of the material world. 
 
My criticism of Ingold’s work, as I have said, is that he does not reflect in sufficient 
detail on the nature of making with materiality as part of an ecology93. I posit their 
integration as necessary given the ecological considerations which I have 
highlighted as a consequence of particular implications of making with materiality94. 
Perhaps more vitally I am able to offer a significant contribution by integrating 
Ingold’s concepts with other ecological ideas in an integrated theoretical and 
technical account of making with contemporary technology. I argue that the rich 
technical detail provided in this thesis develops a particular ecological sensibility 
which would not be possible without it. At the beginning of this chapter, I 
foregrounded the rich diversity of materials as part of my sense of what an ecology 
is. In this context the technical engagement described is fundamental to developing 
that sensibility. Over the following paragraphs I will discuss the impact of ecological 
ideas on methodology during the making of an artwork and ask to what extent 
these were already implicit in the making-process. Particularly I will focus on the 
sense of an exploratory engagement whose navigation is informed by not only 
developing technical skills but a particular sense of political, ethical and aesthetic 
ecological contribution. 
                                            
93 This criticism may be unwarranted since he makes no claim to reconcile these 
things. 
94 For instance, in Chapter Two, affordance was related to Suchman’s description 
of “the contingency of action on a complex world of objects, artifacts, and other 
actors, located in space and time” (Suchman, 2007, p. 177). 
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Ingold’s description of ecologies as comprising “gatherings of materials in 
movement” (2012, p. 439) provides a useful starting point for describing the making 
of Refractive Index (henceforth RI) in ecological terms95. If RI is a “gathering of 
materials”, (2012, p. 439) what materials are gathered, what is the various stuff 
from which our ecology is composed and how? RI is discussed throughout the 
following paragraphs because, of all the creative work undertaken, it provides the 
clearest example of an ecology related to the facets developed. The diversity of 
sites, technologies, architectures and creative interventions provide a rich 
grounding for the discussion. 
 
I have previously suggested that to make with materiality is to acknowledge that 
meaning is already embodied in materiality and one’s role as a maker is, 
effectively, to reconfigure it. The project itself had a number of sites of 
infrastructure which presented an array of materials each with their own features. 
Perhaps most important was the BBC infrastructure comprising of the screen itself 
and the hardware which supported it {Figure 27}, a video mixer, the CCTV camera 
control, and the BBC-owned PC which ran our software. Allen describes his 
intention to draw attention to the architecture surrounding the displays (Allen, 
2012). The piece is intended to “mark[…] the physical effect that public media 
displays have” (Allen, 2012). In my terms, the city architecture surrounding the 
screen, as well as the screen itself, is conceived of as part of the ecology of the 
piece.  
 
During the development of RI much prototyping work was carried out in situ, in the 
control rooms for the screens in adjacent buildings. The project became, at times, 
a (near) live coding exercise as we operated as a team with on-the-ground team 
members feeding back ‘on-the-ground’ details about the effects of the light on city 
                                            
95 As a coder on the project, I can only offer my own theorization of its aims and 
effects. Ecological approaches to the project are my own original work. Where 
ideas are influenced by Allen himself, I will attribute them in text. 
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architecture. Materials were gathered as the aims and needs of the project brought 
together a collection of technologies. As the project evolved, as ideas unfolded, 
materials were brought forward into play or were reduced in importance. The 
ecology of making this work was an integration of practical coding, tweaking 
camera angles and screen performance, and feedback between artists.  
 
With the above materials gathered together, we worked within the confines of what 
was available. The screens had a set resolution and refresh rate. Their gain could 
be adjusted to make them brighter. In some sites, the project team corresponded 
with city authorities to extinguish all surrounding streetlights. Many phases of 
iterative testing were carried out on one particular screen site. The power of the PC 
running our software was assessed by trial and error with more demanding 
computation sacrificed at times for speed. The colour profile of the screens too, 
became a subject of conversation, design, and experimentation as we trialed the 
effects of different hues or luminances. All of these elements were both points of 
orientation and potential sites of intervention. In ANT terms some of these might be 
described as the punctualised black boxes against which actors might be aligned 
and deployed. The (semi-obsolete) systems graphics cards for instance shaped 
almost every aspect of our intervention by restricting or defining the kinds of action 
which could be carried out through the screen infrastructure. In this sense the 
ecology expresses a kind of micro-politics. There were actors in this network (such 
as the graphics cards) whose state of punctualisation positioned them as Callon’s 
authors (1991, pp. 140-2). They were able to put other actors in play through their 
capacity to “combine, mix, […] degrade, compute” (1991, p. 141). In this way, an 
understanding of ecologies as political, inflects an ecological engagement with 
them. In our case, we adapted our working methods to work in concert with 
existing points of punctualisation or at times to attempt to conflict with them. For 
instance, in debugging programmes on site, I would frequently seek to cause the 
graphics card to produce an error and by doing so hope to get closer to the source 
of the bug. In essence I was co-opting the frustrating intractability of the hardware 
to produce the kind of action I was trying to achieve. 
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These infrastructural components also embodied meaning and the perception of 
such meanings as potential sites for engagement was key to an understanding of 
our intervention as ecological in terms of the navigability of the ecology. As a 
media artist, designer and coder, I engaged with these material elements with a 
techno-historical perspective, informed by methodologies from media archaeology. 
channel96 colour and was responsible for sensitizing me to the notion of digital 
colour as a techno-historical entitity. This kind of sensitivity is perhaps what Ingold 
might describe as “foresight” (Ingold, 2013, pp. 66, 69-72) as discussed in Chapter 
4. This background afforded particular kinds of encounter with materials in the 
ecological. For instance, my understanding of colour, has been developed by  
 
Figure 27: The Control Panel for a BBC Big Screen 
 
                                            
96 8 bits-per-channel (24 bit ‘true colour’) means that each channel (red, green, 
blue) has a possible value of 0-255 making a total of 16777216 possible colours. 
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both experience of programming graphics and from an interest in what Erkki 
Huhtamo calls “screenology” (2004), a techno historical study of the origin and 
development of the screen through proto-cinematic devices, to film, to analogue TV 
and thence to computer graphics. A full discussion of screenology is beyond the 
scope of this thesis but it is mentioned as relevant here because of its implications 
for the navigability of ecologies of (screen) material. Essentially my capacity to 
‘navigate’ the features of technical colour in the ecology around RI was afforded by 
an integrated technical and cultural understanding of what colour is. In the context 
of RI this knowledge provided not only technical insight but a way of 
contextualizing our work in the history of computer graphics and display 
technology. The methodological implication of an ecological description for our 
activities in terms of navigability described above therefore seems congruent with 
approaches found in media archaeology. A media archaeological approach 
focusing on the historical behavior of particular technologies I suggest has the 
potential to develop the kind of “foresight” (Ingold, 2013, pp. 66, 69-72) into the 
performance of technologies valued by Ingold. Such a methodology is also a good 
compliment to Dewey’s description of aesthetics and experience (2005 [1934]). 
The contextualization of current practice as part of a history of making found in 
media archaeology is not only a practical benefit but, as described, situates 
practice in relationship to that history. It is consequently proposed as particularly 
appropriate for a critical making-practice which is actually about the current and 
future development of that history. 
 
The preceding paragraphs have outlined a number of suggested congruences 
between ecological theories and experimental making methodology. I have 
suggested, in summary, that media archaeological approaches have much to offer 
the practitioner working within such ecologies and have outlined a number of 
theoretical considerations to support this. The development of the five facets of 
materiality through the earlier part of this thesis are intended to nuance a media 
archaeological approach by suggesting specific features of technological material 
with which to engage. Before offering some final thoughts around future work, in 
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the next section I will discuss some checks and balances to the proposals offered 
up to now. 
6.6 Checks and Balances 
6.6.1 Away from Naïve Holism and Naïve Materialism 
A reasonable objection to the idea of ecologies may be articulated thus: How is the 
notion of an ecology, which emphasises local phenomena, agents in action, 
alliances and so forth distinct from a kind of ‘naïve holism’? With the term ‘naïve 
holism’ I mean a vague intuition that things happen contextually, that things affect 
each other, that in essence, everything is ‘connected’”. A similarly ‘naïve’ 
materialism could be described as the view in which un-nuanced physical causality 
is posited in terms of mechanistic agency. That is to say where physics is 
substituted for culture. (Drucker 2013) describes such a view as ‘literal materiality’ 
and criticises its inability to provide a basis for any kind of discursive account of 
how humans interact with materials.  
 
To counter accusations of naïve holism we can first look to other ecological 
accounts: We have already seen how other kinds of ecology have been useful in 
providing new approaches to understanding the distribution of cognition and the 
organisation of tasks (Hutchins, 1995; Sharrock & Anderson, 1993). Other authors 
have noted implicit ecological aspects to aesthetic experience of art or technology 
(Dewey, 2005 [1934]; McCarthy & Wright, 2004). Still others offer insight into the 
way that ecologies are brought together and regulate themselves, (Dewey, 1991 
[1927]; Bennet, 2010).   
 
What differentiates my account of ecologies from both accusations of ‘naïve 
holism’ and from the previous authors’ accounts is embodied in the integration of 
technical details of creative making-practice and the theoretical concerns 
described. Through the development of the five facets of materiality I have 
described specific ways in which various human and technological actors interact 
in ecologies of making. For instance, the description of the making process of 
Refractive Index above highlighted the combination of the specific understanding of 
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colour which I have developed through programming experience with the 
development of programmes for big screen hardware in the context of the aims of 
the project. I propose that is through exactly through this kind of rich detail that 
naïve generalities about ecologies can be avoided. 
6.6.2 User Centredness 
I have claimed that design methods based on interpretation and verbal discourse 
risk reifying a hylomorphic tendency. I have described the difficulty in ‘applying’ 
ideas in practice through materials, as a ‘square peg, round hole’ problem. The 
risk, though, is that a practice founded so strongly in materiality disregards the end-
users of designed technologies or audiences of artworks. I suggest though that 
experiential ecologies offer some counter to that risk. I have described how 
Dewey’s notion of “appreciation of consequences” (Dewey, 1991 [1927], p. 27) 
points to an understanding of ecological responsibility. It is an acknowledgment 
that making, as part of an ecology, when viewed as a ‘public’, has resonances to 
others. An engagement with historical practice, to some degree at least, provides 
clues for future work in approaching this problem.  
 
Perhaps though, it is at exactly the point at where such ‘clues for future work’ prove 
unreliable that an art and design practice such as the one described here can 
prove useful. I claimed, at the beginning of this thesis, that this practice was ‘for 
and with’ contemporary technology in that I use non-linear design technologies in 
the form of programming and electronics (with) in order to create critical objects 
positioned to query the role of technology (for) in our lives and the lives of others. It 
may be that the lack of user-centredness to this approach affords a particular kind 
of creative freedom, as McCarthy and Wright have suggested (2004, p. 42). 
Materiality and experiential ecologies are not posited as a one-size-fits-all solution 
to all design practices. They provide a solid foundation for embodying critical 
action. 
6.7 Future Work 
Over the preceding chapters I have approached materiality and ecologies from my 
perspective as an artist and designer. My professional experience has encouraged 
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me to pursue a particular kind of interaction with the world, that is, through making 
artefacts and I have tried to describe this practice openly and with an analysis that 
will provide insight for others. Through the research undertaken, I have 
encountered a number of benefits. The study of materiality has allowed me to be 
productive, to follow new lines of work and to connect what I do with other 
practices and theories. It has also changed my relationship with many everyday 
technological practices outside my work, for example in the way that I use my 
smartphone. It has made me feel a tighter sense of continuity between my life and 
work. The value it has had for me is in line with Dewey’s description of the 
mechanic who is ‘in tune’ with the engine on which he is working (2005 [1934], p. 
4). It is the sense of fulfilment which comes from a deep engagement in one’s 
practice. Part of the essence of this practice is to consider the way that one’s 
making enters an ecology of other things with which it interacts. It is therefore a 
design practice which attempts to go beyond the ‘next larger context’ (Greenfield, 
2006, p. 164).  
6.7.1 The Characteristic Work Being Done 
The practice-based research described in this thesis can be summarised as 
follows. A critically-engaged, creative making-practice has been described which 
takes techno-historical engagement with technology, nuanced by specific 
approaches to materiality, to produce artefacts of art and design which embody a 
critical response to contemporary technology. As has been repeated, they are for 
contemporary technology in contributing to an on-going understanding of what it 
can and should be, and with technology in the sense that they use technology in a 
flexible and creative way through programming, building and electronics. Over the 
next paragraphs I will describe some implications of this practice as it relates to the 
field of technological research and development more broadly, and position it 
briefly in comparison to other work with a view to possible future correspondences. 
6.7.2 The Future 
A question implicit in the claim that this practice is for technology is: To what 
degree are the specific implications from these works of art and design, ‘results’ for 
the development of technology, in industry for example?  For instance, in the case 
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of Null By Morse, is the final intention to feedback into the commercial design of 
smartphones, for instance by positioning the user experience in terms of “slow 
technology” (as in (Hallnäs & Redström, 2001))97. If so, by what mechanism is this 
feedback to occur? Are exhibition visitors expected to leave the show with their 
attitudes permanently altered towards the device in their pocket? Are the object, 
documentation and research papers intended to influence later works of design? 
 
I have argued consistently throughout this thesis that agential relationships are 
reliant on the state of the network in which they are situated. In this sense, I resist 
the inclination to describe the influence of this work as if it were based an abstract 
transmission of ideas. Its agency will be determined by the alliances that it finds 
with other congruent work and this will be achieved through particular material 
channels. Through the publication of research papers and their availability and 
visibility in search engines. Through the discussion of exhibition artworks in 
influential online blogs98 and through the usefulness of code resources which I 
have made available freely online {see Appendix 2}. With that caveat there are, 
however, a number of areas where I suggest a distinct application, described in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
Early in this thesis (1.3) I discussed how the research described was partially 
motivated by a comparison between my undergraduate and postgraduate 
education as an artist on one hand and my work within an interdisciplinary 
research lab on the other. A key criticism was that poor integration between taught 
theory and practice as well as a lack of developed discussion of research 
methodologies served students poorly in their development as artists. There are a 
                                            
97 I adopted this position here: (Schofield, Null by Morse: historical optical 
communication to smartphones, 2013). 
98 The inclusion of Neurotic Armageddon Indicator on the popular blog Creative 
Applications prompted 10000 views of the video documentation in less than a 
week. http://www.creativeapplications.net/objects/neurotic-armageddon-indicator-
nai-proximity-to-armageddon/. 
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number of areas in which the findings of this thesis could productively find a place 
in art pedagogy in undergraduate and postgraduate level. 
 
Becker (1984) describes how artists, particularly from the second half of the 20th 
Century, have situated their practices within a broader ecology (an art world) in 
which skills, materials, audiences and markets combine. Professional artists, often, 
are not only artists. They are educators, graphic designers, architects, illustrators, 
games designers, workshop leaders and youth development workers. Art 
practitioners work in different fields and their practice often adjusts to fit as they 
learn new skills and make a living. The creative work described in this thesis was 
produced, as I have stressed, within a variety of contexts strongly recalling those 
described by Becker. Some works were commissioned for galleries, some were 
submitted for academic conferences, some were the products of collaboration. The 
product of this was two-fold. Firstly, I acquired a diverse set of technical skills, 
necessary to produce the commissioned work and support collaborators. Secondly 
I gained a strong sense of how the variety of financial, technical, material and 
human factors formed an ecology around the work and this understanding 
supported both my creativity and my capacity to collaborate and work in different 
fields across art and design subsequently. I suggest that two interconnected 
factors afforded this crucial professional development and have implications for 
fine art pedagogy. First the focus on materials described by media-archaeological 
research methods strongly encourages the development of skills in response its 
findings. For instance, the focus on the technological history of the telegraph in 
Chapter 4 resulted in my learning to develop for mobile platforms and building 
various control circuits. These were not inevitable outcomes but the close focus on 
the material specificities of the technologies involved, heavily influenced this 
approach. Pedagogically therefore, the approach described here, is useful for 
confronting students with a set of technical and theoretical problems to solve. The 
engagement with, and resolution of, these supports their professional development 
in terms of acquiring new skills and competencies and also leads to my second 
point regarding their development as artists: that is the integration of theory and 
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practice. I strongly contend that the methods undertaken in the creative work 
described in this thesis provide a way of teaching combined theory and practice 
that is both adaptive to student needs and that actually helps students produce 
work rather than paralysing them as they try and fit theoretical square pegs into 
practical round holes. Many A-Level, foundation level and undergraduate 
programmes in Fine Art provide a component of art history intended to ground 
students’ understanding of their work within a historical context, helping them to 
understand what has come before, how it was inter-related and how it was 
contextualised by other historical events. Media archaeology does similar work for 
our techno-cultural heritage and by doing so supplements art historical study by 
helping students understand how their work is bound, through the development of 
shared tools, materials and skills to an extended set of creative and technical 
practices. 
 
In the introduction to this thesis I asserted that this work was intended for 
practitioners whose work is engaged with building, crafting, constructing, or 
sculpting conceived of as a contribution to knowledge irreducible to words, working 
across art and design. In these final remarks I will return to this point and describe 
implications for specific communities. In particular I will discuss the application of 
this work in future research within Critical Design, Interaction Design more 
generally, ethnographic approaches within HCI and within media art. 
 
There are many ways in which the research aims of the works described here 
could be described as ‘Critical Design’ as described by Anthony Dunne and Fiona 
Raby, (Dunne, 1999; Dunne & Raby, 2001; 2013). Critical design aims “to make us 
think. But also raising [sic] awareness, exposing assumptions, provoking action, 
sparking debate, even entertaining in an intellectual sort of way, like literature or 
film” (Dunne & Raby, 2013) with the purpose of subverting design culture. Dunne 
and Raby are insistent that proximity to everyday life, particularly in the form of 
designed products, distances Critical Design from art. I have avoided describing 
work in this thesis as Critical Design for this reason. The distinction made between 
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art and design by Dunne and Raby, I find to be both ahistorical and placing 
unfortunate demands on Critical Design itself (to generate a series of artificial 
distinctions between the two), a position also adopted by (Bardzell & Bardzell, 
2013). Following (Latour, 2004) I also question the productiveness of Dunne and 
Raby’s approach and ask what truths they expect to uncover behind our 
“assumptions” (Dunne & Raby, 2013). Critical Design as described in (Dunne & 
Raby, 2013) is ahistorical firstly because it implicitly ignores a generation of 1960s 
art practices which were concerned with exactly the combination of art and life (for 
instance as described in (Kaprow, 2003)), often using comparable techniques of 
satire, absurdity and provocation. The practice described here finds commonality 
with the aims of Critical Design described above but hopes to answer Bardzell and 
Bardzell (2013) by introducing the approaches described through this thesis to 
Critical Design methodology, emphasising material engagement and media 
archaeological enquiry. These latter, I argue are one thing which could be ‘critical’ 
about Critical Design. This thesis shares an interest with Critical Design in the role 
that made objects can play in articulating technological futures. It is, as I have said, 
for technology as well as with it. Bardzell and Bardzell (2013) articulate a critical 
vision for Critical Design which leans heavily on a critical tradition from the 
humanities and literature in particular, including influences from the Frankfurt 
School (p. 3298) and postmodernism (pp. 3301-3302). Their proposal, effectively, 
is to draw established critical strategies such as dialectics (p. 3301) from the 
humanities and apply them to design criticism. There is certainly valuable potential 
in this approach but with it comes a risk that the artefact becomes merely 
something to talk around, to be interpreted after the fact. If Critical Design has 
value, then its criticality must also be wound into the process of making, of 
designing. I propose that the framework of materiality articulated in this thesis 
could provide a useful counterpart to the literary criticality proposed by Bardzell 
and Bardzell (2013) by situating the design process in relation to other, older 
techniques, materials and theories in the specific and contingent circumstances of 
making creative work. As much as anything, the framework describes an 
   194 
orientation towards exploring this particular kind of situatedness and this, I suggest, 
represents a positive direction for Critical Design in the future. 
 
In Chapter Two I discussed an on-going interest in the Interaction Design and HCI 
communities into materiality and craft history (such as in (Robles & Wiberg, 2010); 
(Wiberg, 2013)). This thesis identifies with this orientation and attempts to nuance 
some of the approaches already adopted with a more rigorous conceptualisation of 
materiality itself according to the facets described. Although craft is of interest 
within Interaction Design, there is significant inconsistency regarding how the 
lessons we learn from it actually inform design practice. Zoran (2013) for instance 
is at pains to describe a lengthy engagement with the practices and traditions of 
Botswanan basket making, seeking to “demonstrate that tradition can be merged 
into a hybrid, contemporary ‘making’ practice that respects its double origins” 
(2013, p. 324). In this work however there is an unfortunate methodological 
separation between the designer’s initial anthropological work and the process of 
designing an artefact. The designs produced are to some degree formally sensitive 
to the Botswanan baskets but the process of their making - their ‘craft’ - owes little 
to the older of its two “origins”. My criticism of Zoran’s work99 is that his genuine 
engagement with the traditions of basket making in Botswana is not truly integrated 
into his designs except as an initial inspiration. His baskets are reflections of the 
formal qualities of craft, not an engagement with its practices and history. By 
contrast the framework introduced in this thesis offers a way of more tightly 
considering the relationship between traditional craft materials and contemporary 
technologies. For instance, applied to Zoran’s work, performative materiality would 
encourage a focus on the particular performative action of the palm leaves which 
are the primary basket-making material. One might enquire for instance how their 
properties of tensile strength, fibrousness or roughness afford particular kinds of 
relationships to be made with other materials. Continuing, one could examine how 
                                            
99 I in no way wish to denigrate the obvious creativity of Zoran’s work. His work 
makes significant steps towards integrating traditional craft and 3D printing. My 
criticism is that his methodology is not entirely consistent with his stated aims. 
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these properties have positioned the material with respect to their enduring use in 
Botswana and crucially, compare this to the 3D printing materials Zoran employs in 
his generative baskets. This brief example is intended to illustrate some of the 
ways that the material framework described here might facilitate a more genuine 
methodological relationship between contemporary computational technologies 
and traditional craft. In summary, materiality and the methods from media 
archaeology described give a way of experimenting with a wider range of cultural, 
historical and technical factors in the making of crafted objects. Crucially it 
promotes an experimental position, supported by a guiding framework, towards the 
agency and performance of made things, a position which, surely, is strongly 
compatible with the aims of Interaction Design. 
 
Earlier in this thesis I noted the comparison between the practice described here 
and the professional organisation of work described in early ethnographic studies 
of workplaces including air traffic control centres (Bentley, et al., 1992; 
Sommerville, Tom, Pete, & Bentley, 1992) and offices (Sharrock & Anderson, 
1993). Motivated by the significant contributions of this latter work into theorising 
our ecological relationship with technological environments, and the empirical 
(though not objective) orientation of this thesis, future work should more closely 
examine methods from this work and ask if, and how they might be adopted, 
adapted or transposed into the very different combination of making and research 
described here.  
 
Much discussion of media art in the context of HCI focuses on the experience of 
finished work. Lessons are drawn for public interaction e.g. (Reeves, Benford, 
O'Malley, & Fraser, 2005; Taylor, Schofield, Shearer, Wright, Boulanger, & Olivier, 
2014), for the experience of live events e.g. (Hook, McCarthy, Wright, & Olivier, 
2013) or, as discussed, for reflecting on visualisation (Jacobs, Benford, Selby, 
Golembewski, Price, & Giannachi, 2013). Despite this interest, there is 
comparatively little work which explores the process of art making to inform HCI 
rather than focusing solely on its products, perhaps because this is simply very 
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difficult to do, particularly in a way which is specific enough to be a genunie 
account of the process, but generalisable enough to be of use to others. There is 
however a clear interest in such processes as evinced by the frequent citation of 
Ingold’s (2007; 2013) work in HCI publications, e.g. by (Benford, 2010; Pink, et al., 
2013; Crivellaro, Comber, Bowers, Wright, & Olivier, 2014). As was discussed in 
relation to Critical Design, the framework of Materiality proposed here provides a 
way of analysing and describing making processes as well as guiding them. This 
thesis informs the production of media art work by providing some guiding 
principals. However, this also has the side effect of providing the kind of on-site 
analysis of the production of artwork which HCI has found productive in studying its 
outcomes. 
 
More generally, future work should examine the relationship of this research to 
other possible communities both in design and outside. Perhaps its chief value is in 
public engagement100, or as tools for advocacy as with some visualization work 
(such as Calvillo, 2008). The potential of the framework of five-facets of materiality 
should also be considered in the light of on-going and upcoming paradigms of 
technology. (Drucker, 2013) has already attempted to apply material thinking to 
interface design and a number of other areas immediately suggest themselves: 
The growing discussion around “digital personhood” (for instance in (Wallace, 
McCarthy, Wright, & Olivier, 2013)) for instance through its focus on our personal 
relationships to digital objects seems a relevant test ground for the approaches 
described here. Similarly the increasing realisation of the so-called “Internet of 
Things” (Atzori, Iera, & Morabito, 2010) from cultural technical vision (as in Weiser, 
1991; Weiser & Brown, 1996), to hobbyist appropriation (for instance in the many 
projects described on Instructables, 2014) to increasing commercialisation for 
instance with programmable lights (Phillips, 2014) and sockets (Belkin International 
                                            
100 As in the project Material Beliefs (Goldsmiths, 2013) wherein Critical Designers 
entered bio-science laboratories and used their design responses to engage 
publics via exhibitions. 
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Inc., 2014) could usefully be considered from an integrated materialist and 
ecological perspective. 
 
The work produced here is proposed as situated in dynamic ecologies. It is 
intended to play an active role in them not through intrinsic worth but through the 
things it does, through putting people in new listening relationships to their 
environment (The Quiet Walk), or remaking people’s smartphones as telegraph 
receiving devices (Null by Morse), through repurposing urban displays as re-
modellers of architectural space (Refractive Index), or damaging gallery walls as 
an extension of the material history of counting (Mark Inscriber). As I have said the 
definition of experiential ecologies has been arrived post-creation of these works. 
The process of making new works, contextualised by this idea, is for the future. 
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Chapter 8. Appendix 
Appendices 1: Documentation and 2: Git code repository may be found on the 
accompanying DVD. 
